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ABSTRACT
TOWARD AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE COGNITIVE ETIOLOGY OF
DEPRESSIVE REACTIONS TO LIFE STRESSORS:
AN EVALUATION OF THE HOPELESSNESS THEORY OF DEPRESSION
by
Nancy L. Asdigian
University of New Hampshire, December, 1993

Abramson, Metalsky, and Alloy's (1989) theory of hopelessness
depression Is the most recent model of depression to emerge from the
learned helplessness tradition (Seligman, 1975).

Hopelessness theory

describes an etiological pathway by which a unique subtype of
depression-* hopelessness depression-- is believed to emerge.
The most proximal cause of hopelessness depression is the formation
of a hopelessness expectancy.

Experiencing a significant life stressor

and either making stable and global causal attributions, anticipating
adverse consequences, or inferring derogratory self-attributes is
thought to contribute to hopelessness.

In turn, generalized tendencies

to make stable and global causal attributions, expect negative
consequences, or perceive personal deficiencies in response to life
stress purportedly increase the likelihood of making hopelessnessinducing inferences, and thus increase the risk of hopelessness and
depressive symptoms.
The present research sought to a.) provide a comprehensive
assessment of the proposed etiological pathway and b.) evaluate the
competing predictions made by the hopelessness model and its most
immediate theoretical precursor, the reformulated theory of learned
xviii

helplessness depression

(Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978).

In a

two-wave panel design, college undergraduates (N - 247) completed
measures assessing the constructs of both models.

Higher levels of

dysfunctional cognitive styles and event-based inferences predicted
increases in depressive symptoms only among subjects who experienced an
upsetting interpersonal stressor that was also perceived as
uncontrollable.

Little support was obtained for the hypothesis that

hopelessness mediates associations between depressive symptoms and
either maladaptive cognitive styles or event-inferences.
Consistent with the postulates of hopelessness theory,
dysfunctional cognition appeared to render individuals vulnerable to
depressive symptomatology in the face of life stress.

However, the

present findings call into question hopelessness theory's elimination of
control perceptions in its etiological pathway.

Continued study of the

control construct is encouraged as are future tests of hopelessness
theory that use more sophisticated assessments of life stress and fine
grained measures of hopelessness expectancies.

xix

INTRODUCTION

The cognitive approach to depression has emerged over the past
several decades as one of the leading paradigms guiding the study as
well as the treatment of depressive disorders (Gilbert, 1984).

Although

numerous theories of depression align themselves with such a
perspective, (e.g, Beck, 1967; Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979; Ellis,
1985; Seligman, 1975), the assumption that cognitive structures and
processes are Intimately involved In the etiology of depressive
illnesses lies at the heart of each theory.
A substantial amount of theoretical and empirical work on the
cognitive underpinnings of depression has been inspired by Seligman's
(1975) influential treatise on learned helplessness.

The most recent

model of depression to emerge from the learned helplessness tradition is
Abramson, Metalsky, and Alloy's (1989, 1988; Abramson, Alloy, &
Metalsky, 1988) hopelessness theory of depression.

Abramson et al.'s

(1989) model posits the existence of a unique subtype of unipolar
depression--hopelessness depression--and outlines an etiological pathway
by which the hypothesized depressive subtype Is believed to emerge.

A

comprehensive assessment of the causal pathway and etiological processes
specified by Abramson et al. has not yet been undertaken, although more
restricted tests of specific components of the hopelessness
model have been generally supportive (e.g., Alloy & Clements, 1992;
Metalsky, Abramson, Seligman, Semmel, & Peterson, 1982; Metalsky,
Halberstadt, & Abramson, 1987; Metalsky & Joiner, 1992; Metalsky,

1

Joiner, Hardin, & Abramson, 1993).

The present research was designed to

test the full causal model offered by Abramson et al, (1989) and to
evaluate the competing predictions made by hopelessness theory and its
theoretical forerunner, the reformulated theory of learned helplessness
depression (Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978).
The Nature and Prevalence of Depressive Disorders
Mood disorders represent a pervasive form of psychopathology,
afflicting up to 100 million people worldwide (Charney & Weismann,
1988).

Of the different types of mood disturbances, major depression is

one of the most prevalent.

More people suffer from a major depressive

disorder than all other psychiatric disturbances combined.

Using DSM-

III-R criteria (American Psychiatric Association; APA, 1987), major
depressive episodes are diagnosed in individuals who experience either
depressed mood or anhedonia for a period of 2 weeks or more.

The

presence of additional features such as unintentional weight changes
(i.e., weight loss or gain), sleep disturbances (i.e., insomnia or
hyposomnia), psychomotor retardation, feelings of guilt or
worthlessness, is also required for a diagnosis of major depression.
In their review of current epidemiological data, Charney and
Weissman (1988) reported that as many as 3.5% of U.S. citizens suffer a
major depressive episode during any six-month period.

Substantially

higher prevalence rates (i.e., 13-20%) have been observed for less
severe but clinically significant depressive symptomatology as well as
for major depression in some high risk groups (e.g., women).

Moreover,

up to 6.7% of the U.S. population has experienced an episode of major
depression sometime during their life and incidence rates of depressive

I
disorders have steadily increased during the last decade (cf. Seligman,
1990) .
Depression also tends to be either chronic or recurrent (APA, 1987;
Charney & Weismann, 1988).

With respect to the former, evidence

indicates that as many as one-quarter of major depressive episodes are
superimposed on dysthymic disturbances.

Dysthymia is a moderate but

chronic form of depression that persists for a large majority of
sufferers (roughly 60%) after more severe depressive episodes remit.
Additionally, 20% of major depressive episodes among individuals without
a history of dysthymia persist for intervals longer than two years.
With respect to recurrence, between 50% and 85% of individuals who
experience an episode of major depression will have at least one
subsequent episode in their lifetime.
In addition to the distress and functional impairment experienced
by those who suffer from it, depression takes its toll in numerous other
ways.

For example, of all individuals diagnosed with DSM-III-R

disorders, those with mood disorders represent the greatest portion of
mental health service users (Charney & Weissman, 1988).

Furthermore,

the children of depressed parents are two to three times more likely
than children of nondepressives to experience a range of pathological
disorders, especially depression.

The former are also at increased risk

for a variety of behavioral problems including school difficulties,
social skill deficits, and substance abuse (Charney & Wiessman, 1988;
see also Hammen, 1991)).
Finally, depression is responsible for a large majority of
attempted and completed suicides.

Weissman (1974) found that 80% of
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patients hospitialized for a suicide attempt received a diagnosis of
major depression.

Depressives are also more likely than other suicide-

prone individuals (e.g., those with borderline personality disorder) to
complete their suicide attempts (Boyer & Guthrie, 1986),
The Classification of Depressive Disorders
Psychopathologists have long regarded unipolar depression as a
heterogenous disorder with respect to both underlying etiology and
clinical manifestation (Depue & Monroe, 1978).

Researchers have made

significant advances in uncovering both biological and psychological
factors that contribute to the onset of depression (Shelton, Hollon,
Purdon, & Loosen, 1991).

In addition, numerous subtypes have been

proposed for both unipolar major depression (e.g., primary, secondary,
psychotic, neurotic, endogenous, reactive, familial pure depressive
disease, depression spectrum disease, sporadic depressive disease) and
dysthymic disorders (e.g., subaffective dysthymia; character spectrum
disorder) (Leber, Beckham, & Danker-Brown, 1985; Rush, 1986).
Unfortunately, the correspondence between etiology and depressive
subtypes has not been unequivocally established (Abramson et al., 1988a;
Leber et al., 1985; Rush, 1986).

For example, stressful life events are

believed to contribute to the onset of reactive depression whereas
endogenous depression is thought to arise independently of environmental
events.

Depressives falling in both diagnostic categories, however,

report stressful life events as precipitants of their symptoms (Rush,
1986).

Conversely, biological correlates believed to distinguish

endogenous depression have been observed in varying degrees in both
endogenous and reactive depressives (Leber et al., 1985).
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Furthermore,

psychopharmacological treatments for depression are effective in
individuals diagnosed with a variety of depressive disorders (Shelton et
al., 1991).
Largely because of the lack of conclusive etiological evidence,
DSM-III-R criteria for the differential diagnosis of depressive
disorders reflect only clinical data (i.e., variability in presenting
signs and symptoms and/or treatment response). The etiology of those
disorders is merely inferred (Leber et al., 1985; Millon, 1991; Rush,
1986).

For example, biological dysfunction is believed to underlie DSM-

III-R's category of melancholic depression.

The diagnosis of

melancholia, however, is based only on the presence of a variety of
vegetative symptoms (e.g., weight loss, insomnia) (APA, 1987).

As Rush

(1986, p. 9) aptly stated:
In our current state of knowledge, psychiatric syndromes are
nonspecific etiologically... In affective disorder the field is
replete with ideas, but no current model is specific enough for us
to understand fully the etiology or pathogenetic mechanisms in any
given case...In light of these problems, DSM-III diagnoses are
simply based on the apparent phenomenology (the particular signs
and symptoms) and do not imply a specific etiology.
An etiologically-based classification system for depressive
disorders would represent a significant advance over our current
understanding of the illness of depression.

An etiological (rather than

descriptive) approach to the identification of depression subtypes would
also be of great value to clinicians in choosing appropriate treatment
regimens.

A model of depression, based on such an approach, has

recently been offered by Abramson et al. (1989).

Abramson and

colleagues proposed that hopelessness depression is an etiologically
distinct subtype of depression.

According to the model, a series of
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events, occurring in a causal chain, contributes to the development of a
hopelessness expectancy.

Hopelessness is characterized by the

expectation that undesirable events are likely to occur in the future
and that there is nothing one can do to prevent the occurrence of those
events.

This hopelessness expectancy is regarded by Abramson et al. as

a necessary and sufficient cause of a unique constellation of symptoms
with a distinct clinical course and specific treatment implications
(i.e., hopelessness depression).
Evolution of the Hopelessness Theory of Depression: Learned Helplessness
Theory
Abramson et al.'s (1989) hopelessness model of depression traces
its roots to observations made by Seligman and colleagues (e.g.,
Overmier, 1968, Overmier & Seligman, 1967, Seligman & Maier, 1967) over
two decades ago.

Seligman and others demonstrated in numerous

experimental investigations that organisms exhibit striking behavioral
deficits after exposure to uncontrollable events.

In a prototypical

experiment, Seligman and Maier (1967) initially exposed mongrel dogs to
a series of either escapable or inescapable electric shocks. In the
former condition, each shock presentation could be terminated if the
dogs made a prespecified panel-press response.

In the latter condition,

however, no response was effective in terminating the shock.

Thus, for

dogs in this inescapable-shock condition, the shock presentations were
uncontrollable (i.e., the probability of shock offset given a response
was equal to the probability of shock offset given no response). A no
shock control group was also used in this initial, training phase of the
experiment.
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In a subsequent testing phase, the experimental dogs were placed
in a shuttle-box and again exposed to a series of electric shocks.

This

time, however, all of the dogs could terminate the shocks by hurdling a
barrier that separated the two compartments of the shuttle-box.

Dogs in

the no-shock control and escapable-shock training conditions quickly
learned to hurdle the barrier and escape the shock.

In marked contrast,

the dogs previously exposed to inescapable shocks exhibited extreme
deficits in escape responding.

For example, Seligman and Maier (1967)

reported that 75% of the dogs in the latter group failed to hurdle the
barrier on nine or more of the 10 test trials and took almost twice as
long as the other dogs to hurdle the barrier when escape was attempted.
Moreover, the dogs initially exposed to inescapable shock responded
maladaptively in the testing phase.

They became passive and immobile

during shock presentations, lying in the corner of the shuttle box while
the shocks were being delivered.

They even failed to escape the shock

after one or two trials in which hurdling the barrier successfully
terminated the shock.
Observations such as those described above led to the development
of learned helplessness theory (Seligman, 1975; Maier & Seligman, 1976).
According to the theory, organisms are capable of integrating
contingencies for responding and contingencies for not responding.

That

is, organisms can simultaneously represent the probability of outcome
occurrence given a response and the probability of outcome occurrence
given no response.

As such, they are able to detect instances in which

outcomes are as likely to occur when a response is emitted as when a
response is not emitted (i.e., response noncontingency).
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Seligman

(1975) believed that when organisms perceive outcomes as responsenoncontingent they develop an expectation that future outcomes will also
occur independently of their responses.

He further proposed that this

expectation of future response-outcome independence is the "causal
condition" (p. 48) for a state of learned helplessness.

The latter is

characterized by a failure to initiate voluntary responses in an attempt
to control future outcomes that truly are controllable (motivational
deficit), difficulty perceiving response-outcome contingencies that do
exist, (cognitive deficit), and depressed mood (affective deficit)
In explaining the emergence of the motivational deficit among
organisms exposed to uncontrollability, Seligman (1975) argued that
organisms remain passive in the absence of an incentive to do otherwise.
The incentive that underlies voluntary behavior, according to Seligman,
is the expectation that such behavior will increase the likelihood of
desired outcomes (e.g., obtaining food, terminating shock).

Thus, by

eliminating the expectation that outcomes are contingent upon responses,
experience with uncontrollability eliminates the incentive to behave and
produces response deficits.

Seligman (1975, p. 50) summarized his

reasoning by stating that: "For voluntary responding to occur, an
incentive must be present in the form of an expectation that responding
may succeed.

In the absence of such an expectation, that is, when an

organism believes responding is futile, voluntary responding will not
occur."
Viewed through learned helplessness theory, the extreme passivity
of the dogs in Seligman and Maier's (1967) inescapable-shock condition
becomes more understandable.

According to the theory, these dogs
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learned during the training phase of the experiment that shock offset
was response-noncontingent; it occurred independently of their behavior.
When presented in the shuttle-box, the dogs expected that shock would
again be uncontrollable and therefore made no attempt to either avoid or
terminate it.

Now devoid of any incentive to attempt escape, the dogs

sat passively in the shuttle-box and accepted the shock.
In addition to motivational impairments, Seligman (1975) suggested
that helpless organisms suffer cognitive deficits.

The cognitive

component of helplessness manifests itself as difficulty detecting
contingencies that do exist between responses and outcomes.

That is,

organisms who expect outcomes to be response-noncontingent have
difficulty learning that some outcomes are indeed controllable.
Seligman accounted for the emergence of this cognitive deficit using the
notion of proactive interference.

Proactive interference refers to

instances in which information learned at one point in time inhibits the
acquisition of contradictory information at a later point in time.

In

the context of helplessness, the representation of response-outcome
independence simply Interferes with the representation of responseoutcome dependence. That is, once organisms learn that outcomes are
uncontrollable, their ability to learn the converse--that outcomes can
be controlled--is impaired.
Seligman's (1975) insight into the cognitive component of
helplessness sheds additional light on the seemingly inexplicable
behavior exhibited by the dogs who received inescapable shock in the
training phase of Seligman and Maier's (1967) investigation. Recall that
in the testing phase of that experiment, some of the dogs previously
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exposed to inescapable shock hurdled the shuttle-box barrier and
successfully escaped the shock on several initial trials.

Unlike the

dogs in the escapable- and no-shock training conditions, however, the
former did not continue to hurdle the barrier to escape the shock even
though that response was effective in terminating the shock.

For those

dogs, the expectation of response-outcome noncontingency superseded the
experience of shock offset upon hurdling the barrier and the contingency
went unlearned.

In reference to this observation, Seligman (1975, p,

51) noted that:
When [a dog who initially receives inescapable shock] goes to the
shuttle box and jumps the barrier, in reality causing shock
termination, the dog has trouble learning this. This is because .
. . he still expects that shock will be just as likely to go off if
he fails to jump the barrier. Such a dog will revert to taking
shock passively even after he makes one or two successful jumps.
In contrast, a naive dog has no interfering expectation that shock
termination is independent of responding, so one jump over the
barrier resulting in shock termination is sufficient for him to
catch on.
Finally, Seligman (1975) conceived of learned helplessness as
having an affective component.

More specifically, he believed organisms

experience a state of depression upon learning that important outcomes
are uncontrollable.

According to Seligman, the initial emotional

response to an aversive event is fear.

When confronted with such an

event, organisms will attempt to exert control over the event in order
to reduce the ensuing trauma.

If the event can be brought under

control, the fear response dissipates and is replaced by effective
responding.

If, on the other hand, the aversive event can not be

brought under the organism's control, the initial fear reaction, because
it is effortful and no longer useful, gives way to depression.
Although Seligman (1975) believed that uncontrollable trauma
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produced depression, he suggested that depressive reactions could also
arise from uncontrollable events that were positive in valence.
Seligman based this speculation on his belief that positive affect does
not emerge from reinforcement per se, but from effective responding or
mastery over the environment. Thus, receiving "free" reinforcement was,
according to Seligman, sufficient to engender depression.

He states,

for example:
I suggest that what produces self-esteem and a sense of competence,
and protects against depression, is not only the absolute quality
of experience, but the perception that one's own actions controlled
the experience. To the degree that uncontrollable events occur,
either traumatic or positive, depression will be predisposed and
ego strength undermined. To the degree that controllable events
occur, a sense of mastery and resistance to depression will result
(P. 99).
This, then, is the model that Seligman (1975) developed to account
for the behavior exhibited by organisms exposed to uncontrollable
outcomes.

Experience with response-noncontingent outcomes fosters an

expectation of uncontrollability and the latter brings about deficits in
motivation, contingency learning, and affect.
Although Seligman's (1975) formulation of learned helplessness was
derived from experimental observations of nonhuman animals, researchers
were quick to evaluate the theory's ability to predict human responses
to uncontrollability. For example, Hiroto and Seligman (1975) exposed
college students to aversive tones that were either controllable or
uncontrollable, or to discrimination tasks that were either soluble or
insoluble.

Half of the subjects in each of these four training

conditions were subsequently exposed to aversive tones that could be
terminated (or avoided) by moving a manipulandum to the opposite side of
a hand shuttle-box.

The remaining subjects in each training condition
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were asked to solve (soluble) anagrams.
As would be predicted from learned helplessness theory, Hiroto and
Seligman (1975) found that subjects who were initially exposed to
uncontrollable outcomes performed worse on the test-phase tasks relative
to subjects who initially received controllable outcomes.

The former

solved fewer anagrams and successfully escaped aversive tones on fewer
trials than did their counterparts in the controllable training
conditions.

When they were successful in either solving test-phase

anagrams or terminating the aversive tone, subjects in the two
uncontrollable training conditions took longer to do so than did
subjects in either controllable training condition.

Furthermore,

performance deficits were not affected by the degree of correspondence
between training- and test-phase tasks.

For example, subjects who were

initially exposed to an insoluble discrimination task performed just as
poorly on the noise-escape test task as they did on the anagram test
task.

This finding, as well as similar results observed among nonhuman

animals (e.g., Altenor, Kay, & Richter, 1977; Braud, Wepman, & Russo,
1969; Rosellini & Seligman, 1975), lends support to the suggestion that
helplessness expectations generalize to, and produce deficits when
dealing with a range of outcomes.
In an analogous investigation, Thornton and Jacobs (1971) first
exposed college students to either escapable or inescapable electric
shocks and then assessed shock-avoidance/escape responding.

The

students who first received inescapable shocks failed to either avoid or
escape shock on more test trials than did their counterparts who
initially experienced escapable shock.
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Indeed, a full 65% of the

subjects in the former condition failed to make even one escape response
across 10 test trials. Moreover, 60% of the subjects in the inescapable shock condition spontaneously stated in post-experimental interviews
that they did not attempt to avoid or escape shock on the test trials
because they felt as if they had no control over the shocks and
therefore expected responding to be futile.
Noting similarities in symptomatology, etiology, cure, and
prevention, Seligman (1975) applied his learned helplessness model to
human depression, suggesting that experimentally-induced helplessness is
analogous to naturally occurring human depressions.

With respect to

symptoms, Seligman pointed out that both human depressives and organisms
exposed to uncontrollability suffer motivational/motoric impairments.
Like helpless organisms who remain passive and immobile instead of
initiating responses that could effectively control important outcomes,
depressives tend not to engage in even the most effortless activities
and are much slower in the behaviors that they do perform.
Seligman additionally argued that depressives exhibit the same
types of cognitive deficits that characterize helpless organisms.

That

is, depressives expect their behavior to be ineffective in altering
important outcomes.

Moreover, the results of an experiment conducted by

Miller and Seligman (1973, cited in Seligman, 1975) suggest that these
expectancies are resistant to change in the face of contrary evidence
(i.e., experience with response-outcome contingency).

Miller and

Seligman examined changes in success expectancies among depressed and
nondepressed subjects as they worked on tasks involving either skilldetermined or chance-determined outcomes.
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When asked to estimate the

likelihood of success on successive trials, expectancy changes as a
function of previous task performance were larger among nondepressed
subjects who worked on skill tasks than among nondepressed subjects who
worked on tasks of chance.

Specifically, nondepressives lowered their

success expectancies more after experiencing failure on a skill task
than after experiencing failure on a chance task.

They likewise

increased their success expectancies more after success on the skill
task than after success on the chance task.
Among depressed subjects, however, previous performance had as
little impact on success expectancies for the skill task as it did on
success expectancies for the chance task.

That is, depressed subjects

in the skill-task condition were no more likely to alter their success
expectancies in response to past successes and failures than were
depressed subjects in the chance-task condition.

Whereas nondepressives

appropriately perceived the skill and chance components of the
respective tasks, depressed subjects apparently perceived their
performance on both types of tasks as chance-determined.

In other

words, depressives failed to see the relation between their behavior and
their task performance when working on the skill task.
Interestingly, Miller and Seligman (1974, cited in Seligman, 1975)
found that the pattern of expectancy changes exhibited by nondepressed
subjects exposed to inescapable noise paralleled that exhibited by the
untreated depressives described above.

In contrast, nondepressives

exposed to either escapable or no noise behaved like the untreated
nondepressives described above.

In discussing the implications of the

latter findings, Seligman (1975, p. 87) suggested that "These results
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show experimentally that both depression as found in the real world and
helplessness induced by uncontrollable events result in a negative
cognitive set, the belief that success and failure are independent of
one's efforts."
A subsequent investigation by Miller and Seligman (1975)
demonstrated that laboratory-induced helplessness and naturally
occurring depression converge not only with respect to cognitive
deficits but also in regard to affective symptoms.

In this study,

depressed and nondepressed subjects were assigned to either an
inescapable-noise, escapable-noise, or no-noise training condition.
Subjects were then presented with a series of anagrams, all of which
were scrambled according to the same pattern, and asked to solve each
anagram within 100 seconds.

Post-training performance on the anagrams

task was indexed by average latency to solution, number of anagrams left
unsolved after 100 seconds, number of trials required for learning the
anagram pattern (with the latter defined as the point at which solutions
are reached within 15 seconds), and number of anagrams successfully
solved before learning the anagram pattern.

Finally, Miller and

Seligman assessed levels of pre- to post-training change in depressed
mood among subjects in each training condition.
Consistent with previous demonstrations of the helplessness
phenomena, Miller and Seligman (1975) found that nondepressed subjects
who received inescapable-noise performed worse than nondepressed
subjects in the escapable- and no-noise conditions on all performance
measures.

More importantly, however, Miller and Seligman demonstrated

that untreated (i.e., no-noise control group) depressives also exhibited
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a greater degree of impairment on all performance measures than did
nondepressed subjects in the escapable- and no-noise training
conditions.

Untreated depressives performed just as poorly on the

anagrams task as did nondepressives pretreated with inescapable noise.
The effects of inescapable noise were not, however, limited to
performance deficits on the anagrams task.

Among initially nondepressed

subjects, exposure to inescapable noise resulted in larger increases in
post-training levels of depressed mood than did exposure to escapable or
no noise.

Although post-training anxiety and hostility levels also

increased among nondepressives exposed to inescapable-noise, they did so
to a lesser extent than depressed mood.

Among initially depressed

subjects, however, exposure to inescapable noise had no such effect on
post-treatment changes in levels of depressed mood.

Finally, subjects'

self-reported depression levels were highly positively correlated with
the degree of task impairment on the four performance measures (rs
ranged from .69 to .86).

Taken together, the results of Miller and

Seligman's research program provide evidence of substantial overlap
between naturally occurring depression and laboratory-based
helplessness.
Guided by his laboratory observations, Seligman (1975) advanced a
theory of human reactive depression in which experience with
uncontrollability served a central etiological role.

According to

Seligman's learned helplessness model of depression, individuals become
depressed when they learn that important outcomes, either positive or
negative in valence, are noncontingently related to their actions.
Seligman believed that such experience with response-outcome
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noncontingency gives rise to an expectation that future outcomes will
also be uncontrollable.

The syndrome of depression, he argued, is the

result of this future uncontrollability expectation, and consists of the
motivational, cognitive, and affective deficits characterizing the state
of learned helplessness (see Figure 1).

The motivational deficit

manifests itself in human depression as psychomotor retardation as well
as cognitive and social dullness; the cognitive deficit manifests itself
as a "negative cognitive set," the depressive's belief that all actions
are futile (e.g., "nothing I do matters"); and the affective deficit is
expressed as sad or depressed mood.
Attributional Reformulation of Learned Helplessness Theory
Shortly after its development, researchers began to recognize that
Seligman's (1975) theory of learned helplessness was unable to
adequately account for the course and characteristics of helplessness
deficits.

Instances in which organisms failed to become helpless after

exposure to uncontrollability were attributed post hoc to previous (but
unknown) experiences with control that served to immunize those
organisms from helplessness (Abramson et al., 1978; Seligman, 1975,
1991).

Furthermore, the original theory had difficulty explaining

individual differences in the nature of helplessness deficits that did
occur following experience with response-noncontingent outcomes.
To remedy these explanatory problems, an attributional
reformulation of the learned helplessness model was proposed by Abramson
et al. (1978).

The reformulation allowed researchers to predict, a

priori, 1.) under what conditions exposure to uncontrollable outcomes
would give rise to an expectation of future outcome uncontrollability
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Figure 1. Learned Helplessness Model of Depression
(Adapted from Seligman. 1975^

Exposure to Uncontrollable Outcomes

Expectation of Future Outcome
Uncontrollability

Depressive Symptomatology

Motivational
Deficit
(Failure to
exert control
over potentially
controllable
outcomes)

Cognitive
Deficit
(Negative Cognitive
Set; "Nothing I do
matters")
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Affective
Deficit
(Sad/depressed
mood)

(and thus to learned helplessness deficits), 2.) whether the future
uncontrollability expectancy would be relatively short-lived or
relatively long-lasting, 3.) whether the future uncontrollability
expectancy would remain specific to the outcome experienced as
uncontrollable or generalize to a variety of other outcomes, and 4.)
whether lowered self-esteem would accompany the other helplessness
deficits.

In addition, a revised theory of human depression, based on

the attributional reformulation of learned helplessness theory, was
advanced.
As in the original learned helplessness theory, Abramson et al.
(1978) maintained that an expectation of future uncontrollability
directly precipitates the motivational, cognitive, and affective
helplessness deficits.

In contrast to Seligman's (1975) suggestion,

however, perceived response-outcome noncontingency was no longer
regarded as a sufficient condition for the development of this future
uncontrollability expectation.

According to the reformulation, the

perception of response-outcome noncontingency motivates an attributional
search whereby individuals attempt to determine the cause of the
uncontrollability.

It is the causal attributions that individuals make

for uncontrollable outcomes, not the outcomes themselves, that lead to
the future uncontrollability expectation.

Specifically, the

reformulation suggested that individuals develop future
uncontrollability expectations only when they attribute responsenoncontingent outcomes to causes that are internal (something about
themselves), stable (long-lasting), and global (affecting many other
outcomes).

When response-noncontingent outcomes are attributed to

19

external (something about others or the environment), unstable (short
lived) , and specific (affecting only a narrow range of outcomes) causes,
expectations of future uncontrollability, and consequent learned
helplessness deficits are not predicted to arise (see Figure 2).
The reformulated theory also suggested that the temporal and
situational parameters of the future uncontrollability expectation, as
well as the occurrence of self-esteem deficits, could be accounted for
by the nature of the causal attributions made for uncontrollable
outcomes.1 Abramson et al. (1978) hypothesized that three orthogonal
dimensions of causal attributions--internal/ external, stable/unstable,
and global/specific--influence the future uncontrollability expectation
and thus, the nature of helplessness deficits.
The internal-external dimension reflects the extent to which the
causes of response-noncontingent outcomes are believed to reflect
something about the self or something about the environment,
respectively.

Internal causes for failing an academic task despite

studying might include low academic ability or poor study habits.
External causes for the same outcome might include the difficulty of the
task and poor academic instruction.

According to Abramson et al.

(1978), attributing uncontrollable negative outcomes to internal causes
results in a state of personal helplessness.

Personally helpless

individuals expect that they will be unable to control the future
occurrence of negative events but believe that others possess the
responses that can control those events.

For example, a student who

believes that her academic failure was caused by low ability might
expect that she will be unable to attain future academic success but
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Figure 2. Reformulated Learned Helplessness Model of Depression
Abramson. Seligman. & Teasdale ('1978')
Depressive
Attributional
Style

Exposure to Uncontrollable Negative Outcomes

Outcomes Attributed to
External, Unstable, &
Specific Causes

Outcomes Attributed to
Internal, Stable, &
Global Causes

Expectation of Future Outcome
Uncontrollability

Negative Outcome Expectancy

J

Depressive Symptomatology

Motivational
Deficit

Cognitive
Deficit

Effective
Deficit

Unique Roles Assigned To Attributional Dimensions

1. Intemalitv

-> Self esteem loss will accompany motivational,
cognitive, and affective deficits

2. Stability

-> Chronicity of future uncontrollability
expectation and thus duration of depressive
symptoms

3. Globalitv

-> Generality of future uncontrollability
expectation (i.e., range of outcomes over which a
lack of control is expected) and thus pervasiveness
of depressive symptoms
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that her fellow classmates will be able to do so.
Individuals who attribute noncontingency to external causes, on
the other hand, are believed to experience a state of universal
helplessness characterized by the expectation that neither they nor
similar others are able to control the occurrence of future negative
outcomes.

A student who believes that her academic failure was caused

by poor instruction might expect that both she and her fellow classmates
will be unable to succeed on future academic tasks in the same class.
Given that the expectation of future uncontrollability is present
among personally and universally helpless individuals, both are
predicted to experience the motivational and cognitive deficits of
learned helplessness.

Because they believe that the causes of aversive

uncontrollability reflect something about themselves, however, only
personally helpless individuals should experience self-esteem loss in
addition to the other deficits. According to the reformulation, then,
both the personally helpless and universally helpless students mentioned
above might stop trying to control future academic outcomes
(motivational deficit) and erroneously perceive a lack of control over
other academic outcomes (cognitive deficit). Only the personally
helpless student, however, should experience lowered self-esteem in
response to the noncontingent academic outcome.
The stable-unstable attributional dimension represents the extent
to which causes are perceived, respectively, as enduring or transitory.
Stable attributions for the uncontrollable academic outcome mentioned
above might include low aptitude for that academic subject or chronic
unfairness on the part of the instructor.
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Unstable attributions might

include a temporary illness or an unusually heavy work load.

According

to the reformulation, the temporal persistence or chronicity of future
uncontrollability expectations is dependent on the perceived stability
of the causes attributed to uncontrollable negative outcomes.
Expectations of future noncontingency (and the resulting
helplessness deficits) are believed to persist for an extended period of
time when uncontrollable outcomes are attributed to stable causes, but
to be short-lived when outcomes are attributed to unstable causes.

When

a student attributes an uncontrollable academic outcome to a stable
cause such as low aptitude, it suggests that she will also be unable to
control similar academic outcomes that occur well into the future.

That

student should thus remain helpless as long as she expects those
outcomes to be uncontrollable.

On the other hand, a student who

attributes an uncontrollable academic outcome to an unstable cause
should not expect that cause to render similar outcomes uncontrollable
long into the future.

The future uncontrollability expectation, and

resulting helplessness deficits should thus dissipate quickly.
The third dimension of causal attributions discussed by Abramson
et al. (1978) is the global-specific dimension.

Global causes are those

that affect a wide variety of outcomes whereas specific causes affect
only a limited array of outcomes.

Continuing with the example of

academic failure, global causes might include low general intelligence
or incompetent faculty at a particular institution.

An inability to

understand the particular academic task or the instructor's inability to
explain the concepts relevant to that particular task reflect specific
causes.

23

According to the reformulated theory, the perceived globality of
causes influences the generality of helplessness deficits or the range
of outcomes over which an individual expects to lack future control.

A

student who attributes an uncontrollable negative outcome to a global
cause might come to expect that the many outcomes affected by that cause
will also be uncontrollable in the future.

The helplessness deficits

exhibited by that student should thus be highly generalized and manifest
themselves in a wide variety of situations.

For example, a global cause

such as low general intelligence might be expected to adversely affect a
variety of outcomes including one's performance in many different
academic subjects or one's occupational success.

A student who makes

such an attribution after experiencing an uncontrollable academic
failure might then become helpless in her other classes and/or give up
the lofty career goals to which she once aspired.
Unlike global attributions, specific causes render only a limited
array of outcomes uncontrollable.

Being unable to understand a

particular task or concept, for example, has little relevance to tasks
requiring other skills. An individual who makes such an attribution
might expect to lack control over only future tasks requiring the
unattainable skill.

That individual should not, however, expect other

unrelated outcomes to also be uncontrollable.
The reformulation also made predictions about the severity of
helplessness deficits and the extent of self-esteem loss among
personally helpless individuals.

Abramson et al. (1978) suggested that

the motivational and cognitive deficits of helplessness increase in
severity as the expectation of future uncontrollability increases in
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certainty.

The severity of affective deficits and the intensity of

self-esteem loss was hypothesized to be a function of both the certainty
of the future uncontrollability expectation and the importance of the
outcome over which a lack of control is expected.

Individuals who are

highly certain that an outcome will be uncontrollable should thus
exhibit more extreme passivity and impairment in learning when outcomes
truly are controllable.

When that certainty concerns a highly important

outcome (e.g., the ability to obtain a desired job), the Intensity of
depressive affect and magnitude of self-esteem loss (if an internal
causal attribution is made) should also increase.
To reiterate, the reformulated theory is an attributional model of
learned helplessness that makes specific predictions about the
occurrence and nature of helplessness deficits arising from perceived
noncontingency.

According to the reformulation, self-esteem loss

accompanies helplessness deficits only among personally helpless
individuals who attribute noncontingency to internal causes.

The

chronicity and generality of helplessness deficits are influenced,
respectively, by the perceived stability and globality of the causes of
noncontingent outcomes.

Finally, the strength of the future

uncontrollability expectation and the importance of the outcorae(s)
expected to be uncontrollable influence the intensity of helplessness
deficits.
The developers of the reformulated model also addressed the
important question of when noncontingent outcomes are likely to be
attributed to internal, stable, and/or global causes.

They suggested

that both "bottom-up" and "top-down" processes influence beliefs about
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the causes of uncontrollable outcomes.

With respect to the former,

Abramson et al. (1978) followed the lead of other attribution theorists
(e.g., Kelley, 1967) in noting that causal attributions for specific
outcomes are often derived from situational information (e.g., the
nature of the outcome, the contexts in which it occurs, whether others
also experience it).

For example, a student who continually fails exams

that the majority of her classmates pass is likely to make an internal
attribution for those failures.

But Abramson et al. also speculated

that causes might be attributed to outcomes in a "top-down" fashion.
That is, people's generalized styles of attributing causality to
outcomes might shape their perceptions of the causes of specific
outcomes.

Abramson et al. further proposed that some people possess a

"depressogenic attributional style," or a general tendency to attribute
a wide variety of negative outcomes to internal, stable, and global
causes.

Individuals who possess this depressogenic attributional style

are thought to be prone to helplessness deficits and depressive
reactions when noncontingent negative outcomes occur.
Abramson et al. (1978) also revised Seligman's (1975) original
helplessness model of human depression.

According to the reformulated

theory, "helplessness depression" is a subtype of depression comprised
of motivational, cognitive, affective, and self-esteem deficits.

In

contrast to Seligman's (1975) proposal that each of these deficits
follow directly from the expectation of future uncontrollability,
Abramson et al. hypothesized that the affective deficits of depression
arise only when the expectancy of future uncontrollability co-occurs
with a negative outcome expectancy.

That is, people experience sadness
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or depressed mood only when they anticipate either being unable to bring
about highly desired outcomes or being unable to prevent the occurrence
of highly undesired outcomes.

Passivity and a negative cognitive set,

however, arise when future outcomes of any valence are perceived as
uncontrollable.
Abramson et al. (1978) also noted that the original helplessness
model of depression could not explain the low self-esteem frequently
observed among depressives, nor could it account for variability in the
time course or generality of depressive symptoms.

In line with their

attributional reformulation of learned helplessness, Abramson et al.
suggested self-derogation and low self-worth should be exhibited by
depressives who attribute their helplessness to internal causes.
Likewise, variability in the duration and generality of depressive
symptoms was accounted for by individual differences in the perceived
stability and globality of the causes of one's helplessness,
respectively.
Abramson et al.'s (1978) reformulated model of helplessness
depression thus restricted the affective component of human depression
to expectations regarding the uncontrollable occurrence of negative
outcomes (or nonoccurrence of positive outcomes), provided an account of
the depressive's low self-esteem, and explained individual differences
in the chronicity and generality of depressive symptomatology.

Finally,

it is important also to note that the reformulation regarded a
negativistic attributional style as a vulnerability factor for
depression.

Abramson et al. suggested that people who generally

attribute negative outcomes to internal, stable, and global causes

possess a "depressive personality," and are thus vulnerable to
depressive reactions in response to uncontrollable stressors (see also
Abramson et al., 1989; Metalsky et al., 1982).
Hopelessness Theory: A Revision and Extension of the Attributional
Reformulation of Helplessness Depression
Since its appearance in the literature, the reformulated model of
helplessness depression has been the subject of an extraordinary amount
of research, not all of which has been supportive (for reviews see
Brewin, 1985; Coyne & Gotlib, 1983; Peterson, Villanova, & Raps, 1985;
Robins, 1988; Sweeney, Anderson, & Bailey, 1986).

In light of the

accumulating evidence, and in response to various critiques of the
reformulated model, Abramson et al. (1989) recently revised and extended
their 1978 statement of the model.

Abramson et al. refer to this

revision as the hopelessness theory of depression.

The fundamental

postulate of hopelessness theory is that "hopelessness depression"
represents a subtype of depression that is distinguished primarily by
its etiology, but which is also unique in symptomatology, clinical
course, and treatment/ prevention implications.
With respect to its etiology, Abramson et al. (1989) proposed that
the formation of a hopelessness expectancy is the most proximal cause of
the symptoms of hopelessness depression.

The hopelessness expectancy is

comprised of two necessary components; a negative outcome expectancy and
a helplessness expectancy.

The former refers to the belief that either

highly undesired outcomes are likely to occur In the future or that
highly desired outcomes are unlikely to occur.

The latter reflects the

belief that the occurrence of those outcomes can not be controlled.
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In

essence, people feel hopeless when they expect their futures to be bleak
and believe that there is nothing they can do to change that pessimistic
forecast.
The formal theoretical status of the hopelessness expectancy is
that of a necessary and sufficient proximal cause of
depression.

hopelessness

It is a sufficient cause because, according to the model,

the presence of a hopelessness expectancy guarantees the onset of
depressive symptoms.

A hopelessness expectancy is a necessary cause of

hopelessness depression because it defines that subtype of depression.
Of course, Abramson et al. do not suggest that hopelessness is a
necessary cause of all depressive disorders or symptoms.

Finally,

hopelessness is conceived as a proximal cause because its occurrence
directly precedes the onset of depressive symptoms.
In addition to specifying hopelessness as the proximal cause of
depressive symptoms, Abramson et al. (1989) outlined an etiological
pathway by which hopelessness expectancies are believed to develop (see
Figure 3).

That causal pathway describes a series of sequentially

occurring events, each of which contributes to, but is neither necessary
nor sufficient for the formation of helplessness expectancies.

The

events along the proposed causal chain are therefore formally regarded
as contributory causes of hopelessness depression.
The causal sequence leading up to the hopelessness expectancy is
initiated by the perceived occurrence of one or more negative or
stressful life events.

As mentioned above, negative life events are

contributory causes and are not by themselves sufficient for a
hopelessness expectancy to occur.

According to the hopelessness model,
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Figure 3. Causal chain Specified In the Hopelessness Model of Depression
(Adapted from Abramson. Metalskv. and Alloy (1989^
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depressogenic inferences drawn from negative life events moderate the
relation between those events and hopelessness.

Whether the occurrence

of a stressful event results in a hopelessness expectancy depends on the
inferences an individual draws about: 1.) the cause of the event, 2.)
the consequences resulting from the event, or 3.) the characteristics of
the self given the event's occurrence.

Note that in contrast to the

reformulated model, the depressogenic inferences specified In
hopelessness theory include, but are no longer limited to, causal
attributions.
Although causal attributions are not accorded exclusive status,
Abramson et al. (1989) do suggest that attributing negative events to
stable and global causes can give rise to hopelessness expectancies.
Hopelessness theory further speculates that stable and global
attributions for negative events contribute to hopelessness expectancies
only when those events are regarded as important.

Finally, internal

attributions for negative events play no role in the development of
hopelessness expectancies according to the current model.
Abramson et al. (1989) suggest that regardless of how causality is
attributed to negative events, people might also become hopeless if they
expect those events to bring about a variety of undesired consequences.
Thus an individual might believe that she performed poorly on an
important job assignment because of inadequate preparation (an unstable
and specific causal attribution), but still become hopeless if the poor
performance is expected to undermine her ability to secure a desired
promotion.

In addition, hopelessness is thought to be more likely to

occur when the expected negative consequences are regarded as highly
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important, unchangeable, and as affecting many aspects of one's life.
The final moderating variable included in the hopelessness model
concerns the inferences an individual draws about herself upon
experiencing a negative life event.

Hopelessness is predicted to result

when negative events adversely impact an individual's self-conception.
In other words, hopelessness arises when negative events are perceived
as diagnostic of personal deficiencies such as being unworthy,
unlovable, unintelligent, or incapable.

As with inferred negative

consequences, the development of hopelessness expectancies is believed
to be more probable when the negative characteristics ascribed to the
self are perceived as highly incapacitating (i.e., preventing one from
attaining valued goals).
Although they are conceived as orthogonal causes, Abramson et al.
(1989) acknowledge that it may be difficult to distinguish inferred
negative self-characteristics from causal attributions.

For example,

the inference, "I failed the exam, therefore I must be unintelligent,"
includes the ascription of a negative trait to the self as well as an
implicit internal attribution for the cause of the failure.

Despite

their cautionary comments, however, the difference between internal
attributions (which currently have no causal role in the development of
hopelessness) and inferred negative traits is unclear, and hopelessness
theory currently offers no adequate resolution to this discrepancy.
The three classes of inferences discussed above are regarded as
proximal contributory causes of hopelessness depression because their
occurrence in the causal chain closely precedes the development of
hopelessness expectancies (which then produce the symptoms of
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hopelessness depression).

However, the causal pathway proposed by

Abramson et al. (1989) also incorporates more remote (i.e., distal)
causal factors that contribute indirectly to the formation of
hopelessness expectancies.

These distal contributory causes, which are

referred to as "depressogenic cognitive styles," represent generalized
thought patterns or styles of perceiving the environment that are
believed to render individuals vulnerable to depressive symptomatology.
Abramson et al. (1989) suggested that individuals who chronically
attribute negative events to stable and global causes, habitually
anticipate negative consequences, or infer personal deficiencies when a
variety of negative events occur, are at risk of becoming hopeless in
the face of life stressors.

Depressogenic cognitive styles are

considered risk factors for hopelessness because the individuals who
exhibit them are likely to make corresponding inferences when specific
negative life events occur (i.e., attribute specific stressors to stable
and global causes, expect negative consequences to result from those
stressors, or infer derogatory characteristics about the self when those
stressors occur).
Hypotheses regarding the relation between attributional style and
depressive symptomatology are, of course, not new to hopelessness
theory.

Such a relation was initially suggested by the reformulators of

helplessness theory (Abramson et al., 1978), elaborated in subsequent
theoretical statements (e.g., Peterson & Seligman, 1984; Seligman,
Abramson, Semmel, & von Baeyer, 1979), and empirically validated by
helplessness researchers (for a review, see Sweeney et al., 1986).
causal attributions for specific events, however, the role of
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Like

attributional style in putting individuals at risk for depression is deemphasized as other inferential styles are incorporated into the current
model.

In addition, hopelessness theory considers only the tendency to

make stable and global attributions for negative events to be a risk
factor for depressive symptoms.

In contrast to previous statements, the

tendency to attribute negative events to internal causes is no longer
regarded as a risk factor.
The hopelessness model also differs from its theoretical
predecessor in postulating a "specific vulnerability hypothesis" with
regard to attributional style.

The specific vulnerability hypothesis

holds that depressogenic attributional styles are domain-specific and
therefore increase the likelihood of depressive symptomatology only when
vulnerable individuals encounter stressors in a corresponding domain.
Specifically, Abramson et al. (1989) suggest that individuals habitually
make stable and global attributions for either negative achievement
outcomes or negative interpersonal outcomes. The former group should
then be prone to depression when they encounter stressors in the
achievement domain, but not when they experience stressful outcomes of
an interpersonal or social nature.

The converse is true of individuals

whose depressogenic attributional style Is limited to interpersonal
outcomes.
Abramson et al.'s (1989) notion of domain specific attributional
styles is similar to Beck's (e.g., Beck, 1983) suggestions regarding
sociotropic and autonomous personality styles.

The former refers to

tendencies toward socially dependency and is believed to render
individuals vulnerable to depression when loss or disruption of social
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relationships is experienced.

The latter is characterized by excessive

achievement striving and independence needs.

An autonomous personality

style is believed to increase the likelihood of depressive reactions in
the face of events that threaten one's goal attainment.
Relations between the aforementioned depressogenic cognitive
styles and hopelessness expectancies are thought to be moderated by the
occurrence of negative life events and the inferences drawn from those
events.

As such, hopelessness theory is regarded as a diathesis-stress

model of depression. Depressogenic cognitive styles serve as "cognitive
diatheses" that increase the likelihood of depression only in the
presence of life stress.

In the absence of negative life events (or in

the presence of positive life events), individuals who exhibit the
hypothesized inferential styles should be no more hopeless or depressed
than individuals who do not exhibit those cognitive styles.
A note about the proposed symptoms and clinical course of
hopelessness depression is also in order.

The constellation of symptoms

believed to characterize hopelessness depression includes the
motivational and affective deficits originally discussed by Seligman
(1975) and subsequently retained in the (1978) reformulation.

According

to the current statement, psychomotor decrements stem from the
helplessness component of the hopelessness expectancy.

Depressed or sad

mood, on the other hand, stems from the negative outcome expectancies
accompanying hopelessness.

The cognitive deficit (i.e., negative

cognitive set) discussed in the original and reformulated models is no
longer included in the symptom constellation comprising hopelessness
depression.

According to Abramson et al. (1978), Its exclusion is based

on evidence suggesting that depressives do not erroneously underestimate
the degree of control they have over outcomes.

Rather, nondepressives

appear to distort optimistically their degree of control, perceiving
personal control over outcomes when none exists in reality (cf. Alloy &
Abramson, 1979, 1988; Taylor & Brown, 1988).
Abramson et al. (1989) suggest that hopelessness depression might
also be characterized by rumination and consequent disturbances in
concentration and sleep.

Furthermore, research by Beck (e.g., Beck,

Kovacs, & Weismann, 1975) has shown that hopelessness expectancies are
strong predictors of suicidal ideation and suicide attempts.

As such,

the latter are also considered likely concomitants of hopelessness
depression.
Finally, Abramson et al. (1988) make predictions as to when self
esteem loss will he present amid the other symptoms of hopelessness
depression.

In contrast to the reformulation which held that self

esteem deficits stem exclusively from internal attributions,
hopelessness theory predicts that internal attributions lead to self
esteem loss only when they are combined with stable and global
attributions.

Self-esteem deficits are not expected to occur when

negative outcomes (e.g., academic failure) are attributed to causes
perceived as internal, unstable, and specific (e.g., lack of adequate
preparation).

An alternative route to self-esteem reduction suggested

by hopelessness theory is the ascription of negative characteristics to
the self in response to the occurrence of a negative life event (see
above discussion of contributory causes of hopelessness).
Hopelessness depression is believed also to have a distinct
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clinical course.

Briefly, Abramson et al. (1989) speculate that the

continued presence of hopelessness expectancies predicts the duration
(i.e., chronicity) of a given depressive episode.

In turn, an

individual's perceptions regarding the stability of event causes,
inferred consequences, or inferred self-deficiencies
might contribute to the maintenance of hopelessness expectancies.
Differences Between Hopelessness Theory and the Reformulated Model of
Helplessness Depression
Several differences between the hopelessness model and the
reformulated model of helplessness depression were mentioned in the
preceding discussion.

Because of their importance to the present

research, the differences between the two models are elaborated and more
completely discussed below.
First, and perhaps most striking, Abramson et al. (1989)
eliminated perceived uncontrollability from the etiological sequence
leading to hopelessness depression.

Hopelessness theory does not

require negative events to be perceived as uncontrollable in order for
hopelessness expectancies and depressive symptoms to emerge.

As

discussed above, a perceived lack of control over negative outcomes was
central to both Seligman's (1975) original theory of learned
helplessness and to the 1978 reformulated theory of helplessness.
According to Seligman, exposure to uncontrollable outcomes directly
precipitates helplessness expectancies.

In the reformulation, exposure

to uncontrollable negative outcomes brings about helplessness
expectancies only when those outcomes are attributed to internal,
stable, and global causes.
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According to hopelessness theory, perceiving negative events as
uncontrollable is no longer a necessary prerequisite for the
of hopelessness expectancies.

formation

Abramson et al. (1989) specifically

assert that,
In contrast to the 1978 reformulation (but consistent with later
statements such as those of Peterson & Seligman, 1984), we begin
the etiological chain with the perceived occurrence of a negative
life event, rather than an uncontrollable event, because the logic
of the hopelessness theory requires only the occurrence of the
former, rather than the latter, to initiate the series of causes
hypothesized to culminate in hopelessness and, in turn, the
symptoms of hopelessness depression ... (p. 360).
Other than the above statement, Abramson et al, (1989) offer no
empirical or theoretical rationale for hopelessness theory's elimination
of perceived uncontrollability (nor did Peterson and Seligman, 1984).
It appears to be based only on the assumption that stressful life
events, combined with the hypothesized depressogenic inferences, are
sufficient conditions for the development of hopelessness expectancies,
regardless of the perceived controllability of those events.
Contrary to Abramson et al.'s (1989) recent assumptions, however,
the results of recent investigations demonstrate the importance of
perceived uncontrollability to the onset of depressive symptomatology.
Several researchers (Benassi, Sweeney, & Asdigian, 1990; Brown & Siegel,
1988; Pagel, Becker, & Coppel, 1985) have shown that individuals who
attribute negative events to internal, stable and/or global causes
exhibit elevated levels of depressive symptoms only when those events
are perceived as relatively uncontrollable.

Attributions for negative

events perceived as controllable were not associated with elevated
levels of depressive symptomatology.

These results suggest that

Abramson et al.'s removal of perceived uncontrollability from the
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hopelessness model is unwarranted.

Instead, perceiving a lack of

control over negative events might indeed be a necessary precursor of
hopelessness expectancies, and thus to the symptoms associated with
hopelessness depression.

Whereas perceived uncontrollability has been removed, other
variables not previously included in the reformulation have been
incorporated into the hopelessness model.

Unlike the reformulation, the

current model no longer regards causal attributions as the sole
predictors of hopelessness expectancies, nor does it propose that
attributional style is exclusive in rendering individuals vulnerable to
depressive symptoms.
With respect to the former, the current statement suggests that
expectations of negative consequences and inferred personal
deficiencies, in addition to stable and global causal attributions for
negative life events, might also lead to hopelessness expectancies.
Numerous investigations have demonstrated a relation between depressive
symptoms and stable and global causal attributions for negative events
(e.g., Benassi et al., 1990; Brown & Siegel, 1988; Follete & Jacobson,
1987; Metalsky et al., 1987,

but see above for conditions under which

this relation is not obtained). There is little evidence available,
however, with which to evaluate the latter two predictions.
In support of the moderating effects of Inferred negative
consequences, Abramson et al. (1989) cite several investigations
conducted by Hammen and associates (i.e., Gong-Guy & Hammen, 1980,
Hammen & Cochran, 1981) which purport to demonstrate a relation between
expectations of negative consequences and depressive symptomatology.
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A

close examination of the measures used in those studies, however,
suggests that inferred negative consequences might not have been
adequately assessed.

For example, Gong-Guy and Hammen (1980) and Hammen

and Cochran (1981) found that, relative to nondepressives, depressed
subjects perceived recent life stressors as causing a greater degree of
uncertainty in their lives.

Based only on subjects' responses to this

measure, the authors suggested that cognitions about the consequences of
stressful life events play a role in the onset of depressive symptoms.
This conclusion appears premature given that the single-item
measure of life uncertainty used in each study might not adequately
reflect expectations concerning the negative consequences of stressful
life experiences. Moreover, the cross-sectional nature of these studies
leaves open the possibility that perceived life uncertainty is a
consequence rather than an antecedent of depressive symptomatology.
Although suggestive, the findings obtained by Hammen and colleagues do
not provide unequivocal support for the hypothesized effects of inferred
negative consequences.

A more definitive test of this component of

hopelessness theory is thus required.
The model's predictions regarding the etiological role of inferred
negative self-characteristics are likewise in need of evaluation.

As

the basis for these predictions, Abramson et al. (1989) cite clinical
evidence that depressed patients engage in self-derogation and infer
personal deficiencies when they experience negative events (e.g.,
inferring that one is worthless upon the termination of an important
relationship, p. 361).

From this evidence, of course, it is impossible

to determine whether such inferences serve as causes or consequences of
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depressed affect.

Abramson et al.'s notion of inferred negative self

characteristics appears conceptually similar to the notion of self
blame.

Although self-blame is believed by some to be a symptom of

depression (Beck, 1967), the precise role of self-blame in depression
remains equivocal (cf. Shaver & Drown, 1986).

The ability of inferred

personal deficiencies to predict future depressive affect (or more
specifically, the development of hopelessness expectancies) needs to be
established in order for the model's predictions to be supported.
The diathesis-stress component of the hopelessness model has also
been expanded to include cognitive styles other than the depressogenic
attributional style as vulnerability factors for depression.

The

predictions that Abramson et al. (1989) do make about attributional
style, however, are similar to those advanced by the reformulation
(except for hopelessness theory's exclusion of the internality dimension
as a risk factor).

As discussed above, hopelessness theory predicts

that stable and global attributions for specific negative events are
more probable among individuals who are predisposed to attribute
negative events to stable and global causes.

As such, this subset of

individuals is at greater risk of becoming hopeless and therefore
depressed when specific negative events are encountered.
Abramson et al. (1989) additionally suggest that some individuals
might habitually infer either negative consequences or personal
deficiencies in response to a variety of negative events. According to
hopelessness theory, these individuals are likely to make similar
inferences in response to specific negative events and are therefore at
risk of becoming hopeless.

Abramson et al. liken these inferential
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styles to Beck's (Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979) notion of
depressogenic assumptions and to Ellis' (1977) notion of irrational
beliefs, both of which are described below.
According to Beck et al. (1979), depressogenic assumptions reflect
deeply ingrained, maladaptive beliefs that predispose individuals to
depression (p. 244).

These beliefs primarily take the form of "personal

contracts" or contingencies specifying the conditions required for
happiness and perceived self-worth.

Beck et al. (1979, p. 246) offered

examples of the types of dysfunctional beliefs that foster depressive
reactions, including the following:
successful in whatever I do";

"In order to be happy, I have to be

"To be happy, I must be accepted by all

people at all times"; and "If I make a mistake, it means that I am
inept."

Note that each of the above statements implies that one's value

depends on prespecified external factors (e.g., being successful in
one's endeavors, being regarded highly by others) (cf. Olinger, Kuiper,
& Shaw, 1987).
Beck argued that the above beliefs, and others like them, lay the
groundwork for depressive affect because they require excessively
demanding conditions that frequently can not be met.

Furthermore, they

are vaguely defined (e.g., "success") and therefore might never be fully
satisfied.

When those conditions are not met (e.g., when failure or

rejection is encountered), the individual's sense of self-worth or
personal security Is severely threatened and extreme reactions of
depressed affect are likely to result.
Although not explicitly framed in terms of a diathesis-stress
model, Beck's cognitive theory of depression clearly conforms to such a
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model (cf. Abramson et al., 1990). For example, Beck et al. (1979, p.
270) suggest that dysfunctional beliefs by themselves do not lead to
negative affect.

Individuals who adopt such beliefs function quite well

when they encounter acceptance, love, success, etc.; they are at risk
for depression only when those factors are absent or are removed.
Moreover, Beck et al. (1979, p. 16) do not regard life stressors by
themselves to be sufficient for extreme depressive reactions.

Such

reactions are expected only among individuals who interpret life
stressors through negativistic or depressogenic schemas.

Thus, Beck's

conception of depressogenic assumptions as vulnerability factors for
depressive symptomatology provides a theoretical basis for including
such beliefs among the other cognitive diatheses specified by
hopelessness theory.
Beck et al. (1979) additionally suggested that depressogenic
assumptions underlie various information processing errors that serve to
distort the depressive's interpretations of her experiences.

The errors

outlined by Beck include such things as: 1.) drawing extreme conclusions
based on limited information (i.e., overgeneralization), 2.) magnifying
the significance of negative events while minimizing that of positive
events, 3.) thinking in absolutist and dichotomous terms (e.g., people
are either perfect or a failure), 4.) expecting severe consequences when
bad things happen (i.e., catastrophizing), 5.) accepting excessive
personal responsibility for negative events (i.e., personal causality),
6.) inappropriately expecting the persistence of negative events (i.e.,
temporal causality), and 7.) making excessively punitive and moralistic
judgments about the self.

These illogical thought patterns are believed
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to follow from the inappropriate contingencies dictated by the
depressive's maladaptive beliefs.

For example, a person who believes

that making mistakes renders one inept is likely to infer, upon making a
mistake, that she is indeed inept or completely incapable, and therefore
will never be able function competently at important tasks or achieve
desired goals.

These interpretive distortions contribute to the

negative cognitive triad, which according to Beck, directly precipitates
depressive symptomatology.
The cognitive errors that Beck ascribes to depressives appear
similar to the negativistic inferences that contribute to hopelessness
expectancies in Abramson et al.'s (1989) model.

For example,

"catastrophizing" is analogous to expecting negative consequences to
result from specific negative events.

Likewise, harsh moralistic and

punitive self-judgments are analogous to inferring personal deficiencies
from negative life events.

Furthermore, Beck's conception of the

relationship between depressogenic assumptions and cognitive errors is
similar to (and provides theoretical support for) Abramson et al.'s
suggestion that individuals who hold dysfunctional assumptions are
likely to make the depressogenic inferences that contribute to
hopelessness.
As with depressogenic assumptions, Abramson et al. (1989) suggest
that irrational beliefs (Ellis, 1977) are similar to the dysfunctional
inferential styles that serve as vulnerability factors in the
hopelessness model.

The notion of irrational beliefs is at the heart of

Ellis' Rational-Emotive Therapy (R-ET) as well as the theory of
psychopathology upon which R-ET is based.

44

Ellis (1977) contends that

illogical beliefs or thoughts about negative environmental events, and
not the events themselves, are the primary causes of emotional
disturbance (including, but not limited to, severe depressive affect).
Ellis (1977, p. 10) suggested that most irrational beliefs can be
subsumed under the following categories 1.) unrealistic and absolutist
demands regarding what the self, others, and world "should" and/or
"must" be like; 2.) "awfulizing" beliefs regarding how terrible it is
when people (including the self) or conditions deviate from what they
should or must be like; 3.) beliefs regarding one's inability to
tolerate conditions that deviate from what they should or must be like
(i.e., "i-can't-stand-its"); and 4.) beliefs regarding how terrible
people (including oneself) are when they fail to behave as they should
or must behave.

Ellis' (1977) conception of the nature and emotional

consequences of irrational beliefs lends support to Abramson et al.'s
(1989) contention that such beliefs predispose individuals to depressive
affect.

To a large extent, Ellis believes that irrational thinking

reflects tendencies to overgeneralize from the data at hand and
negatively distort objective realities.

Accordingly, he suggests that

many irrational thoughts involve, "unempirical or unrealistic
statements," and "irrational or illogical conclusions from limited data"
(p. 8).

Irrational thinking might lead a person to conclude, for

example, that because certain environmental conditions are currently
undesirable, they will always be undesirable, or that because another
person has behaved badly, s/he is a bad person.

Irrational thinkers

place overly stringent demands on themselves, others, and their
environments.

They overestimate or overgeneralize the "awfulness" of
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negative events as well as the "awfulness" of people (including
themselves) who do not live up to their lofty standards.

Individuals

who advocate irrational beliefs should therefore be highly likely to
expect negative consequences and/or infer personal deficiencies when
they encounter life stressors, as is suggested by hopelessness theory.
An additional difference between the reformulation and
hopelessness theory concerns the precursors of self-esteem deficits.
The reformulation suggested that the internal-external attributional
dimension was uniquely and independently predictive of self-esteem
deficits.

Individuals who made internal attributions for negative

outcomes were predicted to experience self-esteem loss, regardless of
the stability or globality of those attributions.

The hopelessness

model, however, no longer regards internal attributions as sufficient
for the appearance of self-esteem loss among depressives.

Self-esteem

deficits are now believed to result only when negative events are
attributed to internal causes that are also perceived as stable and
global.

Hopelessness theory makes the following predictions regarding

symptomatology associated with causal attributions: 1.) attributing
negative life events to stable and global causes leads to the formation
of a hopelessness expectancy, which in turn, leads to depressed affect,
motoric lethargy, concentration difficulties, insomnia, etc, and 2.)
attributing negative life events to internal. stable, and global causes
predicts the occurrence of hopelessness expectancies, the symptom
constellation described above, and self-esteem loss.
Abramson et al. (1989) instituted this revision in response to
evidence indicating that internal attributions are sometimes associated
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with positive emotional and behavioral outcomes.

Dweck (1975), for

example, encouraged helplessness-prone children to attribute academic
failures to low effort (an internal but unstable cause) . Children who
received this attributional retraining after initial failure experiences
perservered in the face of subsequent academic failure to a greater
extent than did children who experienced initial task success.

These

results suggest that internal attributions might sometimes be associated
with hopefulness rather than hopelessness, and thus lend support to the
revised predictions presented by hopelessness theory.
The results of the few studies that have actually examined
attributional precursors to self-esteem loss favor Abramson et al.'s
(1989) current predictions over those made by the reformulated model.
For example, both Zautra, Guenther, and Chartier (1985) and Brewin and
Furnham (1986) failed to observe a unique relation between internal
attributions and self-esteem loss.

Zautra et al. found that internal,

stable, and global attributions for both hypothetical (i.e., ASQ) and
real negative events were each significantly associated with self-esteem
deficits.

Subsequent analyses showed that internal attributions

correlated significantly with self-esteem when those attributions were
relatively stable but not when they were relatively unstable.

Using a

regression approach, Brewin and Furnham (1986) found that both internal
and global attributions were uniquely related to low self-esteem.
Although the evidence presented above is consistent with Abramson
et al.'s (1989) most recent predictions regarding self-esteem loss, a
more direct evaluation of the competing predictions is necessary before
the revision is ultimately verified.
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Abramson et al.'s (1989)

additional speculation that self-esteem deficits stem from inferred
personal deficiencies is also in need of assessment.
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I. METHODOLOGY

The present investigation was designed to test the etiological
postulates of the hopelessness theory of depression (Abramson et al,,
1989) and to evaluate the divergent predictions made by the hopelessness
and reformulated learned helplessness models (Abramson et al., 1978) of
depression.

To achieve these research objectives, a two-wave

longitudinal methodology was used in which subjects responded to
measures of each construct in the two models over a three week period.
During the first assessment session, subjects responded to measures of
dysfunctional cognitive styles, self-esteem, hopelessness expectancies,
and depressive symptomatology.

Measures of life stress, event-based

inferences and cognitions, self-esteem, hopelessness, and depressive
symptoms were administered three weeks later when subjects returned for
the follow-up assessment session.
Regression analyses were conducted to examine the degree to which
higher levels of maladaptive cognitive styles and event-based cognitions
were associated with T1 to T2 increases in depressive symptomatology
among subjects who experienced highly stressful life events.

Additional

tests evaluated hypotheses concerning the mediational roles of eventcognitions and hopelessness expectancies as well as those regarding the
cognitive precursors of self-esteem deficits.

The role of perceived

control in moderating the effects of life stress was assessed by
performing the primary analyses separately for subjects who perceived
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their most upsetting stressors as relatively controllable and as
relatively uncontrollable.
Research Participants
Two hundred forty seven (94 male and 153 female) undergraduates
enrolled in Introductory Psychology classes at the University of New
Hampshire participated in exchange for course credit.

The hopelessness

model is appropriately tested using a sample of nondepressed collegestudent subjects (rather than clinically depressed patients) for several
reasons.

First, hopelessness theory addresses Itself to the etiology of

depressive symptoms and can therefore be adequately assessed only by
using a sample of initially nondepressed subjects.

Second, as mentioned

above, the hopelessness model is an etiological theory of moderate
depressive reactions as well as depressive episodes of a more severe
nature (cf. Metalsky et al., 1982).

The depressive reactions that

nonclinical student populations exhibit in response to life stressors
are thus appropriately used in an evaluation of hopelessness theory (cf.
Vredenburg, Flett, & Krames, 1993).
Materials
Dysfunctional Cognitive Styles

Attributional Stvle. Generalized tendencies to attribute negative
achievement and interpersonal events to stable and global causes were
assessed using Metalksy et al.'s (1987) Expanded Attributional Style
Questionnaire (EASQ). In contrast to the original ASQ (Peterson et al,
1982; Seligman et al., 1979) which includes six positive and six
negative hypothetical events, the EASQ is comprised of 12 hypothetical
negative events. Six of the EASQ events fall in the achievement domain
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(e.g., "You take an exam and receive a low grade on it") and the
remaining six fall in the interpersonal domain (e.g., "Your relationship
with your boyfriend/girlfriend ends even though you would like it to
continue).
For each event on the EASQ, subjects wrote down the one major
factor that would have caused it.

They then rated each causal factor on

seven-point bipolar externality-internality, instability-stability, and
specificity-globality subscales.

Responses to each subscale were summed

across the six achievement events and across the six interpersonal
events to yield total achievement-domain and interpersonal-domain EASQ
scores on each attributional dimension.

Total subscale scores can

therefore range from six to 42, with higher scores reflecting stronger
tendencies to attribute negative events to internal, stable, and global
causes.
The EASQ was developed, in part, to bolster the low subscale
reliabilities typically obtained using the original ASQ (cf., Peterson &
Seligman, 1984).

Metalsky et al. (1987) noted high internal consistency

coefficients for composite stability and globality indexes in both the
achievement (alpha — .77) and interpersonal (alpha — .79) domains.
Metalsky et al. also demonstrated that scores on the EASQ are highly
correlated with the attributions that college students make for specific
negative events.

They obtained a correlation of r - .60 between

composite stability and globality scores in the achievement domain and
scores on an analogous composite assessing causal attributions for
failure on an important course exam.

Consistent with the hopelessness

model's specific vulnerability hypothesis (see above), attributions for
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exam failure were less strongly correlated (r - .30, £ > .10) with
scores on the interpersonal-domain stability/ globality composite.
These data suggest that EASQ is both a reliable and valid measure of
attributional styles in the achievement and interpersonal domains.
Dysfunctional Attitudes. Subjects also responded to Wiessman's
(1979) Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale (DAS-Form A).

The items on the DAS

were derived from clinical reports of the thought content of depressed
patients and include 40 statements such as: "I must be a useful,
productive, creative person or life has no purpose," "A person should
think less of himself if other people do not accept him," and "If I fail
at my work, then I am a failure as a person."

Subjects used seven-point

(strongly disagree to strongly agree) Likert scales to indicate their
level of agreement with each statement.

Total scores can range from 40-

280, with higher scores reflecting more dysfunctional attitudes.
Although Weissman (1979) demonstrated that the original 100-item
DAS was multi-factorial, she reported alpha coefficients of .86 and .87
for both 40-item versions of this measure.

Dobson and Breiter (1983)

obtained comparable reliability coefficients for males (alpha - .90) and
for females (alpha - .88).

In addition to being a reliable measure of

depressogenic assumptions, the DAS has been shown to correlate in
theoretically predicted ways with measures of depression-related
cognitions and depressive symptomatology.

Using a college-student

sample, Weissman (1979) obtained a correlation of r - .52 between DAS
scores and scores on Krantz and Hammen's (1976) Story Completion Test of
cognitive distortion.

Dobson and Breiter (1983) observed significant

correlations (r - .43 for males; r - .36 for females) between DAS scores
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and scores on Hollon and Kendall's (1980) Automatic Thoughts
Questionnaire.

In addition, Weissman (1979) and Dobson and Breiter

(1983) found DAS scores to correlate between .30 and .36 with scores on
the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock, &
Erbaugh, 1961).
Irrational Beliefs. Kassinove, Crisci, and Tiegerman's (1977) 33item Idea Inventory (Idl) was used to measure irrational beliefs falling
in three of the four categories described by Ellis (1977): 1.)
unrealistic demands (i.e., "shoulds" and "musts"); 2.) awfulizing
statements, and 3.) blame and self-derogation.

The Idl consists of

Ellis' 11 original irrational beliefs and two additional statements
corresponding to each of the original beliefs.

Example statements on

the Idl include: "People need the love or approval of almost everyone
one they consider important" (one of Ellis' original irrational
beliefs), "I feel inadequate and worthless when I fail at school or
work," and "I cant help but feel depressed and rejected when others let
me down."

Responses to each item were recorded on Likert scales ranging

from 1 (disagree) to 3 (agree). Total Idl scores can range from 33 to
99, with higher scores reflecting stronger irrational ideation.
To assess the internal consistency of the Idl, Kassinove et al.
(1977) correlated each third of the total inventory with each of the
other two-thirds and obtained reliability coefficients ranging from .84
to .91.

Vestre (1983) administered the Idl to a sample of college

students on two occasions separated by a 4-week interval and obtained a
test-retest reliability coefficient of .81.

Also using a college-

student sample, Kassinove et al. found that Idl scores (reverse coded in
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their study) correlated negatively with neuroticism (r - - .57) and
adjustment (rs ranging from -.35 to -.58) scores.

With respect to

depressive symptomatology, Vestre and Budd (1980; cited in Vestre, 1983)
obtained a significant correlation of -.40 between Idl and BDI scores.
Finally, Vestre (1983) found that relative to low and moderate scorers,
high Idl scorers exhibited the most Intense levels of negative affect
across a 2-4 week time period.
Overgeneralization. The seven-item Overgeneralization subscale of
Carver and Ganellen's (1983) Attitudes Toward Self Scale (ATS) was
included as a measure of tendencies to generalize the implications of
specific negative events to one's self worth. The Overgeneralization
index was developed to assess one aspect of self-punitiveness that
appears to overlap with the tendency, described to Abramson et al.
(1988), to perceive personal deficiencies in response to life stressors.
Subscale items include statements such as "How I feel about myself
overall is easily influenced by a single mistake," and "When even one
thing goes wrong I begin to feel bad and wonder If I can do well at
anything."

Subjects used a five-point Likert scale to rate the extent

of their agreement with each statement.

Scores on this measure can

range from 7-35 with higher scores reflect stronger overgeneralizing
tendencies.
In Carver and Ganellen's (1983) factor analysis of the ATS (which
also includes subscales assessing self-imposed high standards and selfcriticism), all Overgeneralization items loaded onto a single factor -with an alpha coefficient of .82.

In addition, of the three ATS

subscales, only Overgeneralization was significantly associated with

concurrently measured depressive symptomatology levels, accounting for
23% of the variance in BDI scores among college undergraduates.

Similar

results using the ATS were obtained in a subsequent investigation
conducted by Carver, La Voie, Kuhl, and Ganellen (1988).

In addition,

Ganellen (1988) reported that Overgeneralization was uniquely associated
with depressive symptomatology--subscale scores continued to predict
clinical ratings of depressive symptoms after controlling for levels of
anxiety.
Locus of Control. Generalized control expectancies were assessed
using the Powerful Others and Chance subscales of Levenson's (1981)
multidimensional Locus of Control Scale.

The eight-item Powerful Others

scale measures the degree to which outcomes are believed to be
controlled by people in positions of power (e.g., "Although I may have
good ability, I will not be given leadership responsibility without
appealing to those in positions of power").

The eight-item Chance scale

measures the degree to which events are perceived to be random (e.g.,
Whether or not I get to be a leader depends on whether I'm lucky enough
to be in the right place at the right time").

Subjects rated the extent

of their agreement with each statement on six-point Likert scales such
that higher scores reflected a more external control orientation.

A

composite locus of control measure, with a possible score range of 16 to
96, was created by summing responses across all 16 items.2
Stressful Achievement and Interpersonal Life Events
An Achievement Events Questionnaire (AEQ) and an Interpersonal
Events Questionnaire (IEQ) were developed to assess the recent
occurrence and perceived stressfulness of a variety of negative
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achievement and interpersonal events, respectively. Both questionnaires
were adapted from several published life-stress measures, including
Cochrane and Robertson's (1973) Life Events Inventory (LEI), Sarason,
Johnson, and Siegel's (1978) Life Experiences Survey (LES), and
Andersen's (1990) Life Events Questionnaire (LEQ). Numerous researchers
have demonstrated that life-stress scores derived from the above
inventories (by themselves and/or In combination with various measures
of cognitive styles) successfully predict depressive symptomatology
(e.g., Andersen, 1990; Hammen, Marks, Mayol, and de Mayo, 1985; Olinger
et al., 1987; Robins & Block, 1988; Wise & Barnes, 1986). In developing
the AEQ and the IEQ, only negative events relevant to the experiences of
college students were selected from existing inventories.

In addition,

events were chosen such that they clearly fell into either achievement
or interpersonal domains and did not overlap in content.

Several

events, not listed on any of the existing life stress measures, were
also added.

Finally, a scale on which subjects could rate the degree of

stress associated with life events was adapted from Sarason et al.'s
(1978) LES.
The AEQ consists of 16 negative achievement events typically
encountered by students in their first semester or year of college.
Example events include: "I received a lower grade on an exam or paper
than anticipated," "I am having trouble adjusting to the academic life
at college (e.g., workload, time-management, effective study habits), "I
chose a college major but now I realize that I do not like It," and "I
am having difficulty balancing school responsibilities with my other
commitments (e.g., job, sports, clubs, fraternity or sorority)."
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The

IEQ lists 20 negative interpersonal events typical of the same
population.

Example events from the IEQ include: "I am having

difficulty adjusting to the social life at college (e.g., difficulty
making friends or "fitting in")," "I was rejected by someone I am
attracted to," and "I had an argument/disagreement with a friend."
On each inventory, subjects placed a check next to each event they
experienced in the three weeks since the first assessment session.
Additional space was provided for subjects to write in up to five
negative events that they experienced during the same time period but
which were not listed on the inventory.

Subjects were also asked to

rate the degree of stress associated with each event that was either
checked or written in.

Stress ratings were made on seven-point Likert

scales ranging from 1 (not at all stressful) to 7 (extremely stressful)
(cf. Sarason et al., 1978).

On both the AEQ and the IEQ, subjects were

asked to select the one event that they experienced as most stressful
and indicate (on two seven-point Likert scales) how important the event
was to them.
Deoressogenic Inferences: Perceived Control. Expected Consequences.
Personal Deficiencies. Self-Blame, and Causal Attributions
For their most upsetting achievement and interpersonal stressor,
subjects completed four-Item measures of perceived control, expected
negative consequences, perceived personal deficiencies, behavioral
blame, and characterological blame.

Subjects were also asked to

identify the one major cause of their most stressful achievement and
interpersonal event and to rate each cause on four-item scales assessing
the attributional dimensions of internality-externality, stability-

instability, and globality-specificity. Ratings on each of these
measures were made on seven-point Likert scales, anchored such that high
scores reflect more depressogenic responses.
Hopelessness Expectancies
Generalized hopelessness expectancies were assessed with the Beck
Hopelessness Scale (BHS; Beck et al,, 1974, Beck & Steer, 1988).

The

BHS consists of 20 clinically-derived statements reflecting both
pessimistic and optimistic attitudes toward the future (e.g., "I might
as well give up because there is nothing I can do about making things
better for myself," "When I look ahead to the future, I expect that I
will be happier than I am now").

Subjects provided true (coded as "1")

or false (coded as "0") responses depending on whether each statement
described their feelings or attitudes throughout the past week.
Responses to the positively keyed (optimistic) items were reverse scored
so that higher BHS scores (which can range from 0-20) reflected higher
levels of hopelessness.
Beck and Steer (1988) reviewed the results of numerous studies
that examined the psychometric properties of the BHS and reported
internal consistency coefficients ranging from .82 to .93 as well as
test-retest correlations of .69 (one week) and .66 (six weeks).

They

also found that BHS scores correlate significantly with clinical ratings
of hopelessness (rs ranging from .62 to .74), severity of depressive
symptomatology (rs ranging from .46 to .76), and scores on a BDI-item
assessing pessimism toward the future (rs ranging from .42 to .74).
Beck et al. (1974) factor analyzed BHS data obtained in a sample
of suicide attempters and observed three dimensions respectively
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reflecting feelings about the future, loss of motivation, and future
expectations.

These factors overlap sufficiently with the helplessness

and negative outcome expectancy components of the proposed proximal
cause of hopelessness depression.
Affect and Self-Esteem Measures

Depressive Symptomatology. The Beck Depression Inventory (BDI;
Beck et al., 1979) was used to measure the symptomatology associated
with hopelessness depression.

The BDI is a widely used instrument that

assesses the severity with which individuals experience a variety of
somatic, motivational, emotional, and cognitive symptoms of depression.
It consists of 21 sets of four statements that reflect increasingly
severe levels of depressive symptoms (e.g., (a) "I do not feel sad," (b)
"I feel sad," (c) "I am sad all the time and I can't snap out of it,"
(d) "I am so sad or unhappy that I can't stand it").

Subjects were

asked to choose the one statement in each set that best represented how
they felt during the previous week.

Each response was coded on a 4-

point scale ranging from 0 (least severe statement) to 3 (most severe
statement).

Total scores on the 21-item inventory can range from 0 to

63.
Using meta-analytic techniques, Beck, Steer, and Garbin (1988)
reviewed studies conducted over the past 25 years that evaluated the
psychometric properties of the BDI.

The results of their review

revealed that the BDI provides a reliable and valid indicator of
depressive symptoms in both psychiatric and nonpsychiatric populations.
Among the latter, the mean alpha coefficient associated with the BDI was
.81.

Beck et al. (1988) reported stability coefficients for the BDI
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ranging from .60 to .90 in nonpsychiatric samples.

In addition, Oliver

and Burkham (1979) reported a test-retest reliability coefficient of .78
for BDI scores assessed across a three-week interval in a college student sample.
Beck et al.'s (1988) analysis also showed that BDI scores obtained
by nonpsychiatric respondents are highly correlated with clinical
ratings of depression (rs range from .60 to .80) and scores on other
self-report depression inventories (rs range from .60 to .86).

Looking

specifically at college students, Bumberry, Oliver, and McClure (1978)
reported that BDI scores correlated .77 with symptom ratings obtained
concurrently from psychiatric interviews.

Using a similar procedure,

Hammen (1980) obtained a correlation of .80.

These data indicate that

the BDI provides a valid assessment of the severity of depressive
symptoms experienced by subjects sampled from college-student
populations.
Self-Esteem Deficits. Rosenberg's (1965) Self-Esteem Scale (RSES)
was used to measure levels of self-esteem.

The RSES is a brief (10

items) but widely used inventory that primarily assesses a selfacceptance component of self-esteem.

Using a five-point Likert scale,

subjects indicated the extent of their agreement with statements such
as, "I feel that I'm a person of worth, at least on an equal basis with
others," and "All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am failure."
Scale values ranged from 1 (extremely true) to 5 (extremely untrue),
yielding a possible score distribution of 10-50.

Higher scores reflect

higher self-esteem.
Robinson and Shaver (1973) reported that the RSES is both reliable
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over time (.85) and internally consistent (.92).

Zautra et al. (1985)

administered the RSES to college students on two occasions separated by
a two-week interval and reported a test-retest reliability coefficient
of r - .81.

With respect to concurrent validity, RSES scores have been

shown to correlate between .27 and .83 with other self-report measures
of self-esteem and with clinical ratings of self-esteem (Robinson &
Shaver, 1973).

Zautra et al. (1985) obtained correlations of ,45 and

.58 between the RSES and two depression inventories (one of which was
the BDI).

Zautra et al. also demonstrated that the two depression

measures used in their research correlated significantly more highly
with one another than they did with the RSES.

The latter suggests that

scores on the RSES reflect more than depressed or negative affect.
Procedure
Subjects participated in two assessment sessions in mixed sex
groups of approximately 15.

The initial two-hour sessions were

conducted during October and November of 1991.

Follow-up sessions,

requiring only one-hour of time, were held three weeks later.

The

nature and participation requirements of the study were described to
subjects at the outset of the initial session.

Subjects were asked to

sign informed consent forms as an indication of their willingness to
participate in this research.

Subjects then received folders containing

all of the measures to be completed during the session as well as answer
sheets for their responses.
During the first assessment session, subjects completed measures
in the following order: EASQ, BDI, DAS, Idl, BHS, RSES, ATS-OVERGEN, and
LOC.

At the follow-up session, the measures were ordered in the

61

following way: BHS, RSES, BDI, AEQ, and IEQ.

Written instructions were

available for each measure and additional oral instructions were
provided for several of the measures (EASQ, AEQ, and IEQ).

Subjects

responded to each measure at their own pace and were allowed to take
rest breaks as needed.
After completing their participation in both assessment sessions,
subjects received a written debriefing statement describing the purpose
of this research as well as the nature of the materials they completed.
The debriefing statement included my name and phone number and subjects
were encouraged to contact me if they wanted to discuss the nature or
results of this research in the future.
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II. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Descriptive and Reliability Data
Means, medians, standard deviations, and coefficient alpha
reliabilities for the Time 1 (Tl) measures of dysfunctional cognitive
style, the Time 2 (T2) event stress and event cognition measures, and
the Tl and T2 hopelessness, mood, and self-esteem scales for subjects
who completed both sessions are presented in Tables 1 through 4,
respectively.

Scores on the stability and globality subscales of the

Extended Attributional Style Questionnaire (EASQ; Metalsky et al., 1987)
were summed to form "attributional generality" scales in the achievement
and interpersonal domains (see Table 1).

Similar composites were

created from the scales assessing stability and globality attributions
for subjects' most stressful achievement and interpersonal events (see
Table 3).

The use of these composite attributional scales is consistent

with hopelessness model's contention that only the stability and
globality dimensions of causal attributions play a role in the
development of hopelessness depression (Abramson et al., 1989; Metalsky
et al., 1982, 1987).
An achievement stress variable was created by multiplying
subjects' ratings of the stressfulness of their most upsetting
achievement event by their ratings of the importance of that event.

The

interpersonal stress variable likewise represents the multiplicative
product of subjects' stressfulness and importance ratings for their most
upsetting interpersonal event.

Methodological as well as theoretical
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics for Cognitive Stvle Measures

M

Mdn

EASQ-ACGEN
EASQ-ACINT

42,40
30.20

43.0
30.0

10.80
4.84

.79
.48

247
247

EASQ-IPGEN
EASQ-IPINT

45.22
26.54

45.0
26.0

10.03
5.08

.72
.41

247
247

130.39
65.14
19.09
45.43

129.0
65.0
19.0
46.0

20.61
10.14
6.36
10.91

.79
.82
.87
.82

246
243
244
228

Measure

DYSATT
IRRIDEAS
OVERGEN
LOCUS

SD

Alpha

N

Note. EASO -ACGEN-Extended Attributional Style Questionnaire: Achievement
Events Generality Composite; EASQ-ACINT-Extended Attributional Style
Questionnaire: Achievement Events Intemality Subscale; EASOIPGEN-Extended Attributional Style Questionnaire: Interpersonal Events
Generality Composite; EASO-IPINT-Extended Attributional Style
Questionnaire: Interpersonal Events Internality Subscale;
DYSATT-Dvsfunctional Attitudes Scale; IRRIDEAS-Irrational Ideas
Inventory; OVERGEN-Overgeneralization Subscale of the Attitudes Toward
Self Scale; LOCUS-Powerful Others and Chance Locus of Control Composite.
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Table 2
Descriptive Statistics for Event Stress Measures

Measure

M

Mdn

ACSTRESS
IPSTRESS

31.09
28.16

33.0
27.5

SD

12.43
13.35

Alpha

N

NA
NA

230
225

Note. ACSTRESS-Achievement Event Stress; IPSTRESS-Interpersonal Event
Stress.
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Table 3
Descriptive Statistics for Achievement- and Interpersonal-Event
Cognition Measures

Measure

M

Mdn

SD

Alpha

N

AEQ-GEN
AEQ-INT
AEQ-CNS
AEQ-DEF
AEQ-CNT
AEQ-BBL
AEQ-CBL

6.81
A.23
3.45
2.64
3.67
3.98
3.17

7.0
4.5
3.3
2.3
3.8
4.0
3.0

2.36
1.91
1.58
1.47
1.53
1.88
1.80

.76
.93
.87
.88
.79
.86
.84

231
231
230
230
230
230
230

IEQ-GEN
IEQ-INT
IEQ-CNS
IEQ-DEF
IEQ-CNT
IEQ-BBL
IEQ-CBL

7.45
3.39
3.34
2.73
4.78
3.28
2.96

7.3
3.5
3.5
2.3
4.8
3.0
2.5

2.33
1.93
1.67
1.68
1.42
1.84
1.82

.80
.92
.93
.91
.75
.88
.88

221
223
225
225
225
225
225

Note. AEQ-Achievement Events Questionnaire; IEO-Interpersonal Events
Questionnaire; GEN—Attributional Generality Subscale; INT— Internality
Subscale; CNS-Expected Consequences Subscale; DEF- Personal Deficiencies
Subscale; CNT—Perceived Control Subscale; BBL-Behavioral Blame Subscale;
CBL-Characterologlcal Blame Subscale.
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Table 4
Descriptive Statistics for Time 1 (Til and Time 2 (T21
)
Hopelessness. Depressive Symptom, and Self-Esteem Measures

Measure

M

Mdn

SD

Alpha

N

Tl BHS
T2 BHS

4.24
3.88

3.0
3.0

3.74
3.56

.84
.83

247
234

Tl BDI
T2 BDI

9.57
7.88

8.0
6.0

6.36
6.87

.82
.88

247
226

38.65
39.97

39.0
42.0

7.31
7.32

.88
.90

244
234

Tl RSES
T2 RSES

Note. BHS~Beck Hopelessness Scale: BDI-Beck Depression Inventory;
RSES=Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale.
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considerations guided the construction of the event stress variables in
this way.

With respect to the former, recall that subjects provided

stress ratings for the one achievement and interpersonal event that they
experienced as most stressful.

Given these instructions, it was not

surprising to find that the distributions of stress ratings for both
achievement and interpersonal events were highly negatively skewed
(skewness - -.824 and -1.04, respectively).

Combining stress and

importance ratings produced event upsettingness variables that were more
normally distributed.

On a theoretical level, the stress measure used

here is consistent with the claim that the etiological pathway leading
to hopelessness depression is triggered by the occurrence of a negative
life event and the perception of that event as important (Abramson et
al., 1988).

Moreover, hopelessness theorists themselves have used a

similarly constructed stress variable in previous tests of the model
(Metalsky et al., 1987).3

Inspection of the alpha coefficients in

Tables 1-4 reveals that all but several of the measures possessed
adequate levels of internal consistency.

The low reliability obtained

for the internality subscale of the EASQ (see Table 1) proved to be the
exception to this pattern (see Cutrona, Russell, & Jones, 1984; Peterson
& Seligman, 1984; Peterson, Semmel, von Baeyer, Abramson, Metalsky, &
Seligman, 1982; Peterson et al., 1985 for similar findings regarding the
internality dimension of attributional style).
Sub ■}ect-Attrition
Differences between the 12 subjects who failed to return to the
follow-up session (noncompleters) and the 235 subjects who participated
in both sessions (completers) were assessed through a series of
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multivariate analyses of variance (MANOVAs) and correlational analyses
on the Tl cognitive style, hopelessness, depressive symptom, and self
esteem measures (cf. Metalsky & Joiner, 1992).4 Noncompleters did not
differ from completers on any of the Tl measures (all j>s > .33),5 nor
was completion status significantly correlated with scores on any of the
Tl measures (rs range from -.05 to .07, ns). These data provide no
evidence that subject attrition biased the results of this investigation
in any way.
Test-Retest Reliabilities and Mean Differences Between Scores on the Tl
and T2 Measures
Scores on the hopelessness, depressive symptom, and self esteem
measures were highly stable across assessment sessions (test-retest
reliability coefficients - ,64, .63, and .76 respectively). A series of
repeated measures analyses of variance (ANOVAs), with time of
administration serving as the within-subjects factor, was conducted to
examine mean differences in scores on the Tl and T2 measures. Based on a
Bonferroni correction for the number of tests performed (Kirk, 1984),
interpretation was restricted to differences that were significant at or
beyond the p = .017 level.
Using this criterion, T2 BDI scores were significantly lower than
Tl BDI scores (F [1, 225] - 21.76, g < .001) and T2 RSES scores were
reliably higher than Tl RSES scores (F [1, 230] - 18.76, £ < .001).
reduction in BHS scores from Tl to T2 did not meet the adjusted alpha
criterion, F (1, 233) - 4.00, £ < .05.

The Tl to T2 decreases in

distress levels that were observed in this study are similar to those
found by other researchers using student samples (e.g., Barnett &
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The

Gotlib, 1988) and may reflect, in part, measurement reactivity (cf.
Zimmerman, 1986).
Gender Differences
Gender differences on the Tl and T2 measures were evaluated in
several steps.

A one-way between-subjects MANOVA was first performed on

Tl RSES, BDI, and BHS scores.

A significant multivariate effect of

subject gender emerged in that analysis, F (3, 240) - 2.68, £ < .05).
Due to the magnitude of the intercorrelations among these measures (rs
range from .54 to .60, all £S < .01), stepdown analysis was used to
assess the significance of the individual measures.6 Higher priorities
were given to measures assessing more stable aspects of functioning,
resulting in the following ordering of measures: RSES, BHS, and BDI.

A

five percent familywise error rate was maintained by setting the alpha
level for each test to £ — .017.
In accord with the stepdown procedure, gender differences on the
Tl RSES measure were assessed In a univariate ANOVA.

Scores on all

other measures were examined in separate univariate analyses of
covariance (ANCOVAs) in which subject gender served as the betweengroups factor and higher-priority measures were used as covariates.

As

shown in Table 5, the only effect to emerge was a marginally significant
gender difference in Tl RSES scores.

Female subjects reported lower

levels of self-esteem (M - 37.86) than male subjects (M - 39.94) did.
Note that after controlling for this difference in self-esteem, males
and females did not significantly differ in levels of depressive
symptomatology (adjusted BDI Ms - 9.05 and 9.94, respectively).
Gender differences on the remaining Tl measures were evaluated
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Table 5
Results of Univariate and Stepdown Analyses Assessing Gender
Differences on Time 1 Self-Esteem. Hooelessness. and Deoressive
SvmDtora Measures

Measure

RSES
BHS
BDI

Univariate
F

4.70
0.50
4.92

df

1,242
1,242
1,242

Stepdown
F

pa

4.70
0.46
2.84

.03
.48
.03

df

P

Eta2

1,242
1,241
1,240

.03
.50
.09

.02
.002
.02

Note. RSES-Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale: BHS-Beck Hopelessness Scale:
BDI-Beck Depression Inventory.
a Significance levels can not be properly evaluated because tests are
not independent. The significance levels presented here are those that
would have been obtained in a univariate context.
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controlling for pre-existing differences in self-esteem.

In the first

analysis, scores on the cognitive style measures were subjected to a
one-way multivariate analysis of covariance (MANCOVA). Subject gender
was the between-groups factor and Tl RSES served as a covariate.7 This
analysis yielded a highly significant gender effect, F (8, 211) - 3.42,
£ — .001.

Due to the moderate to large correlations among most scales

within this set (see Table 7 below), stepdown analysis was used to
evaluate the significance of the individual cognitive style measures.
Tl RSES was used as a covariate in all stepdown tests and the cognitive
style scales were prioritized in the order in which they are listed in
Table 6.

A five percent family-wise error rate was maintained by

restricting interpretation to differences that were significant at or
beyond the p - .006 level.
None of the tests met or surpassed this criterion, although a
number of marginal effects were observed (see Table 6).

Relative to

males, females exhibited a stronger tendency to attribute negative
achievement outcomes to internal causes (adjusted Ms - 30.64 and 29.29,
respectively).

Conversely, males were more likely than females to make

stable and global causal attributions for negative achievement outcomes
(adjusted Ms - 47.56 and 43.75) and for negative interpersonal outcomes
(adjusted Ms - 47.56 and 43.75).

Consistent with observations made in

other investigations (e.g., Barnett & Gotlib, 1988), females (adjusted M
- 127.75) scored somewhat lower than males (adjusted M - 133.60) on the
Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale.

Finally, Overgeneralization scores were

slightly higher among females (adjusted M - 19.06) than among males
(adjusted M - 18.76).
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Table 6
Results of Univariate and Stepdown Analyses Assessing Gender
Differences on Cognitive Style Measures

Measure

EASQ-ACINT
EASQ-ACGEN
EASQ-IPINT
EASQ-IPGEN
DYSATT
IRRIDEAS
OVERGEN
LOCUS

Univariate
F

4.19
5.00
3.55
8.07
5.39
0.004
0.25
3.38

df

1,218
1,218
1,218
1,218
1,218
1,218
1,218
1,218

Pa

.04
.03
.06
.01
.02
.95
.62
.07

Stepdown
F

4.19
4.67
2.71
4.36
3.43
1.83
3.38
1.88

df

1,218
1,217
1,216
1,215
1,214
1,213
1,212
1,211

P

.04
.03
.10
.04
.07
.18
.07
.17

Eta2

.02
.02
.02
.04
.02
.000
.001
.02

Note. EASQ-ACINT-Extended Attributional Style Questionnaire: Achievement
Events Internality Subscale; EASO-ACGEN-Extended Attributional Style
Questionnaire: Achievement Events Generality Composite; EASOIPINT-Extended Attributional Style Questionnaire: Interpersonal Events
Internality Subscale; EAS0-1PGEN-Extended Attributional Style
Questionnaire: Interpersonal Events Generality Composite;
DYSATT—Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale; IRRIDEAS—Irrational Ideas
Inventory; OVERGEN-Overgeneral1zation Subscale of the Attitudes Toward
Self Scale; LOCUS-Powerful Others and Chance Locus of Control Composite.
a Significance levels can not be properly evaluated because tests are
not independent. The significance levels presented here are those that
would have been obtained in a univariate context.
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Gender differences on the T2 measures of self-esteem,
hopelessness, and depressive symptomatology were examined in a one-way
MANCOVA with Tl self-esteem scores used as covariates.®

Stepdown

analysis (measures ordered: 1.) RSES, 2.) BHS, 3.) BDI) revealed that
the multivariate gender effect found across this set of measures (F [3,
218] - 3.12, p - .03) was specific to T2 BHS scores.

After controlling

for Tl and T2 levels of self-esteem, males (adjusted BHS M - 4.45)
exhibited higher levels of hopelessness at T2 than females did (adjusted
BHS M - 3.45), F (1, 219) - 8.31, p < .01.

Gender differences were not

obtained for either T2 RSES scores (F [1, 220] - 0.47, p - .49) or T2
BDI scores (F [1, 218] - 0.59, p - .44).
Multivariate analysis of the T2 achievement and interpersonal
event stress measures (controlling for Tl RSES scores) also yielded a
significant gender difference (F [2, 214] - 3.29, p < .05). Given the
modest correlation (r - .29) between achievement and interpersonal
stress, as well as the difficulty of appropriately prioritizing these
measures, the results of the univariate rather than stepdown tests were
interpreted.

The negative achievement events reported by females were

rated as more stressful (adjusted M - 32.78) than those reported by
males (adjusted M - 28.99), F (1, 215) - 4.92, p < .03.

A similar, but

nonsignificant effect emerged in the analysis of interpersonal- event
stress (adjusted Ms - 29.39 and 26.12 for females and males,
respectively), F (1, 215) - 3.24, p - .07.

Despite these differences in

the perceived stressfulness of life events,

scores on the event

cognition measures in the achievement (F [7, 218] - 1.70, p - .11) and
interpersonal (F [7, 211] - 1.81, p - .09] domains did not reliably
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differ as a function of gender.
Considering the number of measures used in this investigation,
relatively few gender differences were observed.

The differences that

did emerge generally reflected higher levels of emotional distress among
women and higher levels of dysfunctional cognition among men.

For

example, females reported lower levels of self-esteem at Tl and higher
levels of stress associated with the recent occurrence of negative
achievement and interpersonal events.

Males did, however, report higher

levels of hopelessness at T2 relative to females.
With respect to the cognition measures, males endorsed more
dysfunctional attitudes than females did and were more likely to
attribute negative achievement and interpersonal outcomes to stable and
global causes.

Overgeneralization and internalization tendencies, on

the other hand, were slightly stronger among females. Notwithstanding
these differences, the results of the gender analyses provided little
indication that it was necessary to perform the primary analyses
separately for male and female subjects.
Dysfunctional Cognitive Styles
Diathesis-Stress Predictions of Hopelessness Theory
A primary tenet of the hopelessness model is that individuals who
possess certain dysfunctional cognitive styles are at increased risk of
becoming hopelessness and thus developing the symptoms of hopelessness
depression when they experience stressful events.

These cognitive

diatheses, which are formally referred to in the hopelessness model as
"distal contributory causes" of hopelessness depression, include
tendencies to attribute the causes of negative events to stable and
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global factors, expect negative events to result in an array of adverse
consequences, and view the self as personally flawed or deficient when
negative events occur.

The hopelessness model hypothesizes that

individuals who possess these dysfunctional cognitive styles will be
more likely than their counterparts to exhibit elevated levels of
depressive symptomatology under conditions of high stress.

In the

absence of stress (or in the presence of positive life events), little
or no difference is expected in the degree of depressive symptomatology
manifested by individuals who do and do not possess the hypothesized
cognitive diatheses.
The diathesis-stress predictions advanced by hopelessness theory
were evaluated in the present investigation by examining the degree to
which levels of dysfunctional cognitive style interact with the severity
of a recent life stressor to predict Tl to T2 increases in depressive
symptomatology.9

Specifically, Analysis of Partial Variance (APV; Cohen

& Cohen, 1983) was used to examine whether residual changes in BDI
scores from Tl to T2 (I.e., change in BDI scores from Tl to T2, adjusted
for Tl BDI score) could be predicted from interactions of subjects'
ratings of the stressfulness of a recent negative life event and their
scores on several different measures of dysfunctional cognitive style
(cf. Metalsky et al., 1987).

An extension of Analysis of Covariance

(ANCOVA), APV assesses relations between a covariate-adjusted change
score and one or more quantitative (rather than group membership)
research factors, which are also adjusted for the covariate, and is more
appropriate than the simple pre-test/post-test change score method for
predicting change over time (Cohen & Cohen, 1983).
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In each analysis conducted here, residualized change scores were
created by partialling out the variance in T2 BDI scores that was
predictable from Tl BDI scores.

Residualized BDI change scores were

then regressed on the main effects of event stressfulness and
dysfunctional cognitive style.

The interaction of event stressfulness

and dysfunctional cognitive style was always evaluated on the third and
final step, after the variance due to Tl BDI scores and the two main
effects had been removed from both T2 BDI scores and the interaction
terra.

The squared partial correlation (pr2) represents the portion of

variance in residualized BDI change scores uniquely accounted for by
each predictor variable, whereas the R2 increment on each step
represents the total variance in T2 BDI scores explained by the set of
variables entered on that step (Cohen & Cohen, 1983).

Support for the

diathesis-stress predictions of the hopelessness model would be obtained
if the partial correlations corresponding to the cognitive style X
stress interaction terms are significantly greater than zero.
Each cognitive style variable and its interaction with achievement
and interpersonal stress was tested in a separate analysis.

Following

the recommendations of Jaccard, Turrisi, and Wan (1990), as well as
those of Cohen and Cohen (1983), all stress and cognitive style
variables were "centered" prior to their entry in the regression models.
Centering is accomplished by subtracting the mean from scores on
relevant variables.

Its use serves to reduce multicollinearity problems

(i.e., unstable regression coefficients) that result when interaction
terms are created from scores on main effect variables.

Multiplicative

composites representing interactions of dysfunctional cognitive styles
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and either achievement or interpersonal stress were formed from centered
scores.
Zero-order correlations among the variables used in the
diathesis-stress regression models are presented in Table 7.

In

general, associations among the cognitive style, event-stress, and
depressive symptomatology measures were moderate to strong in magnitude.
The one exception to this pattern occurred for the achievement stress
variable, which was relatively weakly correlated with measures of
dysfunctional cognitive style and depressive symptomatology.

The

analyses appearing in Table 8 test hypotheses regarding the interactive
effects of cognitive style and achievement stress on depressive
symptomatology.

As can be seen, a large portion of the variance in T2

BDI scores (40%) was predictable from Tl BDI scores.

Such a finding is

understandable In light of the fact that the first and second assessment
sessions were separated by only three weeks.

A similar result was

obtained in Metalsky and Joiner's (1992) investigation which used a five
week interval between assessment sessions.
The main effect of achievement-event stress was a significant
predictor of residualized BDI change scores, uniquely accounting for an
additional two to three percent of the residualized variance across
analyses.

Significant although weak positive relations were also

obtained between residualized BDI change scores and scores on the
Overgeneralization and Irrational Ideas main effect variables.

Except

for a marginally significant Locus of Control X Achievement Stress
effect, none of the cognitive style X achievement stress interactions
contributed to the prediction of change in BDI scores from Tl to T2.
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Table 7
Intercorrelations Among Cognitive Style. Stress, and Depressive
Symptomatology Measures

Measure
1. Tl BDI
2. T2 BDI
3. ACSTRESS
4. IPSTRESS
5. EASQ-ACGEN
6. EASQ-IPGEN
7. DYSATT
8. IRRIDEAS
9. OVERGEN
10. LOCUS

1

2

.63
.29
.35
.31
.39
.45
.45
.60
.43

.31
.40
.23
.39
.34
.43
.47
.35

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

.69
.23
.22
.32
.19

.40
.32
.45
.31

.53
.48
.50

.46
.48

.49

-

.29
.16a
.23
.10°
.26
.26
.14°

.12b
.27
.25
.23
.32
.24

-

Note. Unless otherwise indicated, all correlations are significant at or
beyond the £ < .01 level. BDI-Beck Depression Inventory; ACSTRESSAchievement Event Stress; IPSTRESS-Interpersonal Event Stress; EASOAGGEN°-Extended Attributional Style Questionnaire; Achievement Events
Generality Composite; EASO-IPGEN-Extended Attributional Style
Questionnaire: Interpersonal Events Generality Composite;
DYSATT—Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale; IRRIDEAS—Irrational Ideas
Inventory; OVERGEN-Overgeneralization Subscale of the Attitudes Toward
Self Scale; LQCUS-Powerful Others and Chance Locus of Control Composite.
a £ < .05. b ns.
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Table 8
Regression Models Predicting Ttme 1 fTl1) to Time 2 (T2) Change in
Residualized BDI Scores from Achievement Stress. Dysfunctional
Cognitive Style, and Achievement Stress X Dysfunctional Cognitive
Style Interactions (N — 226^

Step Predictors in Set

1
2
3
1
2
3

1
2
3

1
2
3

1
2
3

pr

146.39a

1,224

.02
.00

3.47c
0.03

3,222
4,221

.63
.03
.17
.01

12.10s
0.50
2.54b
0.19

.40

146.39s

1,224

3.95c
0.71

3,222
4,221

.63
.07
.17
.06

12.10s
1.09
2.63b
0.84

146.39s

1,224

7.29b
1.81

3,222
4,221

.63
.18
.15
.09

12.10s
2.77b
2.19c
1.35

146.39s

1,224

.63
.13
.16
.001

12.10s
1.88d
2.39c
0.02

.63
.09
.17
.12

12.10s
1.39
2.58b
1.85e

Ffoc

T1 BDI
EASQ-ACGEN
ACSTRESS
EASQ-ACGEN X ACSTRESS

.40

T1 BDI
DYSATT
ACSTRESS
DYSATT X ACSTRESS

T1 BDI
IRRIDEAS
ACSTRESS
IRRIDEAS X ACSTRESS

Tl BDI
OVERGEN
ACSTRESS
OVERGEN X ACSTRESS

Tl BDI
LOCUS
ACSTRESS
LOCUS X ACSTRESS

t

df

R*tnc

.02
.002

.40
.04
.005

.40
.03
.00

5.16b
0.0003

3,222
4,221

.40

146.39s

1,224

.02
.01

4.34b
3.42e

3,222
4,221

Note. BDI-Beck Depression Inventory; ACSTRESS-Achievement Event Stress;
EASQ-ACGEN-Extended Attributional Style Questionnaire-Achievement Events
Generality Composite; DYSATT-Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale;
IRRIDEAS-Irrational Ideas Inventory; OVERGEN-Overgeneralization Subscale
of the Attitudes Toward Self Scale; LOCUS—Powerful Others and Chance
Locus of Control Composite.

a £ < .0001. b £ < .01. C £ < .05. d £ - .06. e £ - .07.
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A similar pattern of results emerged when cognitive style scores,
interpersonal stress levels, and their corresponding interaction terms
were used to predict residual changes in T2 BDI scores (see Table 9).
The significant main effect of Interpersonal stress was twice as strong
as that of achievement stress, explaining between four and five percent
of the variance in residualized BDI scores.

Scores on the Attributional

Style (Interpersonal Domain) and Irrational Ideas measures were also
significant predictors.

As in the previous set of analyses, none of the

cognitive style X interpersonal stress Interaction terms were reliably
different from zero.
Competing Predictions Derived From the Reformulated Theory of Learned
Helplessness
One of the primary differences between the 1989 hopelessness model
and the 1978 reformulation of learned helplessness theory pertains to
the role of perceived control In the development of depressive
symptomatology.

Whereas the reformulation began the causal chain

leading to learned helplessness depression with the perception of
negative events as uncontrollable, the 1989 statement eliminated
perceived uncontrollability as a factor in the development of
hopelessness depression.

Unlike the hopelessness model, the

reformulated theory of learned helplessness would predict that
dysfunctional cognitive styles are associated with increases in
depressive symptomatology only among individuals who experience highly
stressful life events that are also perceived as uncontrollable.
This prediction was evaluated in a series of regression analyses
similar to those described above.

This time, however, the analyses were
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Table 9
Regression Models Predicting Time 1 (Tl*) to Time 2 (T2) Change In
Residualized BDI Scores from Interpersonal Stress. Dysfunctional
Cognitive Style, and Interpersonal Stress X Dysfunctional
Cognitive Style Interactions fN - 226>

Step Predictors in Set

1
2
3

1
2
3

1
2
3

1
2
3

1
2
3

Tl BDI
EASQ-IPGEN
IPSTRESS
EASQ-IPGEN X IPSTRESS

R2|nc
.40
.04
.002

F-inc

df

pr

146.39°

1,224

8.69b
0.80

3,222
4,221

.63
.15
.21
.06

12.10a
2.20c
3.17b
0.90

146.39°

1,224

6.34b
0.52

3,222
4,221

.63
.04
.22
.05

12.10a
0.62
3.42b
0.72

.63
.19
.22
.10

12.10°
2.89b
3.32b
1.54

.63
.11
.21
.02

12.10°
1.72d
3.27b
0.26

.63
.08
.22
-.02

12.10°
1.12
3.39b
-0.35

Tl BDI
DYSATT
IPSTRESS
DYSATT X IPSTRESS

.40

Tl BDI
IRRIDEAS
IPSTRESS
IRRIDEAS X IPSTRESS

.40

146.39°

1,224

.05
.01

10.55°
2.38

3,222
4,221

Tl BDI
OVERGEN
IPSTRESS
OVERGEN X IPSTRESS

.40

146.39°

1,224

7.69b
0.07

3,222
4,221

Tl BDI
LOCUS
IPSTRESS
LOCUS X IPSTRESS

.40

146.39°

1,224

6.80b
0.13

3,222
4,221

.03
.001

.04
.0002

.03
.0003

t

Note. BDI-Beck Depression Inventory; IPSTRESS-Interpersonal Event
Stress; EASQ-IPGEN-Extended Attributional Style OuestionnaireInterpersonal Events Generality Composite; DYSATT-Dysfunctional
Attitudes Scale: IRRIDEAS-Irrational Ideas Inventory;
OVERGEN-Overgeneralization Subscale of the Attitudes Toward Self Scale;
LOCUS-Powerful Others and Chance Locus of Control Composite.
a E < .0001. b £ < .01. c £ < .05. d £ - .09.
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performed separately for subjects who perceived their most stressful
achievement event as either relatively controllable (N - 126) or
relatively uncontrollable (N - 100) and for subjects who perceived their
most stressful interpersonal event as either relatively controllable (N
- Ill) or relatively uncontrollable (N - 107).

Low and high perceived

control groups were formed through median splits on the measures
assessing perceived control over negative achievement (Mdn — 3.8) and
interpersonal (Mdn - 4.8) events.

As before, the cognitive style X

stress interaction terms were formed from centered scores on the
cognitive style and either achievement or interpersonal stress
variables.

Diathesis-stress predictions derived from the reformulated

theory of learned helplessness would receive support if cognitive style
scores interacted with event stressfulness to predict Tl to T2 increases
in BDI scores among subjects who perceived negative achievement or
interpersonal events as relatively uncontrollable but not among subjects
who perceived those events as relatively controllable.
Achievement Stress. Tables 10 and 11 present zero-order
correlations among the cognitive style, achievement stress, and
depressive symptom measures separately for subjects who perceived their
most stressful achievement event as relatively controllable and
uncontrollable, respectively.

Regression results are presented first

for subjects who perceived negative achievement events as controllable
(see Table 12).

Higher levels of achievement stress as well as higher

scores on measures of Irrational Ideas, Overgeneralization, and Locus of
Control Orientation (indicating greater externality), were significantly
associated with residual increases in BDI scores from Tl to T2.
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None of

Table 10
Intercorrelations Among Cognitive Stvle. Achievement Stress, and
Depressive Symptomatology Among Subjects Who Perceived Events as
Controllable (N — 126)

Measure

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Tl BDI
T2 BDI
ACSTRESS
EASQ-ACGEN
DYSATT
IRRIDEAS
OVERGEN
LOCUS

1

2

.65
.33
.29
.45
.45
.51
.37

.35
.18a
.37
.44
.48
.38

3

4

5

6

7

.51
.44
.50

.46
.50

.47

8

-

.24
.09b
.26
.30
.09b

-

.22a
.31
.43
.09b

-

Note. Unless otherwise indicated, all correlations are significant at or
beyond the £ < .01 level. BDI-Beck Depression
Inventory; ACSTRESS-Achievement Event Stress; EASO-ACGEN-Extended
Attributional Style Questionnaire: Achievement Events Generality
Composite; DYSATT-Dvsfunctional Attitudes Scale; IRRIDEAS- Irrational
Ideas Inventory; OVERGEN-Overgeneralizatlon Subscale of the Attitudes
Toward Self Scale; LOCUS-Powerful Others and Chance Locus of Control
Composite.
8 £ < .05. D ns.
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Table 11
Intercorrelations Among Cognitive Style. Achievement Stress, and
Depressive Symptomatology Among Subjects Who Perceived Events as
Uncontrollable (N - 100)

Measure

.62
.23°
.33
.46
.45
.70
.54

.25®
.29
.32
.43
.48
.36

4

3

5

6

7

8

-

.06b
.10b
.24®
.21®
.22®

-

.23®
.10b
.21®
.31

-

.55
.53
.51

-

.46
.47

1

Tl BDI
T2 BDI
ACSTRESS
EASQ-ACGEN
DYSATT
IRRIDEAS
OVERGEN
LOCUS

2

H
in

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

1

Note. Unless otherwise indicated, all correlations are significant at or
beyond the £ < .01 level. BDI-Beck Depression
Inventory; ACSTRESS-Achievement Event Stress; EASO-ACGEN-Extended
Attributional Style Questionnaire: Achievement Events Generality
Composite; DYSATT-Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale; IRRIDEAS- Irrational
Ideas Inventory; OVERGEN-Overgeneralization Subscale of the Attitudes
Toward Self Scale; LOCUS-Powerful Others and Chance Locus of Control
Composite.
_______ b ns
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Table 12
Regression Models Predicting Time 1 (Tl) to Time 2 (T2> Change in
Residualized BDI Scores from Achievement Stress. Dysfunctional
Cognitive Stvle. and Achievement Stress X Dysfunctional Cognitive
Style Interactions Among Subjects Who Perceived Events as
Controllable (N - 1261

Step Predictors in Set

3
1
2
3

1
2
3

1
2
3

1
2
3

Tl BDI
EASQ-ACGEN
ACSTRESS
EASQ-ACGEN X ACSTRESS

Tl BDI
DYSATT
ACSTRESS
DYSATT X ACSTRESS

Tl BDI
IRRIDEAS
ACSTRESS
IRRIDEAS X ACSTRESS

F-inc

df

87.61°

1,124

2 ,45c
1.14

3,122
4,122

.41

87.61°

1,124

.03
.00

3.35c
0.00

3,122
4,121

.41

87.610

1,124

4.83b
0.09

3,122
4,121

87.61°

1,124

4.68b
0.05

3,122
4,121

1—1

1
2

p2
inc

.02
.005

.04
.0004

Tl BDI
OVERGEN
ACSTRESS
OVERGEN X ACSTRESS

.41

Tl BDI
LOCUS
ACSTRESS
LOCUS X ACSTRESS

.41

87.61°

1,124

.04
.01

5.05b
1.65

3,122
4,121

.04
.0002

pr

t

.64
-.05
.20
-.10

9.36a
-0.58
2.20e
-1.07

.64
.13
.20
-.001

9.36a
1.44
2.24c
-0.01

.64
.20
.17
.03

9.36a
2.22c
1.85d
0.30

.64
.19
.16
.02

9.36a
2.16c
1.81d
0.23

.64
.20
.20
.12

9.36a
2.31c
2.28c
1.29

Note., BDI-Beck Depression Inventory; ACSTRESS-Achievement Event Stress;
EASQ-ACGEN-Extended Attrlbutional Style Questionnaire-Achievement Events
Generality Composite; DYSATT-Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale
IRRIDEAS-Irrational Ideas Inventory; OVERGEN-Overgeneralization Subscale
of the Attitudes Toward Self Scale; LOCUS-Powerful Others and Chance
Locus of Control Composite.
a E < .0001. b 2 <

.01. c 2 < .05. d £ - .07.
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the cognitive style X achievement stress interaction terms approached
significance, however.

The results of analogous tests for subjects who

perceived a lack of control over negative achievement events appear in
Table 13.

No significant main effects or interactions involving the

achievement stress and cognitive style variables were obtained.

Thus,

for negative achievement events, no evidence was obtained to support the
etiological status accorded to perceptions of uncontrollability in the
reformulated learned helplessness theory.
Interpersonal Stress. Tables 14 and 15 present zero-order
correlations among the cognitive style, interpersonal stress, and
depressive symptom measures separately for subjects who perceived their
most stressful interpersonal event as relatively controllable and
uncontrollable, respectively.

A very different pattern of findings

emerged when the regression analyses were repeated for interpersonal
stress.

Among subjects who perceived negative interpersonal events as

relatively controllable, only the stress, Irrational Ideas, and Locus of
Control main effect variables predicted temporal increases in BDI scores
(see Table 16).

Among subjects who perceived a lack of control over

negative interpersonal events, event stress as well as Attributional
Style (Interpersonal Domain) were significant main effect predictors of
Tl to T2 increases in BDI scores (see Table 17).

More important,

however, all but one of the cognitive style X interpersonal stress
interaction terras accounted for a significant portion of the variance
(ranging from three to eight percent) in residualized BDI scores.
Although small in magnitude, the size of these Interaction effects is
comparable to that reported in similar investigations (e.g., Alloy &
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Table 13
Regression Models Predicting Time 1 (Tl) to Time 2 (T21 Change in
Residualized BDI Scores from Achievement Stress. Dysfunctional
Cognitive Style, and Achievement Stress X Dysfunctional Cognitive
Style Interactions Among Subjects Who Perceived Events as
Uncontrollable (N — 1001

Step Predictors in Set

1
2
3

1
2
3

1
2
3

1
2
3

1
2
3

Tl BDI
EASQ-ACGEN
ACSTRESS
EASQ-ACGEN X ACSTRESS

Tl BDI
DYSATT
ACSTRESS
DYSATT X ACSTRESS

Tl BDI
IRRIDEAS
ACSTRESS
IRRIDEAS X ACSTRESS

Tl BDI
OVERGEN
ACSTRESS
OVERGEN X ACSTRESS

Tl BDI
LOCUS
ACSTRESS
LOCUS X ACSTRESS

r2

F-inc

df

pr

.38

60.89a

1,98

.02
.01

1.56
1.59

3,96
4,95

.62
.12
.14
.13

7.80B
1.16
1.35
1.26

.38

60.89a

1,98

.01
.01

0.92
1.53

3,96
4,95

.62
.03
.13
.13

7.80a
0.33
1.32
1.24

.38

60.89a

1,98

.03
.02

2.54e
3.04e

3,96
4,95

.62
.18
.11
.18

7.80a
1.81d
1.06
1.74e

.38

60.89®

1,98

1.20
0.001

3,96
4,95

.62
.08
.13
-.003

7.80a
0.81
1.26
-0.03

.38

60.89s

1,98

.01
.01

0.89
1.49

3,96
4,95

.62
.02
.13
.12

7.80s
0.21
1.28
1.22

inc

.02
.00001

t

Note. BDI-Beck Depression Inventory; ACSTRESS-Achievement Event Stress;
EASQ-ACGEN-Extended Attributional Style Questionnaire-Achievement Events
Generality Composite; DYSATT-Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale ;
IRRIDEAS-Irrational Ideas Inventory; OVERGEN-Overgeneralization Subscale
of the Attitudes Toward Self Scale; LOCUS-Powerful Others and Chance
Locus of Control Composite .
a 2 < .0001. d £ - .07. e E - .08.
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Table 14
Intercorrelatlons Among Cognitive SCvle. Interpersonal Stress,
and Depressive Symptomatology Among Subjects Who Perceived Events
as Controllable (N - 111^

Measure

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Tl BDI
T2 BDI
IPSTRESS
EASQ-IPGEN
DYSATT
IRRIDEAS
OVERGEN
LOCUS

1

2

.61
.35
.44
.50
.44
.66
.53

.34
.36
.37
.44
.47
.46

4

5

6

7

.49
.38
.38
.44

.55
.51
.54

.36
.42

.62

3

8

-

.27
,24®
.25
.36
.28

-

-

Note. Unless otherwise indicated. ,
all correlations are significant at or
beyond the
< .01 level. BDI1
-Beck Depression
Inventory; IPSTRESS-Interpersonal Event Stress; EASQ-IPGEN- Extended
Attributional Style Questionnaire: Interpersonal Events Generality
Composite; DYSATT-Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale; IRRIDEAS- Irrational
Ideas Inventory; OVERGEN-Overgeneralization Subscale of the Attitudes
Toward Self Scale; LOCUS-Powerful Others and Chance Locus of Control
Composite.
0 E < .05. b ns,
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Table 15
Intercorrelations Among Cognitive Style. Interpersonal Stress,
and Depressive Symptomatology Amonfl Subjects Who Perceived Events
as Uncontrollable (N - lOO1)

Measure

1.
2.
3.
4,
5.
6.
7.
8.

Tl BDI
T2 BDI
IPSTRESS
EASQ-IPGEN
DYSATT
IRRIDEAS
OVERGEN
LOCUS

1

.68
.35
.36
.38
.45
.52
.32

2

3

4

5

6

.54
.48
.46

.55
.57

7

8

-

.49
.41
.32
.42
.49
.23B

-

.28
.26
.21®
.28
.20“

-

.34
.27
.54
.17b

-

.33

Note. Unless otherwise indicated, all correlations are significant at or
beyond the £ < .01 level. BDI-Beck Depression Inventory; IPSTRESSInterpersonal Event Stress; EASQ-IPGEN- Extended Attributional Style
Questionnaire: Interpersonal Events Generality Composite; DYSATTDysfunctional Attitudes Scale; IRRIDEAS- Irrational Ideas Inventory;
OVERGEN-Overgeneralization Subscale of the Attitudes Toward Self Scale;
LOCUS-Powerful Others and Chance Locus of Control Composite.
a £
n ^
nq &
< .05.
D ns,
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Table 16
Regression Models Predicting Time 1 fTl^ to Time 2 IT21 Change in
Residualized BDI Scores from Interpersonal Stress. Dysfunctional
Cognitive Style, and Interpersonal Stress X Dysfunctional
Cognitive Style Interactions Among Subjects Who Perceived Events
as Controllable fN - 1111

Step Predictors in Set

1
2
3

1
2
3

1
2
3

1
2
3

1
2
3

Tl BDI
EASQ-IPGEN
IPSTRESS
EASQ-IPGEN X IPSTRESS

Tl BDI
DYSATT
IPSTRESS
DYSATT X IPSTRESS

Tl BDI
IRRIDEAS
IPSTRESS
IRRIDEAS X IPSTRESS

Tl BDI
OVERGEN
IPSTRESS
OVERGEN X IPSTRESS

Tl BDI
LOCUS
IPSTRESS
LOCUS X IPSTRESS

p2
K inc

F.inc

df

pr

.37

64.65®

1,109

.02
.002

1.77
0.36

3,107
4,106

.61
.09
.14
-.06

8.04°
0.93
1.50
-0.60

.37

64.65®

1,109

.02
.005

1.57
0.08

3,107
4.106

.61
.07
.15
-.03

8.04°
0.68
1.58
-0.29

.37

64.65®

1,109

4.20c
0.16

3,107
4,106

.61
.22
.13
.04

8.04°
2.37c
1.40
0.41

.37

64.65°

1,109

.02
.02

1.71
2.69

3,107
4,106

.61
.08
.14
-.16

8.04°
0.86
1.47
-1.64

.37

64.65°

1,109

3.22c
0.19

3,107
4,106

.61
.18
.14
- .04

8.04°
1.92d
1.45
-0.43

.05
.001

.04
.001

Note. BDI-Beck Depression Inventory; IPSTRESS—Interpersonal Event
Stress; EASQ-IPGEN-Extended Attributional Style QuestionnaireInterpersonal Events Generality Composite; DYSATT-Dysfunctional
Attitudes Scale; IRRIDEAS-Irrational Ideas Inventory; OVERGENOvergeneralization Subscale of the Attitudes Toward Self Scale;
LOCUS-Powerful Others and Chance Locus of Control Composite •
a £ < .0001. b E < .01. c £ < .05. d E - *06.
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t

Table 17

F.inc

df

pr
.67
.19
.32
.28

9.15a
1.98c
3.44b
2.91b

.67
.02
.34
.18

9.15a
0.25
3.69b
1.90d

.67
.16
.34
.20

9.15®
1.61
3.72b
2.03c

,67
,17
.33
.26

9.15®
1.76e
3.60b
2.75b

67
02
35
02

9.15®
-0.23
3.77b
0.21

t

1

s

Step Predictors in Set

ro

Regression Models Predicting Time 1
to Time 2 CT2') Change In
Residualized BDI Scores from Interpersonal Stress. Dysfunctional
Cognitive Stvle. and Interpersonal Stress X Dysfunctional
Cognitive Stvle Interactions Among Subjects Who Perceived Events
as Uncontrollable (N - 107>

1
2
3

1
2
3

1
2
3

1
2
3

1
2
3

.44

83.63a

1,105

.09
.04

9.32b
8.46b

3,103
4,102

Tl BDI
DYSATT
IPSTRESS
DYSATT X IPSTRESS

.44

83.63®

1,105

.07
.02

7.13b
3.60d

3,103
4,102

Tl BDI
IRRIDEAS
IPSTRESS
IRRIDEAS X IPSTRESS

.44

83.63®

1,105

.08
.02

8.57b
4.13c

3,103
4,102

Tl BDI
OVERGEN
IPSTRESS
0VERGEN X IPSTRESS

.44

83.63®

1,105

.08
.03

8.84b
7.56b

3,103
4,102

Tl BDI
LOCUS
IPSTRESS
LOCUS X IPSTRESS

.44

83.63®

1,105

7.12b
0.04

3,103
4,102

Tl BDI
EASQ-IPGEN
IPSTRESS
EASQ-IPGEN X IPSTRESS

.07
.0002

Note. BDI-Beck Depression Inventory; IPSTRESS-Interpersonal Event
Stress; EASQ-IPGEN-Extended Attributional Style QuestionnaireInterpersonal Events Generality Composite; DYSATT-Dysfunctional
Attitudes Scale: IRRIDEAS-•Irrational Ideas Inventory;
OVERGEN-Overgeneralization Subscale of the Attitudes Toward Self Scale:
LOCUS-Powerful Others and Chance Locus of Control Composite.
0 e < .0001. D £ < .01. c e < .05. a E - .06. e £ - .08.
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Clements, 1992; Metalsky et al., 1987; Metalsky & Joiner, 1992).
The unstandardized regression coefficients obtained for the four
significant interaction terms in Table 17 were compared in series of ttests with the unstandardized regression coefficients obtained for the
corresponding interaction terms in Table 16.

The purpose of these

comparisons was to determine whether the cognitive style X stress
interactions were reliably larger among subjects who perceived negative
interpersonal events as uncontrollable than among subjects who perceived
negative interpersonal events as controllable (cf. Williams, 1985).
results are presented in Table 18.

The

Significant differences were

obtained for the interactions involving Attributional Style
(Interpersonal Domain) and Overgeneralization.

Although both were in

the predicted direction, the Interpersonal Stress X Dysfunctional
Attitudes interaction was only marginally higher in the low control
group and the Interpersonal Stress X Irrational Ideas interaction did
not reliably differ in low and high in perceived control groups.
Despite the somewhat inconsistent results of these comparisons, an
effort was made to clarify the nature of the four cognitive style X
interpersonal stress interactions.

Toward this end, the relationship

between each of the cognitive style variables and residual Tl to T2
changes in BDI scores was evaluated at low, average, and high values of
uncontrollable interpersonal stress.

Using the procedures outlined by

Cohen and Cohen (1983) and Jaccard et al. (1990), the slope of
residualized BDI change scores on each cognitive style measure was
calculated at one standard deviation below the mean, at the mean, and
one standard deviation above the mean on the interpersonal stress
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Table 18
Comparisons of Cognitive Stvle X Interpersonal Stress Regression
Coefficients Obtained Among Subjects Who Perceived Events as
Uncontrollable and Subjects Who Perceived Events as Controllable

Interaction Term

EASQ-IPGEN X IPSTRESS
DYSATT X IPSTRESS
IRRIDEAS X IPSTRESS
OVERGEN X IPSTRESS

b1
.013
.003
.006
.01

S.E.t

.005
.001
.003
.005

b2
-.002
-.0006
.002
-.01

S.E.Z

.004
.002
.004
.007

t

2.34
1.61
0.92
2.33

Pa
<.025
<.06
<.25
<.025

Note, bj-Unstandardized regression coefficient obtained among subjects
who perceived interpersonal events as uncontrollable (JI - 107).
S.E.^Standard error of regression coefficient obtained among subjects
who perceived interpersonal events as uncontrollable. b2-Unstandardized
regression coefficient obtained among subjects who perceived
interpersonal events as controllable (N - 111). S.E.2-Standard error of
regression coefficient obtained among subjects who perceived
interpersonal events as controllable, t - [(b1 - b2)/((S.E.1)2 +
(S.E.Z)2)]1/2. df + Nz - 4. IPSTRESS" Interpersonal Event Stress;
EASO-IPGEN-Extended Attributional Style Questionnaire-Interpersonal
Events Generality Composite; DYSATT-Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale;
IRRIDEAS- Irrational Ideas Inventory; OVERGEN-Overgeneralization
Subscale of the Attitudes Toward Self Scale.
0 One-tailed.
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measure among subjects low in perceived control.

The results of these

calculations appear in Table 19.
The form of the interaction was the same in each case.

At low

values of interpersonal stress, there was no relation between levels of
dysfunctional cognition and residual changes in BDI scores (i.e., the
regression coefficient did not differ from zero). At medium values of
stress, significant positive relations emerged between residualized BDI
change scores and scores on the Overgeneralization and Attributional
Style (Interpersonal Domain) measures.

At high values of stress,

significant positive relations were obtained for all four measures of
dysfunctional cognitive style.

Among subjects who felt unable to

control the occurrence of highly stressful interpersonal events, higher
levels of dysfunctional cognition were associated with larger increases
in levels of depressive symptomatology.
The present results provide evidence that dysfunctional cognitive
styles render Individuals vulnerable to depressive symptomatology, and
support the general diathesis-stress framework that was made explicit in
hopelessness theory.

They do not, however, support the removal of

perceived uncontrollability from the etiological model specified by
hopelessness theorists. Increases in depressive symptomatology among
individuals who possessed dysfunctional cognitive styles were observed
only when highly stressful uncontrollable Interpersonal events occurred.
Analogous relations were not observed among subjects who experienced
highly stressful but controllable interpersonal events.10 This pattern
of results Is exactly what would be predicted by Abramson et al.'s
(1978) reformulation of learned helplessness theory.

Table 19
SloDes of Residual BDI Scores on Cognitive Stvle Variables at
Low. Medium, and High Levels of Uncontrollable Interpersonal
Stress

Measure

b Low

EASQ-IPGEN -.01
DYSATT
-.04
IRRIDEAS
.00
OVERGEN
.06

^low
-0.13
-0.001
0.0003
0.66

^med

*"med

^high

^high

.10
.001
.08
.19

2. 32c
0.96
1.68
2.38c

.21
.05
.16
.33

3.50a
1.61d
2.42b
2.87b

Note. EASO-IPGEN-Extended Attributional Style Questionnaire Interpersonal Events Generality Composite; DYSATT-Dysfunctional
Attitudes Scale; IRRIDEAS-lrrational Ideas Inventory;
OVERGEN-Overgeneralization Subscale of the Attitudes Toward Self Scale.
a E < -001.

0 £ < -01.

c £ “ *02. 0 £ < -05-
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Hopelessness Theory's Specific Vulnerability Hypothesis
The specific vulnerability hypothesis put forth by hopelessness
theory predicts that individuals who possess a depressogenic
attributional style in a particular domain (e.g., the interpersonal
domain) are at risk for developing depressive symptomatology only when
they encounter stressors in the same domain (e.g., social stressors).
The fact that, in the present investigation, subjects who tended to make
stable and global attributions for negative interpersonal outcomes
increased in levels of depressive symptomatology when they also
experienced high levels of interpersonal stress is consistent with this
hypothesis, but does not by itself provide unequivocal support for it.
In order to demonstrate the specificity of the interactive
relation between attributional style and stress, it must be shown that
1.) individuals who possess a depressogenic attributional style for
negative interpersonal outcomes do not exhibit increases in depressive
symptomatology under conditions of elevated achievement stress, and 2.)
individuals who possess a depressogenic attributional style for negative
achievement outcomes do not exhibit increases in depressive
symptomatology under conditions of elevated interpersonal stress.
The specific-vulnerability hypothesis was tested in two additional
regression analyses that evaluated the predictive utility of
"incongruent" attributional style X stress interactions among subjects
who perceived negative life events as uncontrollable.

As shown in the

upper panel of Table 20, the interaction of Achievement Stress and
Attributional Style (Interpersonal Domain) was not significant.
Consistent with the specific vulnerability hypothesis, the tendency to

97

Table 20
Regression Models Predicting Time 1 (Tl~) to Time 2 (T2) Change in
Residualized BDI Scores from Domain-Inconeruent Attributional
Stvle X Stress Interactions Amonp Subjects Who Perceived Events
as Uncontrollable (N — 107

Step Predictors in Set

1
2
3

1
2
3

df

R2inc

F.nc

Tl BDI
EASQ-IPGEN
ACSTRESS
EASQ-IPGEN X ACSTRESS

.38

60.89°

1,98

.03
.02

2.37
2.94

3,96
4,95

Tl BDI
EASQ-ACGEN
IPSTRESS
EASQ-ACGEN X IPSTRESS

.44

83.63a

1,105

.07
.03

7.64b
5.91c

3,103
4,102

pr

t

.62
.17
.12
.17

7.80a
1.72
1.21
1.72

.67
.10
.35
.23

9.15s
0.98
3.80b
2.43c

Note. BDI—Beck Depression Inventory; ACSTRESS—Achievement Event Stress;
IPSTRESS-Interpersonal Event Stress: EASO-IPGEN-Extended Attributional
Style Questionnaire-Interpersonal Events Generality Composite; EASOACGEN-Extended Attributional Style Questionnaire- Achievement Events
Generality Composite.
a E.

< .0001. b

e

< .01. c £ < .05.
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make stable and global attributions for negative interpersonal outcomes
did not confer a risk for depressive symptomatology at high levels of
achievement stress.
The results presented in the lower panel of Table 20, however,
suggest a very different conclusion about the validity of the specific
vulnerability hypothesis.

Significant effects were found for both

Interpersonal Stress and the interaction of Interpersonal Stress and
Attributional style (Achievement Domain).

The results of a slope

analysis performed on that interaction revealed that, as the
stressfulness of negative interpersonal events increased, the tendency
to make stable and global attributions for negative achievement events
became more strongly associated with increases in depressive symptoms.
This finding is of special interest in light of the fact that
scores on all other cognitive style measures used in this research, with
the exception of Locus of Control, also predicted increases in
depressive symptoms at high levels of (uncontrollable) interpersonal
stress.

Stress stemming from the occurrence of negative achievement

events did not moderate either the nature or the strength of any
cognitive style-depression relation.

Although each cognitive style

measure was developed to assess a unique type of dysfunctional
cognition, the diathesis-stress results reported thus far suggest some
commonality that underlies these constructs and leaves individuals
particularly susceptible to depressive symptoms in the face of
interpersonal difficulties.

The analyses described in the following

section were conducted to more specifically address this suggestion.
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Assessing the Unique Effects of the Diathesis-Stress Interactions
Although hopelessness theorists described various dysfunctional
cognitive styles that might serve as vulnerability factors for
depressive symptomatology, they left open the question of whether these
cognitive diatheses were orthogonal.

For example, when discussing

tendencies to anticipate negative consequences and attribute personal
deficiencies to the self when stressors occur, Abramson et al. (1989, p.
362) remarked that "We do not know whether such cognitive styles are
independent of the hypothesized depressogenic attributional style."
In addition to the results reported above, the recent findings of
Metalsky and Joiner (1992) suggest that the cognitive diatheses
specified in the hopelessness model are not independent but reflect a
higher-order vulnerability factor.

When assessed in separate analyses,

Metalsky and Joiner found that tendencies to make stable and global
attributions for negative outcomes, expect adverse consequences to
result from negative events, and attribute negative characteristics to
the self when negative events occur each interacted with scores on a
measure of life stress (the number of stressors recently experienced) to
predict temporal increases in depressive symptomatology.

When tested in

the same analysis, none of the interaction terms attained significance,
leading Metalsky and Joiner (p. 673) to speculate that "it was the
variance shared by the three vulnerability factors that conferred a risk
for depressive reactions.

Thus, the variance shared by the three

vulnerability factors may constitute a common 'core' liability."
In the same vein, the diathesis-stress interaction terms that
reliably predicted changes in depressive symptoms in the present
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research were assessed simultaneously to determine if they exert unique
effects.

The Tl BDI covariate was entered on the first step of this

regression analysis, followed by the eptry of five main effect terms on
the second step: ratings of interpersonal stress and scores on the
Overgeneralization, Attributional Style (Interpersonal Domain),
Irrational Ideas, and Dysfunctional Attitude measures,

All four

cognitive style X interpersonal stress interaction terms entered the
equation on the third step.

Unique predictive utility would be

attributed to each interaction term that continued to be significantly
related to residualized BDI change scores after all other Interaction
terms were statistically controlled.
Table 21 shows a pattern of results similar to that reported by
Metalsky and Joiner (1992) . Of the main effects evaluated on the second
step of the analysis, only interpersonal stress accounted for a
significant portion (11%) of the variance in BDI change scores.

None of

the cognitive style main effect or Interaction variables contributed
unique variance to the prediction of BDI change scores.

These results

strengthen speculations that a higher-order cognitive vulnerability
factor, which is tapped by a number of existing measures, contributes to
the onset of depressive symptomatology under conditions of high
(uncontrollable) Interpersonal stress.
Hopelessness as a Mediator of the Relation Between Dysfunctional
Cognitive Stvle and Depressive Symptomatology
As the proximal sufficient cause of depression in Abramson et
al.'s (1989) revised model, hopelessness is believed to mediate the
effects of all cognitive style and stress variables on depressive
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Table 21
Regression Models Assessing the Unique Contribution of Each
Significant Cognitive Stvle X Interpersonal Stress Interaction
Among Subjects Who Perceived Events as Uncontrollable (N — 107')

Step Predictors in Set

1
2

3

Tl BDI
EASQ-IPGEN
DYSATT
IRRIDEAS
OVERGEN
IPSTRESS
EASQ-IPGEN X IPSTRESS
DYSATT X IPSTRESS
IRRIDEAS X IPSTRESS
OVERGEN X IPSTRESS

df

pr

83.63°

1,105

4.33b

6,100

.67
.15
-.09
.13
.06
.33

9.15°
1.52
-0.91
1.33
0.60
3.45b

10,96

.16
-.07
.06
.10

1.59
0.71
0.60
1.02

R2inc

Finc

.44

.10

.05

2.94c

Note. BDI-Beck Depression Inventory; IPSTRESS-Interpersonal Event
Stress; EASO-IPGEN-Extended Attributional Style QuestionnaireInterpersonal Events Generality Composite; DYSATT-Dysfunctional
Attitudes Scale; IRRIDEAS-Irrational Ideas Inventory; OVERGENOvergeneralization Subscale of the Attitudes Toward Self Scale.
a E < .0001. b £ < .01. c E < .05.
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t

symptomatology.

According to the model, individuals who possess

dysfunctional cognitive styles become hopeless (i.e., come to believe
that negative outcomes are likely to occur in the future and that
nothing can be done to prevent their occurrence) under conditions of
high stress and therefore exhibit elevated levels of depressive
symptomatology.

Thus the relation between dysfunctional cognitive style

and depression hypothesized by Abramson et al. (1989), and demonstrated
in the present investigation among subjects who perceived interpersonal
stressors as uncontrollable, is thought to be an indirect one, mediated
by the formation of hopelessness expectancies.
Support for this mediational hypothesis is very limited.
Ironically, although future outcome and control expectancies have always
played a key role in learned helplessness theorizing, empirical tests of
these models (e.g., Cutrona, 1983; Follette & Jacobson, 1987; Metalsky
et al. , 1982; Metalsky et al., 1987; O'Hara, Rehm, & Campbell, 1982;
Rothwell & Williams, 1983) frequently fail to include measures of
hopelessness (but see Alloy & Clements, 1992; Andersen, 1990; Metalsky
et al., 1993; Metalsky & Joiner, 1992; Riskind, Rholes, Brannon,
Burdick, 1987 for exceptions).

When future expectancies have been

measured so that the mediational hypotheses of the hopelessness model
could be evaluated, the results have not always been in line with
predictions.

Metalsky arid Joiner (1992), for example, found that

interactions of dysfunctional cognitive style and life stress continued
to predict increases in depressive symptomatology after controlling for
concurrent increases in hopelessness expectancies (see Alloy & Clements,
1992 for similar results).

Metalsky et al. (1993), however, did find

103

that hopelessness accounted for the relation between negativlstic
attributional styles and depressive reactions among students who
received failing grades on a midterm exam.
The regression analyses described below were conducted in an
effort to determine whether hopelessness expectancies (as assessed by
the BHS) mediate the interactive effects of dysfunctional cognitive
style and stress that were observed in the present research.

For each

significant cognitive style X stress interaction effect, two regression
equations were estimated to determine whether the conditions required
for hopelessness mediation were satisfied (cf. Baron & Kenny, 1986;
Metalsky & Joiner, 1992).

The first analysis in each set tested whether

the interaction of cognitive style and stress predicts T2 BHS scores
after controlling for Tl BHS scores and the cognitive style and stress
main effects (Condition 1).

The second analysis in each set tested

whether T2 BHS scores predict residualized increases in T2 BDI scores
(Condition 2), and whether the cognitive style X stress interaction
continues to predict BDI change scores after T2 BHS scores are
controlled (Condition 3).
The mediating role of hopelessness expectancies predicted by
Abramson et al. (1989) would be demonstrated if high levels of
dysfunctional cognitive style in combination with high levels of
uncontrollable Interpersonal stress predicted increases in hopelessness,
if increases in hopelessness were significantly associated with
increases in depressive symptomatology, and if the cognitive style X
stress interactions that previously predicted changes in depressive
symptoms were no longer significant when hopelessness was included in
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the model.

Partial mediation would be demonstrated if Conditions 1 and

2 were satisfied and the interactive effects of cognitive style and
stress on depressive symptoms were significantly reduced in strength (as
opposed to being eliminated in the case of complete mediation) after
controlling for hopelessness.
Tables 22 through 25 present the results of the mediational
analyses.

None of the cognitive style X stress interaction effects were

mediated by hopelessness.

Interactions involving Interpersonal Stress

and Dysfunctional Attitudes, Irrational Ideas, and Overgeneralization
failed to predict changes In BHS scores (Condition 1) and, although
increases in hopelessness were reliably associated with increases in
depressive symptomatology (Condition 2), those interaction terms
continued to be significant predictors of BDI change scores after
controlling for hopelessness (Condition 3).

This pattern of findings

suggests a direct relation between dysfunctional cognitive styles and
depressive symptomatology under conditions of elevated Interpersonal
stress.
BHS change scores were predicted by the interaction of
Interpersonal Stress and Attributional Style (Interpersonal Domain) (see
Table 25).

Removing the variance associated with hopelessness, however,

had only a trivial effect on the strength of the relation between BDI
change scores and the Interpersonal Stress X Attributional Style
interaction.

Table 26 shows that the regression coefficients

corresponding to each interaction term did not significantly decrease in
magnitude after T2 BHS scores were controlled.

The development of

hopelessness expectancies was not, therefore, responsible for the
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Table 22
Regression Model Testing the Role of Hopelessness as a Mediator
of the Relation Between Dysfunctional Attitudes and Depressive
Symptomatology Amonp Subjects Who Perceived Negative
Interpersonal Events as Uncontrollable fN - 107)

Step

1
2

Criterion

T2BHS

3

1

T2BDI

2
3
4

Predictors in Set

Rzinc

Finc

T1BHS
DYSATT
IPSTRESS
DYSATT X IPSTRESS

.29

43.44®

T1BDI
T1BHS
DYSATT
IPSTRESS
T2BHS
DYSATT X IPSTRESS

.04
.001

3.35c
0.13

df

pr

1,105

.54 6.59a
-.05 -0.55
3,103 .25 2.59b
4,102 .04 0.36

.44

41.54®

2,104

.07
.12
.01

7.02b
32.36®
3.71d

4,102
5,101
6,100

.61
.04
.02
.34
.49
.19

Note. BHS-Beck Hopelessness Scale: BDI-Beck Depression Inventory;
DYSATT-Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale: IPSTRESS-Interpersonal Event
Stress.
a £ < .0001. b E <

-01. C E <

.05. d £ -.06.
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t

7.81®
0.37
0.25
3.66b
5.69®
1.93d

Table 23
Regression Model Testing the Role of Hopelessness as a Mediator
of the Relation Between Irrational Ideas and Depressive
Symptomatology Among Subjects Who Perceived Negative
Interpersonal Events as Uncontrollable (N - 107)

Step

1
2

Criterion

T2BHS

3

1
2
3
4

T2BDI

Predictors in Set

RZiin
„c

T1BHS
IRRIDEAS
IPSTRESS
DYSATT X IPSTRESS

.29

43.44°

.04
.01

3.36c
0.73

.44

41.54°

2,104

.08
.12
.01

8.44b
34.07°
3.41e

4,102
5,101
6,100

T1BDI
T1BHS
IRRIDEAS
IPSTRESS
T2BHS
IRRIDEAS X IPSTRESS

F-inc

df

pr

1,105

.54 6.59°
-.05-■0.56
3,103 .25 2.59b
4,102 .08 0.86

.61
.04
.16
.34
.50
.18

Note. BHS-Beck Hopelessness Scale; BDI-Beck Depression Inventory;
IRRIDEAS—Irrational Ideas Inventory; IPSTRESS—Interpersonal Event
Stress.
a £ < .0001. b E < .01, c 2 < -05. d E -.06. e E - .07.
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t

7.81°
0.37
1.60
3.69b
5.84°
1.85°

Table 24
Regression Model Testing the Role of Hopelessness as a Mediator
of the Relation Between Overgeneralizatlon and Depressive
Symptomatology Among Subjects Who Perceived Negative
Interpersonal Events as Uncontrollable (N — 107)
Step

1
2

Criterion

T2BHS

3

1

T2BDI

2
3
4

Predictors in Set

T1BHS
OVERGEN
IPSTRESS
OVERGEN X IPSTRESS

T1BDI
T1BHS
OVERGEN
IPSTRESS
T2BHS
OVERGEN X IPSTRESS

tnc

F.inc

df

.29

43.44s

1,105

.04
.01

3.23c
2.31

3,103
4,102

.44

41.54a

2,104

.08
.11
.02

8.72b 4,102
31.908 5,101
4.71c 6,100

pr

t

.54
.02
.23
.15

6.59a
0.25
2.42c
1.52

.61
.04
.17
.33
.49
.21

7.81B
0.37
1.75c
3.58b
5.65s
2.17c

Note. BHS-Beck Hopelessness Scale; BDI--Beck Depression Inventory;
OVERGEN-Overgeneralization Subscale of the Attitudes Toward Self Scales;
IPSTRESS-Interoersonal Event Stress.
8 e < .0001. b E <

.01. C E <

.05. d j) -.06. e 2 - .07.
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Table 25
Repression Model Testing the Role of Hopelessness as a Mediator
of the Relation Between Dysfunctional Attributional Stvle
(Interpersonal Domain^ and Depressive Symptomatology Among
Subjects Who Perceived Negative Interpersonal Events as
Uncontrollable (N — 107)

Step

1
2

Criterion

T2BHS

3

1
2
3
4

T2BDI

Predictors in Set

®-2fnc

TlBHS
.29
EASQ-IPGEN
IPSTRESS
.06
EASQ-IPGEN X IPSTRESS.02

TlBDI
TlBHS
.44
EASQ-IPGEN
IPSTRESS
.08
T2BHS
.10
EASQ-IPGEN X IPSTRESS.02

df

pr

43.44a

1,105

5.08b
3.85c

3,103
4,102

.54
18
.20
.19

6.59a
1,89d
2.08e
1.96c

41.54a

2,104

9.16b
28.82a
5.38d

4,102
5,101
6,100

61
.04
19
.32
.47
.23

7.81a
0.37
1.96c
3.43b
5.37a
2.32c

^inc

t

Note. BHS-Beck Hopelessness Scale; BDI-Beck Depression Inventory; EASOIPGEN-Extended Attributional Style Questionnaire-Interpersonal Events
Generalitv Composite: IPSTRESS-Interpersonal Event Stress.
a E < .0001. D E < .01. c £ < .05. a 2 -.06. e £ - .08.
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Table 26
Comparisons of Cognitive Stvle X Interpersonal Stress Regression
Coefficients With those Obtained in Hopelessness Mediational
Analysis (N — 107^

Interaction Term

DYSATT X IPSTRESS
IRRIDEAS X IPSTRESS
OVERGEN X IPSTRESS
EASQ-IPGEN X IPSTRESS

b1
.003
.006
.01
.013

s .e m

.001
.003
.005
.005

b2
.002
.005
.009
.006

S.E.Z

.001
.003
.004
.003

t

0.71
0.24
0.15
1.21

PB
>.05
>.05
>.05
>.05

Note. b2-Unstandardized regression coefficient obtained in hopelessness
mediational analysis. S.E .2-Standard error of regression coefficient
obtained in hopelessness mediational analysis, t - [(b1 - b2)/((S.E..j)2 +
(S.E.2)2)]1/2. df - Nj + N2 - 4. IPSTRESS-Interpersonal Event Stress;
DYSATT-Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale; IRRIDEAS-Irrational Ideas
Inventory; OVERGEN-Overgeneralization Subscale of the Attitudes Toward
Self Scale; EASO-IPGEN-Extended Attributional Style QuestionnaireInterpersonal Events Generality Composite.
a One-tailed.
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increases in depressive symptomatology observed among subjects who
possessed higher levels of dysfunctional cognitive style and experienced
high levels of uncontrollable interpersonal stress.
Summary of Dysfunctional Cognitive Stvle Findings
Taken together, the results reported in this section provide
little support for Abramson et al.'s (1989) predictions regarding the
etiological role of dysfunctional cognitive styles in hopelessness
depression. Scores on measures of Locus of Control, Overgeneralization,
Attributional Style, Irrational Ideas, and Dysfunctional Attitudes
failed to predict T1 to T2 increases in depressive symptomatology at
high levels of either achievement or interpersonal stress.

The

reformulation's (Abramson et al., 1978) competing prediction that
dysfunctional cognitive styles would be positively associated with
depressive symptoms when negative outcomes were perceived as
uncontrollable fared much better.
Among subjects who perceived a lack of control over negative
interpersonal events, those with higher scores on measures of
Overgeneralization, Attributional Style (Interpersonal Domain),
Irrational Ideas, and Dysfunctional Attitudes exhibited larger increases
in depressive symptomatology as the stressfulness of those events
increased.

Similar relations among dysfunctional cognitive styles,

interpersonal stress, and depressive symptomatology were not observed
for subjects who perceived negative events as controllable.

These

findings suggest that highly stressful experiences were not sufficient
by themselves to trigger increases in depressive symptomatology among
cognitively vulnerable individuals.

Rather, dysfunctional cognition was
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associated with temporal increases in depressive symptoms only when
(interpersonal) stressors were perceived as uncontrollable.
Tests of the hopelessness model's supplemental diathesis-stress
predictions likewise yielded little support.

Consistent with the

specific vulnerability hypothesis, the tendency to make stable and
global attributions for negative interpersonal outcomes predicted
increases in depression at high levels of (uncontrollable) interpersonal
stress but not at high levels of (uncontrollable) achievement stress.
The converse was not true, however, of attributional style in the
achievement domain.

Tendencies to make stable and global attributions

for negative achievement events predicted increases in depression at
high levels of (uncontrollable) interoersonal stress but not at high
levels of (uncontrollable) achievement stress.
In addition, no justification was found for conceptualizing the
three dysfunctional cognitive styles discussed by hopelessness theorists
as independent vulnerability factors.

When evaluated simultaneously,

none of the previously significant cognitive style X interpersonal
stress interaction terms contributed unique variance to the prediction
of T1 to T2 change in depressive symptomatology levels.

Assuming the

adequate measurement of these constructs, tendencies to attribute
negative outcomes to stable and global causes, expect adverse
consequences to result from life stressors, and draw derogatory
inferences about the self when negative events occur appear to be unique
manifestations of a more global vulnerability factor rather than
Independent risk factors.
Finally, hopelessness expectancies did not mediate any of the
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interactive effects of dysfunctional cognitive style and stress on
depressive symptoms.

All but one of the cognitive style X interpersonal

stress interaction terms failed to predict changes In hopelessness
expectancies.

Although the Attributional Style (Interpersonal Domain) X

Interpersonal Stress interaction was significantly related to
hopelessness, it continued to be reliably associated with changes in
levels of depressive symptomatology after controlling for hopelessness.
In contrast to the expectations of hopelessness theorists, relations
between dysfunctional cognitive styles and depression were direct rather
than mediated.
Relations Between Dysfunctional Cognition and Event Inferences:
Mediational Predictions of Hopelessness Theory
Hopelessness theory addresses itself to the question of why
certain dysfunctional cognitive styles put individuals at risk for
depression when negative life events occur.

According to the theory,

relations between maladaptive cognitive styles and depressive
symptomatology are mediated by the inferences that cognitively
vulnerable individuals make about the stressors they experience.
Abramson et al. (1989) hypothesized that attributing specific negative
events to stable and global causes, expecting those events to bring
about undesired consequences, and inferring personal deficiencies when
those events occur, each increase the likelihood of hopelessness and, in
turn, hopelessness depression.

Although they acknowledge that events

themselves provide the "raw data" for the types of Inferences that are
made, Abramson et al. made the reasonable prediction that individuals
who habitually make stable and global attributions, anticipate adverse
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consequences, or view themselves as personally flawed when negative
events occur, will be more likely than their counterparts to make
corresponding inferences when particular stressful events occur.

Thus,

it is the propensity of cognitively vulnerable individuals to make
hopelessness-inducing inferences about stressful life events that is
believed to increase their risk of depressive symptomatology when such
events occur.
The analyses described below evaluate mediational predictions
concerning associations between dysfunctional cognitive styles and
inferences made in response to the occurrence of uncontrollable
interpersonal stressors.

A series of hierarchical regression analyses

were performed to assess the extent to which interactions of
dysfunctional cognitive style and interpersonal stress predicted scores
on event-based measures of attributional generality (i.e., the stable
and global attributional composite), expected negative consequences, and
inferred personal deficiencies among subjects low in perceived control.
Because they have been implicated as etiological factors for depression
(e.g., Janoff-Bulman, 1979), scores on measures of behavioral and
characterological blame for uncontrollable interpersonal stressors also
served as criterion variables in these analyses.
Separate regression equations were estimated to assess the
predictive utility of interactions involving Interpersonal Stress and
Attributional Style (Interpersonal Domain), Dysfunctional Attitudes,
Irrational Ideas, and Overgeneralization.

Event inference scores were

regressed on the (centered) cognitive style and interpersonal stress
main effect variables on the first step of each analysis.
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Cognitive

style X interpersonal stress interaction terms, formed from centered
scores on their respective main effect variables, were always assessed
on the second step of the analysis.

Zero-order correlations among the

cognitive style, interpersonal stress, and inference measures are
presented in Table 27.

In addition to being moderately correlated among

themselves, scores on most event-inference measures were significantly
positively associated with scores on each cognitive style measure expect
the Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale and Irrational Ideas Inventory.
Hierarchical regression results for the Attributional Style
(Interpersonal Domain) measure appear in Table 28.

The main effects of

both attributional style and interpersonal stress significantly
predicted * :ores on each event-inference measure.

Tendencies to make

stable and global attributions for negative interpersonal outcomes were
associated with higher scores on scales assessing stable and global
event attributions, negative consequence expectancies, perceived
deficiencies, and behavioral as well as characterological blame for
uncontrollable interpersonal stressors.

Between four and 10% percent of

the variance in scores on these measures was predictable from the
Attributional Style main effect variable.

In addition, the more

stressful subjects' uncontrollable interpersonal events were, the higher
their scores were on each inference measure.

Stress ratings were most

strongly related to expectations about the negative consequences of
uncontrollable interpersonal experiences, accounting for 22% of the
variance in scores on that measure.

Stress was only weakly related to

behavioral blame, accounting for a marginally significant three percent
of the variance In scores on that measure.

The Attributional Style

Table 27
Intercorrelations Among Cognitive Stvle. Interpersonal Stress and
Event-Cognition Measures Among Subjects Low In Perceived Control
fN - 107)

Measure

1

1. EASQ-IPGEN2. DYSATT
.34
3. IRRIDEAS .27
4. OVERGEN .54
5. IPSTRESS .28
6. IEQ-GEN .37
7. IEQ-CNS .35
8. IEQ-DEF .37
9. IEQ-BBL .35
10. IEQ-CBL .26

3

2

.54
.48
.26
.16b
.10b
.15b
.10b
.08b

5

4

6

7

8

9

10

-

.55
.21°
,15b
.21a
.14b
,05b
.08b

-

.28
,29
.31
.32
.32
.27

-

.38
.52
.34
.26
.26

-

.48
.26
.23°
.18b

-

.42
.28
.18b

-

.80
.78

.89

Note. Unless otherwise indicated, all correlations are significant at or
beyond the £ < ,01 level. EASO-IPGEN-Extended Attributional Style
Questionnaire-Interpersonal Events Generality Composite;
DYSATT-Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale; IRRIDEAS-Irrational Ideas
Inventory; OVERGEN-Overgeneralization Subscale of the Attitudes Toward
Self Scale; IPSTRESS- Interpersonal Event Stress; IEO-GEN-Interpersonal
Events Questionnaire-Attributional Generality Subscale; IEO-CNSInterpersonal Events Questionnaire-Expected Consequences Subscale; IEODEF-Interpersonal Events Questionnaire-Personal Deficiencies Subscale;
IEO-BBL-Internersonal Events Questionnaire-Behavioral Blame Subscale;
IEO-CBl^Interpersonal Events Questionnaire-Characterological Blame
Subscale.
a £ < .05. b ns.
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Table 28
Regression Models Predicting Inferences About Uncontrollable
Negative Interpersonal Events from Interpersonal Stress.
Attributional Stvle (Interpersonal Domain^. and Interpersonal
Stress X Attributional Style Interactions

Step

Criterion

1

IEQ-GEN

2

1

IEQ-CNS

2

1

IEQ-DEF

2

1

IEQ-BBL

2

1
2

IEQ-CBL

Predictors in Set

Ffnc

df

pr

t

EASQ-IPGEN
IPSTRESS
.22
EASQ-IPGEN X IPSTRESS.002

14.53s
0.20

2,104
3,103

.30
.31
.04

3.17b
3. 32b
0.45

EASQ-IPGEN
IPSTRESS
.32
EASQ-IPGEN X IPSTRESS.001

24.29®
0.17

2,104
3,103

.26
.47
.04

2.72b
5.42®
0.41

EASQ-IPGEN
IPSTRESS
.20
EASQ-IPGEN X IPSTRESS.0003

12.95®
0.03

.31 3.31b
2,104 .27 2.80b
3,103 -.02 ■-0.18

EASQ-IPGEN
IPSTRESS
.15
EASQ-IPGEN X IPSTRESS.002

9.17®
0.22

.30 3.19b
2,104 .18 1.87d
3,103 -.05 •■0.47

EASQ-IPGEN
IPSTRESS
.11
EASQ-IPGEN X IPSTRESS .00

6.13®
0.00

2,104
3,103

R2fnc

.21 2.15c
.20 2.07c
.001 0.01

Note. EASQ-IPGEN-Extended Attributional Style QuestionnaireInterpersonal Events Generality Composite; IPSTRESS-Interpersonal Event
Stress; IEO-GEN-Interpersonal Events Questionnaire-Attributional
Generality Subscale; IEO-CNS-Interpersonal Events Questionnaire-Expected
Consequences Subscale; IEO-DEF-Interpersonal Events QuestionnairePersonal Deficiencies Subscale; IEO -BBL-Intemersonal Events
Questionnaire-Behavioral Blame Subscale; IEO-CBL-Interpersonal Events
Questionnaire-Characterological Blame Subscale.
® E < .0001. b e < .01. c E < .05. d £ -.06.
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(Interpersonal Domain) X Interpersonal Stress interaction was unrelated
to scores on all of the Inference measures examined.

The hopelessness

model's mediational hypothesis regarding the attributional diathesis was
not supported.

Tendencies to make stable and global attributions for

negative interpersonal outcomes were associated with negativistic
inferences for uncontrollable interpersonal events at all levels of
stress.
Table 29 presents regression results for the Dysfunctional
Attitudes Scale.

Moderate to strong positive associations were once

again observed between stress ratings and scores on all Inference
measures.

However, neither the main effect of Dysfunctional Attitudes

nor the Dysfunctional Attitudes X Interpersonal Stress interaction
effect accounted for a significant portion of the variance in scores on
any event inference measure.

An identical pattern of results was

obtained in the analyses involving scores on the Irrational Ideas
Inventory (see Table 30).
As shown in Table 31, scores on the Overgeneralization main effect
variable were, along with stress ratings, significant predictors of the
inferences subjects made about uncontrollable negative interpersonal
events.

Stronger tendencies to magnify the implications of negative

events were associated with higher scores on all measures of
depressogenic inferences across all levels of stress.

Like the

attributional diathesis, the positive relation between
Overgeneralization and inferences did not vary as a function of the
stressfulness of negative uncontrollable interpersonal events.
Hypothesized relations between dysfunctional cognitive styles and
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Table 29
Regression Models Predicting Inferences About Uncontrollable
Negative Interpersonal Events from Interpersonal Stress.
Dysfunctional Attitudes, and Interpersonal Stress X Dysfunctional
Attitudes Interactions

Step

Criterion

Predictors in Set

R^-inc

Finc

1

IEQ-GEN

DYSATT
IPSTRESS
DYSATT X IPSTRESS

.15
.01

8.92b
0.91

2,104
3,103

.07 0.68
.35 3.85b
.09 0.95

DYSATT
IPSTRESS
DYSATT X IPSTRESS

.27
.01

19,40a
0.97

2,104
3,103

-.05 -0.49
.51 6.12s
.10 0.98

DYSATT
IPSTRESS
DYSATT X IPSTRESS

.12
.0001

7.04b
0.01

2,104
3,103

.07 0.72
.31 3.37b
.01 0.10

DYSATT
IPSTRESS
DYSATT X IPSTRESS

.07
.001

3.77c
0.08

2,104
3,103

.03 0.31
.24 2.55b
.03 0.28

DYSATT
IPSTRESS
DYSATT X IPSTRESS

.07
.0002

3.68c
0.02

2,104
3,103

.02 0.17
.24 2.57b
.01 0.14

2

1

IEQ-CNS

2

1

IEQ-DEF

2

1

IEQ-BBL

2

1
2

IEQ-CBL

df

pr

t

Note. DYSATT-Dvsfunctional Attitudes Scale; IPSTRESS- Interpersonal
Event Stress; IEO-GEN-Intemersonal Events Questionnaire-Attributional
Generality Subscale; IEO-CNS-Interpersonal Events Questionnaire-Expected
Consequences Subscale; IEO-DEF-Interpersonal Events QuestionnairePersonal Deficiencies Subscale; IEO-BBI^Interpersonal Events
Questionnaire-Behavioral Blame Subscale; IEO-CBL^Interpersonal Events
Questionnaire-Characterological Blame Subscale.
a E < .0001. b E < .01. c B < -05-
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Table 30
Regression Models Predicting Inferences About Uncontrollable
Negative Interpersonal Events from Interpersonal Stress.
Irrational Ideas, and Interpersonal Stress X Irrational Ideas
Interactions

Step

1

Criterion

IEQ-GEN

2

1

IEQ-CNS

2
1

IEQ-DEF

2

1

IEQ-BBL

2

1
2

IEQ-CBL

Predictors in Set

R!|nc

Finc

IRRIDEAS
IPSTRESS
IRRIDEAS X IPSTRESS

.15
.00

9.05b
0.002

2,104
3,103

.08 0.83
.36 3.92b
.004 0.04

IRRIDEAS
IPSTRESS
IRRIDEAS X IPSTRESS

.28
.01

20.32B
1.59

2,104
3,103

.12
.50
.12

IRRIDEAS
IPSTRESS
IRRIDEAS X IPSTRESS

.12
.002

7.09b
0.21

2,104
3,103

.08 0.78
.32 3.45b
.05 0.46

IRRIDEAS
IPSTRESS
IRRIDEAS X IPSTRESS

IRRIDEAS
IPSTRESS
IRRIDEAS X IPSTRESS

df

P*

t

1.26
5.87s
1.26

_ ,002-0.02

.07
.00

.07
.0005

3.72°
0.001

2,104
3,103

,25 2.68b
.
,004 0.04

3.70c
0.05

2,104
3,103

.03 0.26
.25 2.60b
.02 0.23

Note. IRRIDEAS-:Irrational Ideas Inventory; IPSTRESS-Interpersonal Event
Stress: IEO-GEN--Interpersonal Events Questionnaire-Attributional
Generality Subscale; IEQ-CNS-Interpersonal Events Questionnaire-Expected
Consequences Subscale; IEQ-DEF-Interpersonal Events QuestionnairePersonal Deficiencies Subscale; IEQ-BBI^Interpersonal Events
Questionnaire-Behavioral Blame Subscale: IEQ-CBI^*Interpersonal Events
Questionnaire-Characterological Blame Subscale.
0 E < .0001. 15 e < .01. c E < .05.
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Table 31
Regression Models Predicting Inferences About Uncontrollable
Negative Interpersonal Events from Interpersonal Stress.
Overgeneralization, and Interpersonal Stress X Overgeneralization
Interactions

Step

Criterion

Predictors in Set

d2
K inc

F-inc

1

IEQ-GEN

OVERGEN
IPSTRESS
OVERGEN X IPSTRESS

.18
.001

11.39°
0.02

.21 2.17c
2,104 .32 3.49b
3,103 -.01 -0.13

OVERGEN
IPSTRESS
OVERGEN X IPSTRESS

.30
.004

22.12°
0.54

2,104
3,103

.20 2.05c
.48 5.52°
.07 0.73

OVERGEN
IPSTRESS
OVERGEN X IPSTRESS

.17
.00

10.58°
0.0002

2,104
3,103

.25 2.60b
.28 2.93b
.001 0.01

OVERGEN
IPSTRESS
OVERGEN X IPSTRESS

.13
.001

7.80fa
0.12

.26 2.76b
2,104 .19 1.96c
3,103 -.03 -0.34

OVERGEN
IPSTRESS
OVERGEN X IPSTRESS

.11
.0000

6.33b
0.002

.21 2.23c
2,104 .20 2.05c
3,103 .004 0.04

2

1

IEQ-CNS

2

1

IEQ-DEF

2

1

IEQ-BBL

2

1
2

IEQ-CBL

df

pr

t

Note. OVERGEN-Overeeneralization Subscale of the Attitudes Toward Self
Scale; IPSTRESS-Interpersonal Event Stress; IEQ-GEN- Interpersonal
Events Questionnaire-Attributional Generality Subscale; IEQGNS-Interpersonal Events Questionnaire-Expected Consequences Subscale;
IEO-DEF-Interoersonal Events Ouestionnaire-Personal Deficiencies
Subscale: IEO-BBl>Interoersonal Events Questionnaire-Behavioral Blame
Subscale: IEO-CBL-Interoersonal Events Ouestionnaire-Characteroloeical
Blame Subscale.
a E < .0001. D e < .01. c E < -05.
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inferences about uncontrollable interpersonal stressors failed to
receive support in all tests of the hopelessness model's mediational
component.

Although higher attributional style and overgeneralization

scores were associated with increases in depressive symptomatology among
subjects who experienced highly upsetting uncontrollable interpersonal
stressors, the inferences made about those events were not predictable
by any of the cognitive style X stress interactions.

Dysfunctional

cognitive style was either unrelated to interpersonal event inferences
or positively related to inferences across all levels of interpersonal
stress.

In no case were maladaptive cognitions associated with negative

inferences for only the most stressful of subjects' uncontrollable
interpersonal experiences.
Relations Between Event Inferences and Depressive Symptomatology
Proximal Contributory Cause Predictions of Hopelessness Theory
The results described above suggest that maladaptive inferences
did not mediate the dysfunctional cognition-depressive symptom relations
observed among subjects who experienced high levels of uncontrollable
interpersonal stress.

The hopelessness model's proposed causal chain

linking dysfunctional cognition to maladaptive inferences about negative
life events, and maladaptive inferences to depressive symptoms (via
hopelessness expectancies) was not, therefore, empirically confirmed.
The failure to provide support for this etiological process does not, of
course, nullify or in any way diminish the importance of the direct
effects that dysfunctional cognitive styles had on increases in
depressive symptomatology.

Likewise, a lack of support for the

mediational component does not preclude the possibility that maladaptive
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inferences about: highly upsetting events will affect levels of
depressive symptoms independently of dysfunctional cognitive styles.
An additional set of analyses was therefore performed to evaluate
the proximal contributory cause component of the hopelessness model.
The APV procedure described previously was used to test the hypothesis
that attributing highly upsetting life events to stable and global
causes, expecting an array of negative consequences to result from those
events, and/or making derogatory character inferences would be
associated with increases in depressive symptomatology.

Relations

between depressive symptom levels and behavioral as well as
characterological blame for life stressors were also explored.

The

etiological role of maladaptive inferences postulated by hopelessness
theorists would be demonstrated if event-inference X stress interaction
terms accounted for a significant portion of the variance in
residualized BDI change scores.

Such findings would indicate that

higher scores on the inference measures were associated with increases
in residual BDI change scores among subjects who experienced highly
stressful negative life events.
Tables 32 and 33 present zero-order correlations among the
depressive symptom, event-inference, and stress measures used in the
analyses involving negative achievement and negative interpersonal
events, respectively.

Results of the achievement- and interpersonal-

event regressions appear in Tables 34 and 35.

Both achievement stress

and interpersonal stress were positively related to residualized BDI
change scores.

In addition, significant main effects were obtained for

achievement and interpersonal event attributional generality, negative
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Table 32
Intercorrelations Among Achievement Stress. Achievement Event
Inferences, and Depressive Symptomatology fN — 2261

Measure

1

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

.63
.29
.22
.28
.35
,08b
.17°

T1 BDI
T2 BDI
ACSTRESS
AEQ-GEN
AEQ-CNS
AEQ-DEF
AEQ-BBL
AEQ-CBL

2

3

.31
.34
.44
.45
.14°
.21

.35
.49
.30
,13b
.08b

4

5

.58
.42
.12b
.20

.51
.24
.23

6

7

8

-

.50
.64

-

.76

-

Note. Unless otherwise indicated, correlations are significant at the £
< .01 level. BDI-Beck Depression Inventory; ACSTRESS-Achievement Event
Stress; AEO-GEN-Achievement Events Questionnaire-Attributional
Generality Subscale; AEO-CNS- Achievement Events Questionnaire-Expected
Consequences Subscale; AEO-DEF-Achievement Events Questionnaire-Personal
Deficiencies Subscale; AEO-BBL-Achievement Events QuestionnaireBehavioral Blame Subscale; AEO-CBL-Achievement Events QuestionnaireCharacterological Blame Subscale.
a £ < .05. b ns.

Table 33
Intercorrelations Among Interpersonal Event Inferences.
Interpersonal Stress, and Depressive Symptomatology (N — 226*)

Measure

1

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

.

Tl BDI
T2 BDI
IPSTRESS
IEQ-GEN
IEQ-CNS
IEQ-DEF
IEQ-BBL
IEQ-CBL

.63
.35
.24
.33
.25
.07a
.12a

2

3

4

5

6

7

-

.40
.38
.50
.45
.22
.28

-

.40
.50
.36
.28
.26

-

.48
.30
.19
.20

.45
.23
.22

-

.72
.77

-

.85

Note. Unless otherwise indicated, correlations are significant at the j>
< .01 level. BDI-Beck Depression Inventory; IPSTRESS-Internersonal Event
Stress; IEO -GEN-Interaersonal Events Questionnaire-Attributional
Generality Subscale; IEO-CNS- Interpersonal Events QuestionnaireExpected Consequences Subscale; IEO-DEF-Intemersonal Events
Questionnaire-Personal Deficiencies Subscale; IEO-BBIflnternersonal
Events Questionnaire-Behavioral Blame Subscale; IEO-CBI^Interpersonal
Events Questionnaire-Characterological Blame Subscale.
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Table 34
Regression Models Predicting Time 1 (Tl^ to Time 2 (T2> Change in
Residualized BDI Scores from Achievement Stress. Achievement
Event Inferences, and Achievement Stress X Event Inference
Interactions (N — 226^

Step

Predictors in Set

1
2

T1 BDI
AEQ-GEN
ACSTRESS
AEQ-GEN X ACSTRESS

3

1
2
3

1
2
3

1
2
3

1
2
3

.40
.05
.003

FInc

df

pr

t

146.39°

1,224

8.96b
1.14

3,222
4,221

.63
.22
.10
.07

12.10°
3.30b
1.50
1.07

.63
.30
.02
-.04

12.10°
4.76°
0.34
-0.61

.63
.28
.11
-.06

12.10°
4.36°
1.65
-0.89

.63
.09
.16
.10

12.10°
1.33
2.43c
1.46

.63
.12
.17
.12

12.10°
1.85d
2.55b
1.80d

T1 BDI
AEQ-CNS
ACSTRESS
AEQ-CNS X ACSTRESS

.40

146.39°

1,224

.07
.001

15.01°
0.37

3,222
4,221

T1 BDI
AEQ-DEF
ACSTRESS
AEQ-DEF X ACSTRESS

.40

146.39°

1,224

.06
.002

13.13°
0.80

3,222
4,221

T1 BDI
AEQ-BBL
ACSTRESS
AEQ-BBL X ACSTRESS

.40

146.39°

1,224

.02
.01

4.25c
2.14

3,222
4,221

T1 BDI
AEQ-CBL
ACSTRESS
AEQ-CBL X ACSTRESS

.40

146.39°

1,224

.03
.01

5.10b
3.22d

3,222
4,221

Note. BDI-Beck Depression Inventory; ACSTRESS-Achievement Event Stress;
AEO-GEN-Achievement Events Questionnaire-Attributional Generality
Subscale; AEO-CNS-Achievement Events Questionnaire-Expected Consequences
Subscale; AEO-DEF-Achievement Events Questionnaire-Personal Deficiencies
Subscale; AEO-BBL-Achievement Events Questionnaire-Behavioral Blame
Subscale; AEO-CBI^-Achievement Events Questionnaire-Characterological
Blame Subscale.
a E < .0001. b £ <

.01. c p <

.05. d £ - .07.
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Table 35
Repression Models Predicting Time 1 (Tl) to Time 2 (T2) Change In
Residualized BDI Scores from Interpersonal Stress. Interpersonal
Event Inferences, and Interpersonal Stress X Event Inference
Interactions (N — 226)

Step

Predictors in Set

R2
K inc

1
2

T1 BDI
IEQ-GEN
IPSTRESS
IEQ-GEN X IPSTRESS

.40

3

1
2
3

1
2
3

1
2
3

1
2
3

F.inc

df

Pr

146.39a

1,224

.06
.002

12.84®
0.75

3,222
4,221

.63
.23
.14
-.06

12.10®
3.57b
2. llc
-0.87

T1 BDI
IEQ-CNS
IPSTRESS
IEQ-CNS X IPSTRESS

.40

146.39®

1,224

.09
.02

19.50®
9.76b

3,222
4,221

.63
.32
.08
.21

12.10®
5.03®
1.14
3.12b

T1 BDI
IEQ-DEF
IPSTRESS
IEQ-DEF X IPSTRESS

.40

146.39®

1,224

.09
.00

20.45®
0.00

3,222
4,221

.63
.33
.13
.001

12.10®
5.21®
1. 97c
-0.02

.40

146.39®

1,224

.05
.00

9.43b
0.00

3,222
4,221

.63
.17
.18
-.002

12.10®
2.50b
2.74b
-0.04

.40

146.39®

1,224

.06
.001

11.59®
0.20

3,222
4,221

.63
.21
.18
.03

12.10®
3.22b
2.74b
0.45

Tl BDI
IEQ-BBL
IPSTRESS
IEQ-BBL X IPSTRESS

Tl BDI
IEQ-CBL
IPSTRESS
IEQ-CBL X IPSTRESS

t

Note. BDI-Beck Depression Inventory; IPSTRESS-Interpersonal Event
Stress; IEQ-GEN-Interpersonal Events Questionnaire-Attributional
Generality Subscale; lEQ-CNS-Interpersonal Events Questionnaire-Expected
Consequences Subscale; IEQ-DEF-Interpersonal Events Questionnaire Personal Deficiencies Subscale; IEQ-BBL- Interpersonal Events
Questionnaire-Behavioral Blame Subscale; IEQ-CBL^Interpersonal Events
Questionnaire-Characterological Blame Subscale.
® E < -0001. b e < -01. c E < .05.
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consequences, and personal deficiencies, as well as behavioral and
characterological blame for negative interpersonal events.

However,

with only one exception, neither set of analyses yielded any significant
inference X stress interaction effects.

Given the paucity of support

for the hopelessness model's predictions, the significant stress and
inference main effects that emerged from these analyses will not be
further detailed nor will the single significant interaction be
described.
Competing Predictions Derived From the Reformulated Theory of Learned
Helplessness
The regression analyses described in the preceding paragraphs were
repeated to evaluate predictions derived from the 1978 reformulation of
learned helplessness theory about the etiological role of maladaptive
inferences in the onset of depressive symptomatology.

The reformulation

postulated that expectations of future uncontrollability arise when
individuals make internal, stable, and global attributions about the
causes of uncontrollable negative outcomes.

Although the reformulation

limited itself to a discussion of the attributional precursors of
helplessness depression, it would not be inconsistent with the logic of
the 1978 model to predict that negative consequence expectancies,
inferred personal deficiencies, and/or self-blame associated with
uncontrollable negative events would also be predictive of increases in
depressive symptomatology.

After all, it is reasonable to expect that

inferences of these nature, like internal, stable, and global causal
attributions, would be associated with expectations that one will be
unable to prevent the occurrence of highly undesired outcomes in the
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future or unable to bring about the occurrence of highly desired
outcomes.
Tests of these hypotheses were performed by examining the
predictive utility of inference X stress interactions separately for
subjects who perceived their most negative achievement event as
relatively controllable (N - 126) or relatively uncontrollable (N - 100)
and for subjects who perceived their most negative interpersonal event
as either relatively controllable (N - 111) or relatively uncontrollable
(N - 107).

Median splits on the achievement and interpersonal control

measures were again used to classify subjects into low and high
perceived control groups.

All other aspects of the analyses were the

same as those previously described.
Achievement Stress. Zero-order correlations among the depressive
symptom, inference, and stress variables appear in Table 36 for subjects
who perceived achievement stressors as controllable and in Table 37 for
subjects who perceived a lack of control over achievement stressors.

An

examination of the correlations in Tables 36 and 37 shows that relations
among depressive symptoms, achievement stress, and event inferences were
comparable in magnitude among subjects who perceived high and low levels
of control over negative achievement events.

Behavioral and

characterological blame for uncontrollable achievement stressors were,
however, more highly positively correlated with depressive symptoms and
scores on most inference measures than were behavioral and
characterological blame for controllable achievement stressors.
As shown in Tables 38 and 39, respectively, scores on the event
inference measures did not interact with levels of achievement stress to
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Table 36
Intercorrelations Amonp Achievement Event Inferences. Achievement
Stress, and Depressive Symptomatology Among Subjects High in
Perceived Control fN " 126>

Measure

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

T1 BDI
T2 BDI
ACSTRESS
AEQ-GEN
AEQ-CNS
AEQ-DEF
AEQ-BBL
AEQ-CBL

2

1

.65
.33
.19a
.24
.39
- .01b
.09b

3

4

6

7

.40
.56

.67

5

8

-

.35
.25
.25
.44
.10b
.15b

-

.30
.40
.47
.38 .44
.24 ,09b
.12b .19a

-

.54
.31
.24

-

-

Note. Unless otherwise indicated, all correlations are significant at or
beyond the £ < .01 level. BDI-Beck Depression Inventory; ACSTRESSAchievement Event Stress; AEO-GEN-Achievement Events QuestionnaireAttributional Generality Subscale; AEQ-CNS- Achievement Events
Questionnaire-Expected Consequences Subscale; AEO-DEF—Achievement Events
Questionnaire-Personal Deficiencies Subscale; AEO-BBL-Achievement Events
Questionnaire-Behavioral Blame Subscale; AEQ-CBL-Achievement Events
Questionnaire-Characterological Blame Subscale.
8 p < .05, b ns .
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Table 37
Intercorrelations Among Achievement Event Inferences. Achievement
Stress, and Depressive Symptomatology Among Subjects Low in
Perceived Control (N — 100>

Measure

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

T1 BDI
T2 BDI
ACSTRESS
AEQ-GEN
AEQ-CNS
AEQ-DEF
AEQ-BBL
AEQ-CBL

1

2

.62
.23a
.23°
.31
.33
.29
.37

.25°
.38
.57
.55
.43
.49

3

5

4

6

7

8

-

.39
.56
.66
.23
.45
.53
.70
.17b
.46
.37
.40
.81
.15b
.45
.80
■ -- ■
Note. Unless otherwise indicated, all correlations are significant at or
beyond the jj < .01 level. BDI-Beck Depression Inventory; ACSTRESSAchievement Event Stress; AEO-GEN-Achievement Events QuestionnaireAttributional Generality Subscale; AEO-CNS-Achievement Events
Questionnaire-Expected Consequences Subscale; AEO-DEF-Achievement Events
Questionnaire-Personal Deficiencies Subscale; AEO-BBL^Achievement Events
Questionnaire-Behavioral Blame Subscale; AEO-CBL-Achievement Events
Questionnaire-Characterological Blame Subscale.
a p < .05. b ns.

-
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Table 38
Regression Models Predicting Time 1 (Tl> to Time 2 (T2) Change in
Resldualized BDI Scores from Achievement Stress. Achievement
Event Inferences, and Achievement Stress X Event Inference
Interactions Among Subjects High in Perceived Control (N - 126~)

Step

Predictors in Set

1
2

T1 BDI
AEQ-GEN
ACSTRESS
AEQ-GEN X ACSTRESS

3

1
2
3

1
2
3

1
2
3

1
2
3

Tl BDI
AEQ-CNS
ACSTRESS
AEQ-CNS X ACSTRESS

inc
.41

df

87.61®

1,124

3.23c
1.12

3,122
4,121

87.61°

1,124

2.63d
0.05

3,122
4,121

87.61°

1,124

5.29b
0.04

3,122
4,121

87.61°

1,124

2.73d
1.01

3,122
4,121

.41

87.61°

1,124

.03
.01

2.85d
2.45

3,122
4,121

.03
.005

.41
.02
.0002

Tl BDI
AEQ-DEF
ACSTRESS
AEQ-DEF X ACSTRESS

.41

Tl BDI
AEQ-BBL
ACSTRESS
AEQ-BBL X ACSTRESS

.41

Tl BDI
AEQ-CBL
ACSTRESS
AEQ-CBL X ACSTRESS

Finc

.05
.0002

.03
.005

pr

t

.64
.12
.16
.10

9,36a
1.36
1.74d
1.06

.64
.07
.15
.02

9.36a
0.82
1.71d
0.21

.64
.21
.13
- .02

9.36°
2,41c
1.39
-0.19

.64
.08
.16
.09

9.36°
0.93
1.83d
1.01

.64
.09
.18
.14

9.36°
1.05
2.04c
1.57

Note. BDI-Beck Depression Inventory; ACSTRESS-Achievement Event Stress;
AEQ-GEN-Achievement Events Questionnaire-Attributional Generality
Subscale; AEQ-CNS-Achievement Events Questionnaire-Expected Consequences
Subscale; AEQ-DEF-Achlevement Events Questionnaire-Personal Deficiencies
Subscale; AEQ-BBL-Achievement Events Questionnaire-Behavioral Blame
Subscale; AEQ-CBI^-Achievement Events Questionnaire-Characterological
Blame Subscale.
a £ < .0001. b £ < .01. c e < -05. d e < .09.

132

Table 39
Regression Models Predicting Time 1 (Til to Time 2 (T2> Change In
Resldualized BDI Scores from Achievement Stress. Achievement
Event Inferences. and Achievement Stress X Event Inference
Interactions Among Subjects Low In Perceived Control (N - 100^

Step

Predictors in Set

R2loc

1
2

Tl BDI
AEQ-GEN
ACSTRESS
AEQ-GEN X ACSTRESS

.38

Tl BDI
AEQ-CNS
ACSTRESS
AEQ-CNS X ACSTRESS

3

1
2
3

1
2
3

1
2
3

1
2
3

Tl BDI
AEQ-DEF
ACSTRESS
AEQ-DEF X ACSTRESS

Tl BDI
AEQ-BBL
ACSTRESS
AEQ-BBL X ACSTRESS

Tl BDI
AEQ-CBL
ACSTRESS
AEQ-CBL X ACSTRESS

df

pr

60.89°

1,98

5.12b
0.01

3,96
4,95

.62
.28
.03
.01

7.80°
2.89b
0.26
0.12

.38

60.89°

1,98

.16
.004

17.02°
0.87

3,96
4,95

.62
.50
-.17
-.10

7.80°
5.63°
-1.69
-0.93

.38

60.89°

1,98

.12
.004

11.80°
0.80

3,96
4,95

.62
.43
.07
-.09

7.80°
4.64°
0.67
-0.89

.38

60.89°

1,98

5.81b
1.22

3,96
4,95

.62
.30
.10
.11

7.80°
3.12b
1.01
1.10

60.89°

1,98

7.00b
1.13

3,96
4,95

.62
.33
.12
.11

7.80°
3.47b
1.15
1.06

.06
.0001

.07
.007

.38
.08
.006

Ffnc

t

Note. BDI-Beck Depression Inventory; ACSTRESS-Achievement Event Stress;
AEQ-GEN-Achievement Events Questionnaire-Attributional Generality
Subscale; AEQ-CNS-Achievement Events Questionnaire-Expected Consequences
Subscale; AEQjDEF-Achievement Events Questionnaire -Personal Deficiencies
Subscale: AEQ-BBL-Achievement Events Questionnaire -Behavioral Blame
Subscale; AEQ-CBL-Achievement Events Questionnaire-Characterological
Blame Subscale.
a £ < .0001. b e < .01.
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predict Increases in depressive symptomatology among subjects who
perceived negative achievement events as relatively controllable or as
relatively uncontrollable.

It is interesting to note, however, that a

different pattern of results obtained in the two sets of analyses.
Higher scores on measures of attributional generality, expected negative
consequences, behavioral blame, and characterological blame for
uncontrollable achievement stressors, but not for controllable
achievement stressors, were associated with increases in residualized
BDI scores.
Interpersonal Stress. Tables 40 and 41 present zero-order
correlations among the depressive symptom, Inference, and stress
variables for subjects who perceived negative interpersonal stressors as
controllable and uncontrollable, respectively.

The strength of

interrelations among these measures was similar in both groups although
depressive symptoms at Tl tended to be more highly correlated with the
inferences subjects made about controllable rather than uncontrollable
interpersonal stressors.
As can be seen in Table 42, scores on the attributional
generality, negative consequence, personal deficiency, and
characterological blame main effect variables were positively associated
with residual Tl to T2 increases in depressive symptoms among subjects
who experienced controllable interpersonal stressors.

The main effect

of interpersonal stress was nonsignificant, however, as were four of the
five inference X interpersonal stress interaction effects tested.

The

only interaction effect to reliably predict residualized changes in BDI
scores (accounting for 6% of the variance) was that between

Table 40
Intercorrelations Among Interpersonal Event Inferences.
Interpersonal Stress, and Depressive Symptomatology Among
Subjects High in Perceived Control (N — 111>

Measure

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Tl BDI
T2 BDI
IPSTRESS
IEQ-GEN
IEQ-CNS
IEQ-DEF
IEQ-BBL
IEQ-CBL

1

3

2

4

5

6

.49
.19®
.25

.60
.71

7

8

.
.61
.35
.30
.43
.34
.09b
.16b

-

.34
.39
.53
.49
.18b
.29

-

.43
.48
.41
.37
.30

-

.49
.36
.18b
.24®

-

.78

Note. Unless otherwise indicated, all correlations are significant at
the £ < .01 level. BDI-Beck Depression Inventory; IPSTRESS-Interpersonal
Event Stress; IEO-GEN-Interpersonal Events Questionnaire-Attributional
Generality Subscale; IEO-CNS- Interpersonal Events QuestionnaireExpected Consequences Subscale; IEO-DEF-Interpersonal Events
Questionnaire-Personal Deficiencies Subscale; IEO-BBL- Interpersonal
Events Questionnaire-Behavioral Blame Subscale; IEO-CBl>Interpersonal
Events Questionnaire-Characterological Blame Subscale.

£ < .05 . b ns.
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Table 41
Intercorrelations Among Interpersonal Event Inferences.
Interpersonal Stress, and Depressive Symptomatology Among
Subjects Low In Perceived Control (N — 107)

1

Measure

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Tl BDI
T2 BDI
IPSTRESS
IEQ-GEN
IEQ-CNS
IEQ-DEF
IEQ-BBL
IEQ-CBL

.68
.35
.17b
.21a
.14b
.07b
.08b

2

3

5

6

.42
.28
.18b

.80
.78

4

7

8

-

.49
.38
.47
.38
.22a
.23a

-

.48
.26
.23a
.18b

.38
.52
.34
.26
.26

-

.89

Note. Unless otherwise indicated, all correlations are significant at
the £ < .01 level. BDI-Beck Depression Inventory; IPSTRESS-Interpersonal
Event Stress; IEO-GEN-Interpersonal Events Questlonnalre-Attributional
Generality Subscale; IEO-CNS- Interpersonal Events QuestionnaireExpected Consequences Subscale; IEO-DEF-Interpersonal Events
Questionnaire-Personal Deficiencies Subscale; IEO-BBlf Interpersonal
Events Questionnaire-Behavioral Blame Subscale; IEO-CBl^Interpersonal
Events Questionnaire-Characterological Blame Subscale.
a £ < .05. b ns.
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Table 42
Repression Models Predicting Time 1 fTl^ to Time 2 CT2^ Change in
Residualized BDI Scores from Interpersonal Stress. Interpersonal
Event: Inferences, and Interpersonal Stress X Event Inference
Interactions Among Subjects Hlgb In Perceived Control (N — llll

Step Predictors in Set

1
2
3

1
2
3

1
2
3

1
2
3

1
2
3

*2|nc

Finc

df

pr

t

.61
.22
.07
-.12

8.04°
2.36c
0.70
-1.23

.61
.33
.02
.24

8.04°
3.68b
0.17
2.53b

.61
.34
.04
-.09

8.04°
3.70b
0.41
-0.91

.61
.10
.11
-.03

8.04°
1.08
1.13
-0.35

.61
.20
.10
.02

8.04°
2.09c
1.06
0,24

Tl BDI
IEQ-GEN
IPSTRESS
IEQ-GEN X IPSTRESS

.37

64.65°

1,109

.05
.01

4.19c
1.51

3,107
4,106

Tl BDI
IEQ-CNS
IPSTRESS
IEQ-CNS X IPSTRESS

.37

64.65°

1,109

.08
.03

8.25b
6.38b

3,107
4,106

Tl BDI
IEQ-DEF
IPSTRESS
IEQ-DEF X IPSTRESS

.37

64.65°

1,109

8.36b
0.82

3,107
4,106

.37

64.65°

1,109

.02
.001

1.93
0.12

3,107
4,106

.37

64.65°

1,109

3.56c
0.06

3,107
4,106

Tl BDI
IEQ-BBL
IPSTRESS
IEQ-BBL X IPSTRESS

Tl BDI
IEQ-CBL
IPSTRESS
IEQ-CBL X IPSTRESS

.08
.004

.04
.0003

Note., BDI-Beck Depression Inventory: IPSTRESS-Interpersonal Event
Stress; IEQ-GEN-Interpersonal Events Questionnaire-Attributional
Generality Subscale; IEQ-CNS-Interpersonal Events Questionnaire-Expected
Consequences Subscale; IEQ-DEF-Interpersonal Events QuestionnairePersonal Deficiencies Subscale; IEQ-BBL- Interpersonal Events
Questionnaire-Behavioral Blame Subscale; IEQ-CBL-Interpersonal Events
Questionnaire-Characterological Blame Subscale.
a £ < .0001. D £ < .01. c E < .05.
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interpersonal stress and expected negative consequences.
A markedly different pattern of results emerged for subjects who
perceived a lack of control over negative interpersonal events (see
Table 43).

Significant main effects were obtained for interpersonal

stress as well as for attributional generality, negative consequences,
and inferred personal deficiencies.

Weaker and only marginally

significant effects were obtained for scores on the behavioral and
characterological blame main effect variables.

In addition, scores on

measures of expected negative consequences, inferred personal
deficiencies, behavioral blame, and characterological blame interacted
with levels of interpersonal stress to predict residual Tl to T2
increases in BDI scores (although Interactions involving the latter two
measures were only marginally significant).
Table 44 shows the results of comparisons between the
interpersonal stress X event Inference interactions obtained among
subjects low and high in perceived control over negative interpersonal
events. Only the interaction of interpersonal stress and perceived
personal deficiencies was reliably larger among low control subjects.
Results pertaining to the interactions of stress with behavioral and
characterological blame were in the predicted direction but
nonsignificant.

Contrary to expectations, the unstandardized regression

coefficient for the interpersonal stress X negative consequences
interaction was nonsignificantly larger in the high control group than
in the low control group.
Slope analyses (Cohen & Cohen, 1983; Jaccard et al., 1990) were
performed to illustrate the relation between event inferences and
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Table 43
Regression Models Predicting Time 1 (Tl^ to Time 2 fT2) Change In
Residualized BDI Scores from Interpersonal Stress. Interpersonal
Event Inferences. and Interpersonal Stress X Event Inference
Interactions Among Subjects Low in Perceived Control fN - 107)

Stepi Predictors in Set

1
2
3

1
2
3

1
2
3

1
2
3

1
2
3

*lnc

Finc

df

.44

83.63“

1,105

.10
.0001

11.93°
0.03

3,103
4,102

.44

83.63°

1,105

.12
.02

14.23°
5.28c

3,103
4,102

.44

83.63°

1,105

.11
.03

13.17°
6.68b

3,103
4,102

Tl BDI
IEQ-BBL
IPSTRESS
IEQ-BBL X IPSTRESS

.44

83.63°

1,105

.08
.01

8.60b
3.16e

3,103
4,102

Tl BDI
IEQ-CBL
IPSTRESS
IEQ-CBL X IPSTRESS

.44

83.63°

1,105

.08
.01

8.74b
3.05d

3,103
4,102

Tl BDI
IEQ-GEN
IPSTRESS
IEQ-GEN X IPSTRESS

Tl BDI
IEQ-CNS
IPSTRESS
IEQ-CNS X IPSTRESS

Tl BDI
IEQ-DEF
IPSTRESS
IEQ-DEF X IPSTRESS

pr

t

.67
.28
.25
.02

9.15s
2.92b
2.67b
0.16

.67
.33
.17
.22

9.15°
3.54b
1.76d
2.30c

.67
.31
.26
.25

9.15°
3.27b
2.74b
2.59b

.67
.16
.31
.17

9.15°
1.63
3.29b
1.78d

.67
.17
.31
.17

9.15°
1.70
3.28b
1.75d

Note. BDI-Beck Degression Inventory: IPSTRESS-Interoersonal Event
Stress: IEO-GEN-Intemersonal Events Questionnaire-Attributional
Generality Subscale: IEO-CNS-Interoersonal Events Ouestionnaire-ExDected
Conseauences Subscale: IEO-DEF-Interoersonal Events OuestionnairePersonal Deficiencies Subscale: IEO-BBL^Interpersonal Events
Questionnaire-Behavioral Blame Subscale: lEO-CBL-Interoersonal Events
Questionnaire-Characterological Blame Subscale.
° E < .0001. D £ < .01. c £ < .05. d E - .08.
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Table 44
Comparisons of Inference X Interpersonal Stress Repression
Coefficients Obtained Among Subjects Who Perceived Events as
Uncontrollable and Subjects Who Perceived Events as Controllable

Interaction Term

IEQ-CNS
IEQ-DEF
IEQ-BBL
IEQ-CBL

X
X
X
X

IPSTRESS
IPSTRESS
IPSTRESS
IPSTRESS

.039
.050
.036
.035

S.E..,

b2

S.E.j

.017
.019
.020
.020

.063
.022
.008
.006

.025
.024
.023
.024

t

-0.80
2.40
1.47
0.97

Pa
<.25
<.01
<.08
<.25

Note, b.|—Unstandardized regression coefficient obtained among subjects
who perceived interpersonal stressors as uncontrollable (N - 107).
S .E. .j-Standard error of regression coefficient obtained among subjects
who perceived interpersonal stressors as uncontrollable.
b2=Unstandardized regression coefficient obtained among subjects who
perceived interpersonal stressors as controllable (N - 111).
S.E.2-Standard error of regression coefficient obtained among subjects
who perceived interpersonal stressors as controllable, t - [(b1 b2)/((S.E.2)2 + (S.E.2)2)]1/2. df - N, + N2 - 4. BDI-Beck Depression
Inventory; IPSTRESS- Interpersonal Event Stress; IEO-CNS-Interpersonal
Events Questionnaire-Expected Consequences Subscale; IEO-DEFInterpersonal Events Questionnaire-Personal Deficiencies Subscale; IEOBBl-Interpersonal Events Questionnaire-Behavioral Blame Subscale; IEOCBL-Interpersonal Events Questionnaire-Characterological Blame Subscale
6 One-tailed.
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residual Tl to T2 changes in BDI scores at low, average, and high values
of uncontrollable interpersonal stress.

The results of these analyses

for the negative consequence, personal deficiency, behavioral blame, and
characterological blame measures appear in Table 45,

The form of the

interaction was consistent across the four event inference measures.
The inferences that subjects made about relatively unstressful
interpersonal events (i.e., stress rating of one standard deviation
below the mean) were unrelated to residualized BDI change scores (i.e.,
the slope of T2 BDI scores on each inference variable was not
significantly different from zero, all ps > .10).

Only the negative

consequence and personal deficiency inferences that subjects made about
interpersonal events that were average in stressfulness were positively
related to residual Tl to T2 change scores (ps - .002 and ,03,
respectively).

Among subjects who experienced highly upsetting

uncontrollable interpersonal stressors (stress rating of one standard
deviation above the mean), however, higher scores on measures of
expected negative consequences, personal deficiencies, behavioral blame,
and characterological blame were each reliably associated with increases
in residualized BDI scores.

Thus, as the stressfulness of

uncontrollable negative interpersonal events increased, higher scores on
measures of maladaptive event inferences became more strongly associated
with residual Tl to T2 increases in depressive symptomatology.
Assessing the Unique Effects of the Inference X Stress Interactions
Given the moderate to strong intercorrelations that were observed
among negative consequence expectancies, Inferred personal deficiencies,
behavioral blame, and characterological blame for uncontrollable
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Table A 5
Slopes of Residual BDI Scores on Event Inference Variables at
Low. Medium, and High Levels of Uncontrollable Interpersonal
Stress

Measure

b low

IEQ-CNS
IEQ-DEF
IEQ-BBL
IEQ-CBL

.29
-.08
-.18
-.19

blow

bmed

^med

b high

bhigh

0.91
-0.26
-0.51
-0.60

.82
.59
.35
.28

3.12a
2.15b
1.30
1.07

1.38
1.29
.91
.77

3.66s
2.95s
2.22b
1.79c

Note. lEO-CNS-Interpersonal Events Questionnaire-Expected Consequences
Subscale; IEQ-DEF—Interpersonal Events Questionnaire -Personal
Deficiencies Subscale; IEO-BBL^Interpersonal Events Questionnaire Behavioral Blame Subscale; IEO-CBL-Interpersonal Events QuestionnaireCharacterological Blame Subscale.
8 £ < .01. b p. < .05. c p > .05 < .10.
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interpersonal stressors (see Table 41), it is important to determine
whether the stress X event inference interactions described above remain
significant when assessed simultaneously.

The independent effects of

the interactions were therefore assessed by entering stress ratings
along with scores on each inference measure on the second step of a
hierarchical regression analysis, after the variance explainable by Tl
BDI scores was removed on the first step.

The four stress X event

inference interactions were entered as a set on the third step of the
analysis.

Results are presented in Table 46.

As a set, the main effect variables accounted for 15% of the
variance in residualized BDI change scores.

Only negative consequence

expectancies and inferred personal deficiencies were individually
predictive, however, respectively explaining six and four percent of
residual BDI score variance.

The set of stress X event inference

interaction terms did not contribute to the prediction of T2 BDI scores
after Tl BDI scores, stress ratings, and the four event inference main
effects were statistically controlled.

These findings provide no

evidence upon which to posit distinct roles of negative consequence
expectancies, personal deficiency inferences, and self-blame in the
etiology of depressive symptomatology.
Hopelessness as a Mediator of the Relation Between Event Inferences and
Depressive Symptomatology
The final series of regression analyses to be reported in this
section evaluated predictions about the role of hopelessness as a
mediator of relations between depressive symptomatology and inferences
about highly upsetting uncontrollable interpersonal stressors.
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Table 46
Regression Model Assessing the Unique Contribution of Each
Significant Event Inference X Interpersonal Stress Interaction
Among Subjects Who Perceived Events as Uncontrollable CN — 107)

StepPredictors in Set

1

Tl BDI

2

IEQ-CNS
IEQ-DEF
IEQ-BBL
IEQ-CBL
IPSTRESS

3

IEQ-CNS
IEQ-DEF
IEQ-BBL
IEQ-CBL

X
X
X
X

dZ

K fnc

^inc

df

.44

83.63®

1,105

.15
IPSTRESS
IPSTRESS
IPSTRESS
IPSTRESS

.03

7.40b

1.91

Pr

t

.67

9.15®

.25
.21
-.12
.06
6,100 .14

2.62b
2 ,10c
-1.25
0.57
1.41

10,96

.13
.06
.02
.03

1.33
0.56
0.23
0.25

Note. BDI-Beck Depression Inventory; IPSTRESS-Interpersonal Event
Stress; IEO-GEN-Interpersonal Events Questionnaire-Attributional
Generality Subscale; IE0-CNS-Interpersonal Events Questionnaire-Expected
Consequences Subscale; IEO-DEF-Interpersonal Events QuestionnairePersonal Deficiencies Subscale; IEO-BBl>Internersonal Events
Questionnaire-Behavioral Blame Subscale; IEQ-CBL-Interaersonal Events
Questionnaire-Characterological Blame Subscale.
a E < .0001. b £ < .01. ' E < .05.
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indirect associations between negativistic event inferences and
depressive symptoms are predicted by hopelessness theorists.

Such

inferences are believed to be related to depression only insofar as they
contribute to the development of hopelessness expectancies.

In the

context of the present research, support for this mediational hypothesis
would be obtained by demonstrating that 1.) the interpersonal stress X
event inference Interactions that predicted Tl to T2 increases in
depressive symptoms also predict Tl to T2 increases in hopelessness
expectancies, 2.) T2 hopelessness expectancies are positively related to
the severity of depressive symptoms exhibited at T2, and 3.) the
interactive effects of interpersonal stress and event inferences on T2
depressive symptoms are eliminated (or diminished, in the case of
partial mediation) when levels of T2 hopelessness are statistically
controlled.
The results of regression analyses designed to evaluate these
predictions appear in Tables 47 through 50.

The analyses involving

negative consequence expectancies and inferred personal deficiencies
revealed no evidence of hopelessness mediation.

As can be seen in Table

47, the residualized BHS change scores obtained by subjects who
perceived a lack of control over negative interpersonal events were not
predictable from the interaction of stress ratings and scores on the
measure of negative consequence expectancies.

Moreover, the

Interpersonal Stress X Negative Consequence interaction continued to
predict residualized BDI change scores with no significant reduction in
magnitude (see Table 51) after hopelessness expectancies at T2 were
controlled.

Table 48 shows a similar pattern of results for the
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Table 47
Regression Model Testing the Role of Hopelessness as a Mediator
of the Relation Between Negative Consequence Expectancies and
Depressive Symptomatology Amonp Subjects Who Perceived Negative
Interpersonal Events as Uncontrollable (N - 107)

Step

1
2

Criterion

T2BHS

3

1
2
3
4

T2BDI

Predictors in Set

RZi
inc

Finc

T1BHS
IEQ-CNS
IPSTRESS
IEQ-CNS X IPSTRESS

.29

T1BDI
T1BHS
IEQ-CNS
IPSTRESS
T2BHS
IEQ-CNS X IPSTRESS

df

pr

t

43.44°

1,105

.06
.00

4.43b
0.00

3,103
4,102

.54
.15
.14
.00

6.59a
1.52
1.42
0.01

.44

41.54°

2,104

.12
.10
.02

14.07°
29.09°
6.57b

4,102
5,101
6,100

.61
.04
.33
.17
.47
.25

7.81°
0.37
3.53b
1.74
5.39°
2.56b

Note. BHS—Beck Hopelessness Scale; BDI—Beck Depression Inventory; IEOCNS-Interpersonal Events Questionnaire: Expected Consequences Subscale;
IPSTRESS-Interpersonal Event Stress.
° E < .0001. a E < .01.
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Table 48
Regression Model Testing the Role of Hopelessness as a Mediator
of the Relation Between Personal Deficiency Inferences and
Depressive Symptomatology Among Subjects Who Perceived Negative
Interpersonal Events as Uncontrollable (N - 107>

Step

Criterion

df

pr

43.44a

1,105

.54

6.59°

.06

4.55b

3,103

.16
.18

1.60
1.88d

IEQ-DEF X IPSTRESS

.01

1.38

4,102

.12

1.77

T1BDI
TlBHS

.44

41.54a

2,104

.61
.04

7.81°
0.37

IEQ-DEF
IPSTRESS

.11

13.01°

4,102

.31
.26

3.26b
2.71b

3

T2BHS

.10

28.83°

5,101

.47

5.37°

4

IEQ-DEF X IPSTRESS

.02

5.32c

6,100

.22

2.31c

1

T2BHS

2

3

1

2

T2BDI

Predictors in Set

R2,w
inc

Ffnc

TlBHS

.29

IEQ-DEF
IPSTRESS

t

Note. BHS-Beck Hopelessness Scale; BDI-Beck Depression Inventory; IEQDEF-Interpersonal Events Questionnaire: Personal Deficiencies Subscale;
IPSTRESS-Interpersonal Event Stress.
a E < .0001. b E < •01. c £ < .05.
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Table 49
Regression Model Testing the Role of Hopelessness as a Mediator
of the Relation Between Behavioral Blame and Depressive
Symptomatology Among Subjects Who Perceived Negative
Interpersonal Events as Uncontrollable (N - 107)

Predictors in Set

p2
inc

TlBHS

.29

43.44°

1,105

.54 6.59a

IEQ-BBL
IPSTRESS

.07

5.73b

3,103

.21 2.19c
.19 1. 94d

IEQ-BBL X IPSTRESS

.03

5.44c

4,102

.22 2. 33c

T1BDI
TlBHS

.44

41.54a

2,104

.61 7.81®
.04 0.37

IEQ-BBL
IPSTRESS

.08

8.48b

4,102

.16 1.62
.31 3.26b

3

T2BHS

.11

29.36®

5,101

.47 5.42®

4

IEQ-BBL X IPSTRESS

.002

0.65

Step

1

Criterion

T2BHS

2

3

1

2

T2BDI

FirK

df

6, 100

pr

t

.08 0.81

Note. BHS-Beck Hopelessness Scale: BDI-Beck Depression Inventory: IEQBBI^Interpersonal Events Questionnaire: Behavioral Blame Subscale;
IPSTRESS-Interpersonal Event Stress.
0 E < .0001. d e < .01. c £ <

.05. d £ - .06.
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Table 50
Regression Model Testing the Role of Hopelessness as a Mediator
of the Relation Between Characterological Blame and Depressive
Symptomatology Among Subjects Who Perceived Negative
Interpersonal Events as Uncontrollable IN - 107)

Step

Predictors in Set

pZ
K inc

^inc

TlBHS

.29

IEQ-CBL
IPSTRESS

df

pr

43.44°

1,105

.54

6.59a

.05

4.30c

3,103

.14
.20

1.45
2 .10c

IEQ-CBL X IPSTRESS

.03

5.45c

4,102

.23

2.34c

T1BDI
TlBHS

.44

41.54a

2,104

.61
.04

7. 81a
0.37

IEQ-CBL
IPSTRESS

.08

8.61b

4,102

.17
.31

1.69
3.26b

3

T2BHS

.11

30.15s

5,101

.48

5.49s

4

IEQ-CBL X IPSTRESS

.002

0.56

6,100

.07

0.75

1

Criterion

T2BHS

2

3

1

2

T2BDI

t

Note. BHS-Beck Hopelessness Scale: BDI-Beck Depression Inventory: IEQCBL-Interpersonal Events Questionnaire: Characterological Blame
Subscale: IPSTRESS-Interpersonal Event Stress.
a e < .0001. b e < -01. c E < .05.
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Table 51
Comparisons of Regression Coefficients for Event-Inference X
Interpersonal Stress With Those Obtained In Hopelessness
Mediational Analyses

Interaction Term

IEQ-CNS
IEQ-DEF
IEQ-BBL
IEQ-CBL

X
X
X
X

IPSTRESS
IPSTRESS
IPSTRESS
IPSTRESS

b1

S .E. 1

b2

S . E .2

.039
.050
.036
.035

.017
.019
.020
.020

.038
.040
.015
.014

.015
.017
.019
.019

t

0.43
0.40
0.71
0.75

P
>.25
>.25
<.25
<.25

Note. b2-Unstandardized regression coefficient obtained in hopelessness
mediational analysis. S.E.2-Standard error of regression coefficient
obtained in hopelessness mediational analysis, t — [(b^ - b2)/((S •E.,,)2 +
(S.E.2)2)]1/2, df - Nj + N2 - 4. IPSTRESS-Interpersonal Event Stress.
IEQ-CNS-Interpersonal Events Questionnaire-Expected Consequences
Subscale; IEQ-DEF-Interpersonal Events Questionnaire-Personal
Deficiencies Subscale; IEO-BBI^»Interpersonal Events QuestionnaireBehavioral Blame Subscale; IEO-CBL-Interpersonal Events QuestionnaireCharacterological Blame Subscale.
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personal deficiency inference measure (see also Table 51).
Somewhat stronger support for hopelessness theory's mediational
predictions was obtained when behavioral and characterological blame
were assessed.

With respect to the former, the Interpersonal Stress X

Behavioral Blame interaction term accounted for a significant 5% of the
variance in residualized BHS change scores (see Table 49).

Higher

levels of behavioral blame were associated with Tl to T2 increases in
hopelessness among subjects who experienced very stressful
uncontrollable negative interpersonal events.

Increases In hopelessness

were significantly associated with corresponding increases in depressive
symptom severity-- Tl to T2 changes in BHS scores predicted a full 22%
of the variance in BDI change scores.

Finally, the Interpersonal Stress

X Behavioral Blame interaction term that previously predicted BDI scores
(albeit marginally, see Table 43) was no longer significant after T2 BHS
scores were controlled.

As shown in Table 50, an identical pattern of

results emerged for characterological blame.
The three conditions required to establish hopelessness mediation
(cf. Baron & Kenny, 1986) were therefore satisfied in the analyses
involving behavioral and characterological blame.

Subjects who

perceived a lack of control over highly stressful interpersonal events
but blamed either their actions or their characters for the occurrence
of those events exhibited increases in hopelessness expectancies from Tl
to T2.

Those expectations about the future occurrence of uncontrollable

negative outcomes served to increase the severity of depressive
symptomatology experienced by those subjects.

It is important to note,

though, that the regression coefficients obtained for the behavioral and
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characterological blame interaction terms in the mediational analyses on
T2 BOX scores were not significantly different than those obtained in
the analyses that did not control for T2 BHS scores (see Table 51).
Summary of Event Inference Findings
Once again, little support for predictions derived from
hopelessness theory was found in the present data.

Hypothesized

relations between dysfunctional cognitive styles and inferences about
negative life events, as well as those between event inferences and
depressive symptomatology, were not empirically demonstrated.

Although

higher scores on measures of Attributional Style (Interpersonal Domain)
and Overgeneralization were reliably associated with more depressogenic
inferences for uncontrollable interpersonal stressors, none of the
cognitive style variables specifically predicted inferences about the
most upsetting uncontrollable interpersonal stressors.
Hopelessness theory's predictions regarding relations between
event inferences and depressive symptomatology fared no better.

Despite

several significant stress and event-inference main effects, changes in
depressive symptomatology were not reliably predicted by any eventinference X achievement or interpersonal stress interaction.

When data

from subjects high and low in perceived control were analyzed
separately, somewhat stronger support was obtained for an alternative
set of predictions derived from the learned helplessness reformulation.
Levels of stress did not interact with inferences made about
controllable or uncontrollable negative achievement events to predict
depressive symptoms.

In addition, all but one of the stress X

interpersonal event inference interactions were unrelated to BDI scores
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among subjects who perceived interpersonal stressors as controllable.
The exception to this pattern occurred for negative consequence
expectancies, which predicted increases in depressive symptoms among
subjects who experienced highly stressful but controllable interpersonal
events.
Among subjects low in control, however, interpersonal stress
interacted with negative consequence expectancies, perceived personal
deficiencies, behavioral blame, and characterological blame to predict
depressive symptomatology.

Inspection of the interactions revealed that

the magnitude of positive associations between negativistic inferences
and Tl to T2 changes in BDI scores increased as the stressfulness of
subjects' uncontrollable interpersonal events also increased.

However,

the strength of the interactions involving behavioral and
characterological blame was not significantly different in the high and
low control groups and the interpersonal stress X negative consequences
interaction was nonsignificantly larger in the high control group.

It

therefore seems appropriate to conclude that the interpersonal stress X
negative consequences interaction predicted depressive symptoms among
all subjects and only the interaction of interpersonal stress X personal
deficiencies predicted depressive symptoms exclusively among subjects
low in perceived control.

The former favors the hopelessness model, and

the latter, the reformulated model of learned helplessness.
Finally, analyses assessing the degree to which hopelessness
expectancies mediated the observed relations between event inferences
and depressive symptoms yielded few conclusive findings.

Hopelessness

expectancies were not predicted by interactions of uncontrollable
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interpersonal stress and either negative consequence expectancies or
perceived personal deficiencies.

Moreover, when the analyses on

residualized BDI change scores were repeated using T2 BHS scores as
controls, the predictive utility of these two interaction effects did
not diminish in magnitude.
Results of the mediational analyses using behavioral and
characterological blame as predictors were more ambiguous.
Interpersonal stress interacted with scores on both measures to predict
residual increases in hopelessness among subjects low in control and the
two marginally significant stress X blame interaction effects on BDI
change scores dropped out when hopelessness expectancies were
statistically controlled.

However, additional analyses revealed no

difference in the strength of the behavioral and characterological blame
interaction effects with and without the hopelessness covariate.

Rather

than applying a mediational interpretation to these findings, it may be
more appropriate to conclude that behavioral and characterological blame
are more highly related to hopelessness than to depressive symptoms
among subjects who experienced highly upsetting uncontrollable
interpersonal stressors.
Self-Esteem Deficits
A final set of analyses was conducted to evaluate hopelessness
theory's revision of the predictions that the 1978 reformulation made
about the cognitive precursors of self-esteem loss.

The reformulated

model postulated an exclusive association between self-esteem deficits
and the internality-extemality dimension of causal attributions.
Attributing uncontrollable negative outcomes to Internal causes
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(regardless of the stability or globality of those causes) was linked to
a state of personal helplessness characterized by the belief that
others, but not the self, could control the occurrence of important
future outcomes.

Only individuals who felt personally helpless were

believed to suffer self-esteem loss in addition to the other symptoms of
helplessness depression.
A growing body of evidence indicating that internal attributions
are sometimes associated with positive behavioral outcomes led to a
restatement of these predictions in the hopelessness model.

Self-esteem

loss is now believed to occur among individuals who either attribute
negative outcomes to internal, stable and global causes or ascribe
derogatory characteristics to themselves when stressful life events
occur.

Abramson et al. (1988, p. 363) explicitly state that

If people make internal, stable, global attributions, then they
expect that others could attain the outcomes about which they feel
hopeless and therefore would feel inadequate compared with others.
In addition, lowered self-esteem should occur in cases of
hopelessness depression when people have inferred negative
characteristics about themselves that they view as important to
their general self-concept and not remediable or likely to change.
The APV procedure described throughout this paper was employed
again to test the alternative predictions that the hopelessness and
reformulated learned helplessness models make about the cognitive
precursors of self-esteem deficits.

In each regression model estimated,

event-inference and stress main effect variables, as well as inference X
stress interaction terms, served as predictors of residualized changes
in RSES scores from Tl to T2.

The first set of regression equations

tested interactions between achievement stress and composite internal,
stable, and global attributions for an achievement stressor, internal
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attributions alone, perceived personal deficiencies, behavioral blame,
and characterological blame.

These analyses were then performed

separately for subjects who perceived high and low levels of control
over their most upsetting achievement stressor.

Parallel tests were

conducted using the attributional and cognition measures corresponding
to stressful interpersonal events.
The purpose of the analyses reported in this section was not to
predict changes in self-esteem that occur independently of changes in
depressive symptoms.

The predictions made in both the reformulated

theory of learned helplessness and the hopelessness model pertain to the
conditions under which self-esteem deficits will accompany depressive
symptoms rather than the conditions that give rise exclusively to self
esteem loss.

The above quote from Abramson et al. (1988) illustrates

this point from the perspective of hopelessness theory.

Thus, although

the overlap between depressive symptoms and self-esteem at T2 was
substantial (r - -.67, £ < .01), T2 BDI scores were not controlled in
any of the self-esteem analyses.
Achievement Stress
Zero-order correlations among the self-esteem, achievement stress,
and event-cognition measures used in the first set of analyses appear in
Table 52.

Note that although internal attributions were not related to

self-esteem levels, higher levels of achievement stress, as well as
higher scores on the internal, stable, and global attributional
composite and on the personal deficiencies, behavioral blame, and
characterological blame measures were reliably associated with RSES
scores.
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Table 52
Intercorrelations Among Achievement Event Inferences. Achievement
Stress, and Self-Esteem (N - 226>

Measure

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

T1 RSES
T2 RSES
ACSTRESS
AEQ-INT
AEQ-ATTR
AEQ-DEF
AEQ-BBL
AEQ-CBL

1

.76
-.17°
-.13b
-.19
-.33
-, 16a
-.21°

2

-.23
-.llb
-.26
-.43
- .20®
-. 25a

3

4

5

6

7

8

.

-.06b
.25
.30
.13b
.08b

-

.59
.24
.53
.49

.42
.12b
.20

-

.50
.64

-

.76

Note. Unless otherwise indicated, all correlations are significant at
the £ < .01 level. RSES-Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale;
ACSTRESS-Achievement Event Stress; AEQ-INT-Achievement Events
Questionnaire-Internal!ty Subscale; AEO-ATTR-Achlevement Events
Questionnaire-Internal, Stable, and Global Composite; AE0DEF-Achievement Events Questionnaire-Personal Deficiencies Subscale;
AEO-BBL-Achievement Events Questionnaire-Behavioral Blame Subscale; AEOCBL-Achievement Events Questionnaire-Characterological Blame Subscale.
a g < .05. b ns.
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RSES scores were more stable across assessment sessions than were
BDI scores (see Table 53).

Nearly 60% of the variance in T2 RSES scores

was predictable from T1 RSES scores, compared to the 40% of T2 BDI
variance that was predictable from T1 BDI scores.

This should not be

surprising though, given that core beliefs about the self are more
stable than depressed mood.

Achievement stress, as well as the

internal, stable, and global attributional composite, personal
deficiency, and characterological blame main effect variables
significantly predicted portions (ranging from 1-7%) of the remaining
variance in T2 RSES scores.

Higher scores on each of these measures

were associated with Tl to T2 decreases in self-esteem.

The internal

attribution main effect was not significantly related to residualized
RSES scores.
Only the characterological blame X achievement stress interaction
was reliably associated with changes in self-esteem, accounting for two
percent of the variance in residualized RSES scores,

A slope analysis

of this interaction revealed a significant negative relationship between
characterological blame and self-esteem only among subjects who
experienced the most stressful negative achievement events. Finally, it
should be noted that weak and marginally significant effects were also
observed for the interactions of achievement stress with composite
internal, stable, and global attributions (p — .10) and with behavioral
blame (p - .09).
The results of analyses performed separately for subjects who
perceived high and low levels of control over their most stressful
achievement events revealed few differences between groups (see Tables
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Table 53
Regression Models
Residualized RSES
Event Inferences.
Interactions (N -

Predicting Time 1 (Tl1) to Time 2 (T2> Change In
Scores from Achievement Stress. Achievement
and Achievement Stress X Event Inference
226)

Step Predictors in Set

1
2
3

1
2
3

1
2
3

1
2
3

1
2
3

■p2
K inc

F.inc

T1 RSES
AEQ-ATTR
ACSTRESS
AEQ-ATTR X ACSTRESS

.57

297.34°

.02
.01

5.52b
2.78

T1 RSES
AEQ-INT
ACSTRESS
AEQ-INT X ACSTRESS

.57

297.34a

Tl RSES
AEQ-DEF
ACSTRESS
AEQ-DEF X ACSTRESS

.57

297.34a

.04
.001

11.67a
0.45

.01
.0001

2.74
0.07

Tl RSES
AEQ-BBL
ACSTRESS
AEQ-BBL X ACSTRESS

.57

297.34°

.01
.01

3.98
2.97

Tl RSES
AEQ-CBL
ACSTRESS
AEQ-CBL X ACSTRESS

.57

297.34°

.02
.01

4.90b
4.32°

df

Pr

t

1,224

.76
-.16
3,222 -.12
4,221 - .11

17.24a
-2.37c
-1.76
-1.67

1,224

.76
-.03
3,222 -.15
4,221 -.02

17.24°
-0.41
-2.33c
-0.26

1,224

.76
-.27
3,122 -.08
4,221 -.05

17.24°
-4.20°
-1.19
-0.67

1,224

.76
-.11
3,222 -.14
4,221 -.12

17.24°
-1.61
-2.14
-1.72

1,224

17.24°
-2.09c
-2.23c
-2.08c

.76
-.14
3,222 -.15
4,221 -.14

Note . RSES-Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale: ACSTRESS-■Achievement Event
Stress; AEO-INT-Achievement Events Questionnaire-Internallty Subscale;
AEQ-ATTR-Achievement Events Questionnaire-Internal, Stable, and Global
Composite; AEQ-DEF-Achievement Events Questionnaire-Personal
Deficiencies Subscale; AEQ-BBL-Achievement Events QuestionnaireBehavioral Blame Subscale; AEQ-CBL-Achievement Events QuestionnaireCharacterological Blame Subscale.

a E < .0001. b £ < .01. c £ < ^05.
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54 and 55 for zero-order correlations among the measures used in these
analyses and Tables 56 and 57 for regression results).

Although the

attribution and event-cognition main effects were stronger predictors of
residualized RSES change scores among subjects low in control, a
significant achievement stress X composite attribution interaction
emerged among subjects high in control and a marginally significant
achievement stress X characterological blame interaction emerged among
subjects low in control.

Inspection of both interactions showed that

event-cognition scores were negatively associated with residual RSES
change scores at higher levels of stress.
Interpersonal Stress
A very different pattern of results occurred when residual changes
in RSES scores were regressed on attributions and cognitions about
negative interpersonal events (see Table 58 for Intercorrelations and
Table 59 for regression results).

Collapsed across levels of perceived

control, higher scores on measures of interpersonal stress, perceived
personal deficiencies, behavioral blame, and characterological blame
predicted residual decreases In self-esteem from Tl to T2.

In addition,

a highly significant interaction, accounting for four percent of the
variance in RSES change scores, emerged between interpersonal stress and
internal causal attributions.
Unexpectedly, examination of this interaction revealed a pattern
opposite to that predicted by the reformulated model. Specifically, more
internal attributions were associated with increases In self-esteem at
higher levels of Interpersonal stress.

At first glance, the association

between internal attributions for interpersonal stressors and increased
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Table 54
Intercorrelations Among Achievement Event Inferences. Achievement:
Stress, and Self-Esteem Among Subjects Hiph In Perceived Control
£N_=_I261

Measure

1

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

.

Tl RSES
T2 RSES
ACSTRESS
AEQ-INT
AEQ-ATTR
AEQ-DEF
AEQ-BBL
AEQ-CBL

.77
-.25
-. 13b
-. 17b
-.45
-.21°
-. 19a

2

3

4

-.30
- ,07b
- ,23a
-.50
-. 19a
-. 19s

.04b
.28
.38
.24
.12b

.52
.12b
.44
.41

5

6

7

8

-

-

.44
.34
.40

.40
.56

-

.67

-

Note. Unless otherwise indicated, all correlations are significant at
the £ < .01 level. RSES-Roseriberg Self-Esteem Scale; ACSTRESS"
Achievement Event Stress; AEO-INT-Achievement Events QuestionnaireInternality Subscale; AEO-ATTR-Achievement Events QuestionnaireInternal, Stable, and Global Composite; AEO-DEF-Achievement Events
Questionnaire-Personal Deficiencies Subscale; AEO-BBL-Achlevement Events
Questionnaire-Behavioral Blame Subscale; AEO-CBL-Achievement Events
Questionnaire-Characterological Blame Subscale.

a E < .05. b ns.

Table 55
Intercorrelations Among Achievement Event Inferences. Achievement
Stress, and Self-Esteem Among Subjects Low in Perceived Control
(N - 100)

Measure

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Tl RSES
T2 RSES
ACSTRESS
AEQ-INT
AEQ-ATTR
AEQ-DEF
AEQ-BBL
AEQ-CBL

1

.76
- .07b
- .17b
- .22a
- .18b
-. 15b
-.26°

2

3

4

-. 13b
-. 21®
-.32
-.35
-.30
- .40a

*
-.05b
.28
.23®
.18b
.15b

.52
,12b
.44
.41

5

6

8

7

-

.55
.48
.51

-

.70
.81

-

.80

-

Note. Unless otherwise indicated, all correlations are significant at
the £ < .01 level. RSES-Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale;
ACSTRESS-Achievement Event Stress; AEO-INT-Achievement Events
Questionnaire-Internality Subscale; AEO-ATTR-Achi evement Events
Questionnaire-Internal, Stable, and Global Composite; AEODEF-Achievement Events Questionnaire-Personal Deficiencies Subscale;
AEO-BBL-Achievement Events Questionnaire-Behavioral Blame Subscale; AEOCBL=Achievement Events Questionnaire-Characterological Blame Subscale.
3 2 < .05, b ns .

Table 56
Repression Models Predicting Time 1 (Tl') to Time 2 (T2) Change in
Residualized RSES Scores from Achievement Stress. Achievement
Event Inferences. and Achievement Stress X Event Inference
Interactions Among Subjects High in Perceived Control (N - 126)

Step Predictors in Set

1
2
3

1
2
3

1
2
3

1
2
3

1
2
3

Tl RSES
AEQ-ATTR
ACSTRESS
AEQ-ATTR X ACSTRESS

Tl RSES
AEQ-INT
ACSTRESS
AEQ-INT X ACSTRESS

Tl RSES
AEQ-DEF
ACSTRESS
AEQ-DEF X ACSTRESS

Tl RSES
AEQ-BBL
ACSTRESS
AEQ-BBL X ACSTRESS

Tl RSES
AEQ-CBL
ACSTRESS
AEQ-CBL X ACSTRESS

R2|nc

^inc

df

.57

162.62®

1,124

.02
.02

2.80
6.53b

3,122
4,121

.57

162.62®

1,124

.01
.001

2.15
0.22

3,122
4,121

.57
.04
.0002

.57
.01
.001

.57
.02
.003

162.62®

1,124

6.05b
0.05

3,122
4,121

162.62®

1,124

2.00
0.17

162.62®
2.24
0.85

3,122
4,121

1,124
3,122
4,121

pr

t

.75
-.11
-.15
-.23

12.75®
-1.25
-1.63
-2.56b

.75
.05
-.18
-.04

12.75®
0.58
-2.00
-0.47

.75
-.25
-.10
-.02

12.75®
-2.81b
-1.08
-0.23

.75
-.02
-.17
-.04

12.75®
-0.17
-1.92
-0.41

.75
-.06
-.17
-.08

12.75®
-0.71
-1.94
-0.92

Note. RSES-Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale; ACSTRESS-Achievement Event
Stress; AEO-INT-Achievement Events Questionnaire-Internality Subscale;
AEO-ATTR-Achievement Events Questionnaire-Internal, Stable, and Global
Composite; AEO-DEF-Achlevement Events Questionnaire-Personal
Deficiencies Subscale; AEO-BBL-Achlevement Events QuestionnaireBehavioral Blame Subscale; AEO-CBL—Achievement Events QuestionnaireCharacterological Blame Subscale.
® E < .0001. D p < .01. d £ - .07.
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Table 57
Regression Models Predicting Time 1 (Tl) to Time 2 (Tl'i Change In
Residualized RSES Scores from Achievement Stress. Achievement
Event Inferences. and Achievement Stress X Event Inference
Interactions Among Subjects Low in Perceived Control (N - 1001

Step Predictors in Set

1
2
3

1
2
3

1
2
3

Tl RSES
AEQ-ATTR
ACSTRESS
AEQ-ATTR X ACSTRESS

3

.57
.03
.0004

Tl RSES
AEQ-INT
ACSTRESS
AEQ-INT X ACSTRESS

.57

Tl RSES
AEQ-DEF
ACSTRESS
AEQ-DEF X ACSTRESS

.57

1 Tl RSES
2 AEQ-BBL
ACSTRESS
3 AEQ-BBL X ACSTRESS

1
2

R2i
in
n(c.

Tl RSES
AEQ-CBL
ACSTRESS
AEQ-CBL X ACSTRESS

.01
.001

.05
.003

Finc
132.57°
3.27°
0.09

132.57°
1.54
0.14

132.57°
5.98b
0.64

.57

132.57°

.04
.01

4.80b
2.59

.57

132.57°

.04
.01

5.56b
3.37d

df

Pr

t

1,98

.76
-.23
3,96 -.05
4,95
.03

11.51°
-2.28c
-0.50
0.30

1,98

.76
-.14
3,96 -.12
4,95
.04

11.51°
-1.34
-1.22
0.37

1,98

.76
-.31
3,96 -.05
4,95 -.08

11.51°
-3.25b
-0.44
-0.80

1,98

.76
-.28
3,96 -.07
4,95 -.16

11.51°
-2.87b
-0.67
-1.61

1,98

11.51°
-3.12b
-0.75
-1.84d

.76
-.30
3,96 -.08
4,95 -.19

Note. RSES-Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale; ACSTRESS-Achievement Event
Stress; AEO-INT-Achievement Events Questionnaire-Internality Subscale;
AEO-ATTR-Achievement Events Questionnaire-Internal, Stable, and Global
Composite; AEO-DEF-Achievement Events Questionnaire-Personal
Deficiencies Subscale; AEO-BBL-Achievement Events QuestionnaireBehavioral Blame Subscale; AEO-CBL-Achievement Events QuestionnaireCharacterological Blame Subscale.
a p < .0001. b E < .01. c R < .05. d E — .07.
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Table 58
Intercorrelations Among Interpersonal Event Inferences.
Interpersonal Stress, and Self-Esteem (N - 226)

Measure

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Tl RSES
T2 RSES
IPSTRESS
IEQ-INT
IQ-ATTR
IEQ-DEF
IEQ-BBL
IEQ-CBL

2

1

.76
-.26
-.08b
-.23
-.37
-.19
-.26

3

4

.07b
.35
.36
.28
.26

.66
.44
.60
.60

5

6

7

8

-

-.31
- ,08b
-.25
-.44
-.26
-.30

-

-

.48
.50
.50

-

.72
.77

-

.85

“

Note. Unless otherwise indicated, all correlations are significant at or
beyond the £ < .01 level. RSES-Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale;
IPSTRESS-Internersonal Event Stress; IEO-INT-Interpersonal Events
Questionnaire-Internality Subscale; lEO-ATTR-Interpersonal Events
Questionnaire-Internal, Stable, and Global Composite; IE0DEF-Interpersonal Events Questionnaire-Personal Deficiencies Subscale;
IEO-BBL-Intemersonal Events Questionnaire-Behavioral Blame Subscale;
IE0-CBI^Interoersonal Events Questionnaire-Characterological Blame
Subscale.
a p < .05. b ns.

Table 59
Regression Models
Residualized RSES
Event Inferences,
Interactions fN —

Predicting Time 1 (Tl^ to Time 2 (T2) Change In
Scores from Interpersonal Stress. Interpersonal
and Interpersonal Stress X Event Inference
226)

Step Predictors in Set

1
2
3

1
2
3

1
2
3

1
2
3

1
2
3

d2
K inc

Finc

df

Pr

t

.76
- .07
-.14
.12

17.24°
-0.99
-2.12c
1.75d

.76
- .02
-.17
.17

17.24°
-0.30
-2.53b
2.63b

Tl RSES
IEQ-ATTR
IPSTRESS
IEQ-ATTR X IPSTRESS

.57

297.34°

1,224

.01
.01

3.74c
3.06d

3,222
4,221

Tl RSES
IEQ-INT
IPSTRESS
IEQ-INT X IPSTRESS

.57

297.34a

1,224

.01
.01

3.26c
6.93b

3,222
4,221

.57

297.34a

.03
.00

9.00b
0.001

Tl RSES
IEQ-BBL
IPSTRESS
IEQ-BBL X IPSTRESS

.57

297.34°

1,224

5.31b
0.13

3,222
4,221

Tl RSES
IEQ-CBL
IPSTRESS
IEQ-CBL X IPSTRESS

.57

297.34°

1,224

5.38b
0.04

3,222
4,221

Tl RSES
IEQ-DEF
IPSTRESS
IEQ-DEF X IPSTRESS

.02
.0002

.02
.0001

.76 17.24°
-.22
-3.35b
3,2222 -.10
1.50
4,221
.002 0.03
1,224

.76
- .13
-.13
.02

17.24°
-2.Qlc
-2.00c
0.35

.76
-.14
-.14
.01

17.24°
-2.04c
-2.09c
0.21

Note. RSES«*Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale; IPSTRESS--Interpersonal Event
Stress; IEQ-INT-Interpersonal Events Questionnaire-Internality Subscale;
IEQ-ATTR-Interpersonal Events Questionnaire-Internalf Stable, and Global
Composite; IEQ-DEF-Interpersonal Events Questionnaire-Personal
Deficiencies Subscale; IEQjBBL-Interpersonal Events Questionnaire Behavioral Blame Subscale; IEQ-CBL^Interpersonal Events QuestionnaireCharacterological Blame Subscale
a e < .0001. b £ < .01. c £ < .05. 0 e - .08.
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self-esteem appears to support the justification that hopelessness
theorists provided for their revised self-esteem predictions.

When

considered together with a marginally significant (p - .08)
interpersonal stress X attributional composite interaction that
conformed to a similar pattern, however, it becomes clear that neither
the hopelessness model nor the reformulation were supported.11
The results of parallel analyses performed separately for subjects
who perceived high and low levels of control over interpersonal
stressors showed that attribution-self-esteem relations similar to those
found from the full sample emerged only among subjects who perceived
interpersonal stressors as controllable (see Tables 60 and 61 for zeroorder correlations among the measures used in these analyses and Tables
62 and 63 for regression results).

Specifically, higher scores on the

measure of internal attributions and on the internal, stable, and global
composite were both associated with increases in self-esteem at higher
levels of controllable interpersonal stress.

Among subjects who

perceived a lack of control over negative interpersonal events, only
interpersonal stress levels predicted residualized changes in RSES
scores.

Subjects who experienced higher levels of uncontrollable

interpersonal stress exhibited larger decreases in self-esteem from Tl
to T2.
Tests of the self-esteem predictions made by the hopelessness and
reformulated learned helplessness models yielded results that were
counter to patterns previously observed in the present research.

For

example, tests of other hypotheses highlighted the role of
uncontrollable interpersonal stressors and cognitions associated with
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Table 60
Intercorrelations Among Interpersonal Event Inferences.
Interpersonal Stress, and Self-Esteem Among Subjects High in
Perceived Control (N — 111)

Measure

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Tl RSES
T2 RSES
IPSTRESS
IEQ-INT
IQ-ATTR
IEQ-DEF
IEQ-BBL
IEQ-CBL

2

3

4

5

6

-.28
-.12°
-.27
-.53
-.31
-.38

.08®
.39
.41
.37
.30

.61
.27
.48
.48

.44
.41
.46

.60
.71

1

.76
-.34
-.10a
-.34
-.51
-.28
-.33

7

8

-

-

.78

“

Note. Unless otherwise indicated, all correlations ares significant at
the jj < .01 level. RSES-Rosenbere Self-Esteem Scale;
IPSTRESS-Interpersonal Event Stress; IEO-INT-Interoersonal Events
Questionnaire-Internality Subscale; IEO-ATTR-Interpersonal Events
Questionnaire-Internal, Stable, and Global Composite; IE0DEF-Interpersonal Events Questionnaire-Personal Deficiencies Subscale;
IEO-BBI^Interpersonal Events Questionnaire-Behavioral Blame Subscale;
lEO-CBI^-Interpersonal Events Questionnaire-Characterological Blame
Subscale.

Table 61
Intercorrelations Among Interpersonal Event Inferences.
Interpersonal Stress, and Self-Esteem Among Subjects Low in
Perceived Control (N — 112'>

Measure

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Tl RSES
T2 RSES
IPSTRESS
IEQ-INT
IQ-ATTR
IEQ-DEF
IEQ-BBL
IEQ-CBL

1

.78
- .19b
- .06b
-. 15b
-.26
- .18b
-. 23a

3

4

5

.08b
.34
.34
.26
.26

.63
.45
.54
.54

.44
.47
.43

2

- .33
- .04b
-. 22a
-.36
-. 23a
-. 24a

6

8

7

-

-

.81
.79

-

.89

-

Note. Unless otherwise indicated, all correlations are significant at
the £ < .01 level. RSES-Rosenbere Self-Esteem Scale;
IPSTRESS—Interpersonal Event Stress; IEO-INT-Interpersonal Events
Questionnaire-Internality Subscale; IEO-ATTR-Interpersonal Events
Questionnaire-Internal, Stable, and Global Composite; IEODEF-Interpersonal Events Questionnaire-Personal Deficiencies Subscale;
IEO-BBL-Interoersonal Events Questionnaire-Behavioral Blame Subscale;
IEO-CBl^Interpersonal Events Questionnaire-Characterological Blame
Subscale.
a E < .05. b ns.
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Table 62
Regression Models Predicting Time 1 (Tl) to Time 2 CT2’> Change in
Residualized RSES Scores from Interpersonal Stress. Interpersonal
Event Inferences, and Interpersonal Stress X Event Inference
Interactions Among Subjects High in Perceived Control fN - 111^

Step Predictors in Set

1
2
3

1
2
3

1
2
3

1
2
3

1
2
3

Tl RSES
IEQ-ATTR
IPSTRESS
IEQ-ATTR X IPSTRESS

Tl RSES
IEQ-INT
IPSTRESS
IEQ-INT X IPSTRESS

Tl RSES
IEQ-DEF
IPSTRESS
IEQ-DEF X IPSTRESS

Tl RSES
IEQ-BBL
IPSTRESS
IEQ-BBL X IPSTRESS

Tl RSES
IEQ-CBL
IPSTRESS
IEQ-CBL X IPSTRESS

2
K inc
d

.57
.001
.02

.57

F-inc
146.10°
0.14
6.29b

146.10°

df

Pr

1,109

.76
-.01
3,107 -.05
4,106
.24

12.09°
-0.06
-0.48
2.51b

1,109

.76
.06
3,107 -.05
4,106
.23

12.09°
-0.65
-0.49
2.46c

1,109

.76
.24
.02
.006

12.09°
-2.59b
0.26
0.06

.76
.14
3,107 -.003
4,106
.002

12.09°
-1.51
-0.04
0.03

.76
- .20
3,107 -.01
4,106 -.02

12.09°
-2.08
-0.08
-0.24

-

.003
.02

.57

0.35
6.04c

146.10°

-

.03
.0001

.57

3.50c
0.003

3,107
4,106

146.10°

1,109

-

.01
.00

1.28
0.001

.57

146.10°

.02
.0002

2.31
0.06

t

1,109

Note . RSES-Roseriberg Self-Esteem Scale; IPSTRESS-Interpersonal Event
Stress: IEQ-INT-Interpersonal Events Questionnaire-Internality Subscale:
lEQ-ATTR-Interpersonal Events Questionnaire-Internal, Stable, and Global
Composite; IEQ,-DEF-Interpersonal Events Ouestlonnalre-Personal
Deficiencies Subscale; IEQ-BBL-Interpersonal Events Questionnaire Behavioral Blame Subscale; IEQ-CBD-Interpersonal Events QuestionnaireCharacterological Blame Subscale
a £ < .0001. B £ < .01. c £ < .05.
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Table 63
Repression Models Predicting Time 1
to Time 2 CT2'> Change in
Residualized RSES Scores from Interpersonal Stress. Interpersonal
Event Inferences, and Interpersonal Stress X Event Inference
Interactions Among Subjects Low in Perceived Control (N — 112^

Step Predictors in Set

1
2
3

1
2
3

1
2
3

1
2
3

1
2
3

Tl RSES
IEQ-ATTR
IPSTRESS
IEQ-ATTR X IPSTRESS

Tl RSES
IEQ-INT
IPSTRESS
IEQ-INT X IPSTRESS

■d 2

inc

.59
.04
.001

.59
.05
.002

Tl RSES
IEQ-DEF
IPSTRESS
IEQ-DEF X IPSTRESS

.59

Tl RSES
IEQ-BBL
IPSTRESS
IEQ-BBL X IPSTRESS

.59

Tl RSES
IEQ-CBL
IPSTRESS
IEQ-CBL X IPSTRESS

.05
.004

.04
.003

.59
.04
.001

F-inc

df

155.48B

1,110

5.73b
0.16

3,108
4,107

155.48s

1,110

6.95b
0.73

3,108
4,107

155.48°

1,110

7.44b
1.08

3,108
4,107

155.48°

1,110

5.91b
0.76

3,108
4,107

155.48°

1,110

5.62b
0.32

3,108
4,107

pr

t

.77
-.06
-.27
-.04

12.47°
-0.60
-2.96b
-0.40

.77
.15
-.32
.08

12.47°
1.60
-3.48b
0.85

.77
-.18
- .25
-.10

12.47°
-1.86d
-2.66b
-1.04

.77
-.08
-.28
-.08

12.47°
-0.83
-3.05b
-0.87

.77
-.04
-.29
-.05

12.47°
-0.39
-3.16b
-0.56

Note. RSES-Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale; IPSTRESS-Interpersonal Event
Stress; IEQ-INT—Interpersonal Events Questionnaire-Internality Subscale;
IEQ-ATTR-Interpersonal Events Questionnaire-Internal, Stable, and Global
Composite; lEQ^DEF-Interpersonal Events Questionnaire-Personal
Deficiencies Subscale; IEQ-BBL-Interpersonal Events QuestionnaireBehavioral Blame Subscale; lEQ-CBL-Interpersonal Events QuestionnaireCharacterological Blame Subscale
a E < .0001. a E < .01. d E - .07.
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those events in the etiology of dysphoric affect.

The results of these

tests generally favored predictions derived from the reformulation
rather than those stemming from hopelessness theory.

Self-esteem

deficits, on the other hand, were more predictable from cognitions
associated with highly stressful achievement events than from those
associated with interpersonal stressors.

Moreover, relations among

achievement stressors, achievement-event cognitions, and self-esteem
deficits were more in line with the hopelessness model's revised
predictions than with the original 1978 predictions.

Subjects who

blamed something about their character (presumably an internal, stable,
and global factor) for the occurrence of highly upsetting achievement
stressors were the most likely to experience a loss of self-esteem from
Tl to T2.

In addition, this pattern was relatively stable among

subjects who perceived high and low levels of control over their
negative achievement events.
Analyses of interpersonal-event cognitions yielded findings that
were contrary to the theoretical expectations of both models under
consideration.

Internal causal attributions (and to a lesser extent,

composite internal, stable, and global causal attributions) were
associated with Tl to T2 increases in self-esteem among subjects who
experienced highly upsetting stressors in the interpersonal domain.
Subsequent analyses showed that these relations were specific to the
subgroup of subjects who perceived interpersonal stressors as
controllable.

Although the origin of this pattern is unclear,

172

cognitions about interpersonal stressors did not relate to changes in
self-esteem in the ways suggested by either the reformulation or
hopelessness theory.
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Ill. Conclusions and Implications

The purpose of this research was to examine the etiological
predictions of Abramson et al.'s (1988) hopelessness model of depression
and concurrently, to evaluate the divergent postulates of the
hopelessness and reformulated learned helplessness theories.

Although

the findings did not consistently favor one model over another, Abramson
et al.'s (1978) learned helplessness reformulation generally received
greater support than did the more recently proposed theory of
hopelessness depression.
Perceived Control and Depressive Symptoms
The results of the present research particularly highlighted the
importance of perceived uncontrollability (especially for negative
interpersonal life events) in moderating relations between maladaptive
cognitions and depressive symptoms.

Tests of the hopelessness model's

diathesis-stress and proximal contributory cause components failed to
support Abramson et al.'s (1988) assertion that negative life events
need not be perceived as uncontrollable in order to trigger the
development of depressive symptoms. Collapsed across levels of perceived
control, neither interpersonal stress nor achievement stress interacted
with scores on measures of dysfunctional cognitive styles to predict
changes in depressive symptomatology over time.
When data from subjects who perceived high and low levels of
control over recent negative life events were analyzed separately,
however, significant cognitive style X stress interactions were obtained
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among subjects who perceived a lack of control over interpersonal
stressors.

Higher scores on measures of Overgeneralization,

Attributional Style (Interpersonal Domain), Irrational Ideas, and
Dysfunctional Attitudes were each associated with residual increases in
depressive symptomatology among subjects who experienced higher levels
of uncontrollable interpersonal stress.

Similar patterns were not

observed among subjects who perceived interpersonal stressors as
controllable or among subjects who perceived achievement stressors as
either controllable or uncontrollable.
Scores on most measures of negativistic event inferences likewise
failed to predict residual changes in depression scores in interaction
with the stressfulness of negative achievement and interpersonal events
when the data from subjects who perceived high and low levels of control
were combined (the one exception to this pattern occurred for negative
consequence ratings, which predicted increases in depressive symptoms
among subjects who experienced highly upsetting interpersonal
stressors).

When low and high control groups were examined separately,

significant event inference X stress interactions emerged only among
subjects who perceived low levels of control over negative interpersonal
events (negative consequence ratings once again proved to be an
exception to this pattern in interacting with levels of interpersonal
stress to predict depressive symptomatology increases among subjects
high in control). As the stressfulness of uncontrollable negative
interpersonal events increased, higher levels of perceived personal
deficiencies, behavioral blame, and characterological blame became more
strongly associated with residual increases in depressive symptoms over
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the three week study period.
Diathesis-stress findings similar to those obtained here have not
been observed in other investigations of the interactive effects of
dysfunctional cognition and life stress on depression.

Although

Abramson et al. (1978) accorded perceived uncontrollability a prominent
role in the etiology of helplessness depression, researchers have not
assessed subjects' perceptions of control over the stressors
hypothesized to trigger the putative cognitive vulnerability factors.
The neglect of perceived control in this line of research probably stems
from a number of factors.

As Abramson et al. (1989) acknowledge, the

diathesis-stress portion of the reformulated learned helplessness theory
was not made explicit in the 1978 presentation of the model.

As a

result, most research focused on main effect relations between
attributional style and depressive symptoms (cf. Sweeney et al., 1986;
see Cutrona, 1983; O'Hara et al., 1982; Manly, McMahon, Bradley, &
Davidson, 1982 for exceptions).

It was not until the publication of

hopelessness theory that this component was clearly articulated.

With

the introduction of the revised model, however, perceived control was
eliminated from the proposed etiological pathway leading to depressive
symptoms.

Thus, when researchers began more consistently evaluating

diathesis-stress formulations, perceived control over negative life
events was no longer relevant to the validity of the theoretical
propositions under consideration.
In addition, rather than focusing on experiences with individual
stressors, many diathesis-stress investigations examined interactions of
hypothesized vulnerability factors and scores on cumulative Indices of
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stress (i.e., the total number of stressors experienced over a certain
time period) (e.g., Andersen, 1990; Metalsky & Joiner, 1992).

It is

more difficult, and perhaps less meaningful, to examine perceptions of
control over negative life events when such an approach is used.
Finally, the diathesis-stress component Implicit in Beck et al.'s (1979)
cognitive theory of depression does not attribute etiological
significance to perceptions of control over life stressors.

As such,

perceived control has not been examined in tests of Beck et al.'s (1979)
diathesis-stress formulation (e.g., Olinger et al., 1987; Wise & Barnes,
1986).
The failure to assess perceptions of control over negative life
events might partially account for the mixed findings obtained for
diathesis-stress hypotheses.

Supportive evidence has been obtained in

some investigations (e.g., Andersen, 1990; Cutrona, 1983; Hamilton Sacks
& Blunt Bugental, 1987; Metalsky et al., 1987; Metalsky & Joiner, 1992;
Metalksy, Joiner, Hardin, & Abramson, 1993; Nolen-Hoeksema, Seligman, &
Girgus, 1986; O'Hara, Rehm, & Campbell, 1982; Olinger et al., 1987; Wise
& Barnes, 1986 [college student sample]) but not in others (e.g.,
Barnett & Gotlib, 1988; 1990; Follete & Jacobson, 1987; Manly et al.,
1982; Metalsky et al., 1982; Persons & Roa, 1985; Wise & Barnes, 1986
[clinical sample]).

That is, variations in perceptions of control among

the subjects in these studies might have played a role in the
differences in findings across studies.

This possibility receives

support from a growing body of evidence suggesting that event cognitions
(e.g., causal attributions for specific negative life events) predict
the onset of depressive symptoms only among individuals who perceive

negative events as uncontrollable.

Noting the gradual deemphasis of

perceived control in learned helplessness theory and research (e.g.,
Peterson & Seligman, 1984), as well as the inconsistent and weak
relation between event attributions and depression that had emerged from
previous research, Brown and Siegel (1988) assessed the degree to which
perceptions of control over recent negative life events moderated the
relation between causal attributions and depressive symptoms in a sample
of normal adolescents.

The results of their prospective investigation

showed that, among subjects who perceived their most stressful event as
uncontrollable (i.e., attributed it to an uncontrollable cause), higher
scores on a composite index of internal, stable, and global causal
attributions were associated with increases in depressed mood.

In

contrast, among subjects who perceived their most stressful event as
controllable, those with higher scores on the attributional index
exhibited decreases in depressed mood.

Moreover, when subjects'

stressfulness ratings of their most upsetting events were used in a
similar analysis in place of perceived control scores, no interactive
relation emerged.

The latter suggests that the interactive effect of

causal attributions and perceptions of control was not merely a function
of the overlap between event upsettingness and perceived
controllability.
Whereas Brown and Seigel (1988) measured perceptions of event
uncontrollability by asking subjects to rate the controllability of the
causes of their most stressful events, Benassi et al. (1991) included
direct measures of perceived control over life stressors in two crosssectional studies and observed an identical pattern of results (but see
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Flett, Blankstein, & Kleinfeldt, 1990 for a failure to replicate this
pattern).

Evidence of a moderating role for perceived uncontrollability

was also obtained by Pagel et al. (1985) in their analysis of depressive
affect among spouse caregivers of Alzheimer's patients.
In Pagel et al.'s (1985) investigation, internal attributions for
a spouse's prediagnosis symptoms interacted with control perceptions
associated with a spouse's current problem behavior and recent illnessrelated life changes to predict both concurrent levels of depressed mood
and increases in depressive symptomatology over time.

Among subjects

low in perceived control, internal attributions for a spouse's erratic
behavior were associated with both high levels of current depressed
affect and temporal increases in depressed mood.

Internal attributions

were either unrelated or negatively related to depressive symptoms among
subjects who perceived more control over the consequences associated
with a spouse's illness.
The results obtained in the Brown and Siegel (1988), Benassi et
al. (1991), and Pagel et al. (1985) studies converge in their support of
the reformulated theory of learned helplessness and are generally
consistent with the present diathesis-stress and event-cognition
findings.

These findings also lend credibility to the suggestion made

here that more consistent support for the interaction of dysfunctional
cognitive styles and negative life events might have been obtained if
the perceived controllability of life stressors had been assessed in
previous diathesis-stress investigations.

As Brown and Siegel (1988, p.

316) note, "...the ability of causal judgments to predict depression may
be diluted or obscured if the causes of negative events are perceived as
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controllable and perceptions of control are not taken into account."
By analogy, the failure of researchers to examine perceptions of control
over life stressors might account for the equivocal support that has
heretofore been obtained for diathesis-stress hypotheses.

The results

of the present study underscore the need to assess perceptions of
control over the stressors that are believed to trigger the development
of depressive symptomatology in cognitively vulnerable individuals.
Before leaving the topic of perceived control, it is important to
note that, shortly after the publication of Abramson et al's (1989)
original model, hopelessness theory was revised and extended by Alloy,
Kelly, Mineka, and Clements (1990).

As implied by its name, Alloy et

al.'s "helplessness-hopelessness model of anxiety and depression" seeks
to account for the comorbidity of depressive and anxious symptoms within
single illness episodes (intra-episode comorbidity) as well as the
comorbidity of depressive and anxious episodes across the life span
(lifetime comorbidity). The revision of particular relevance to the
present discussion is the inclusion of controllability perceptions in
the etiological sequence believed to lead to a hopelessness expectancy
(now described as a highly certain negative outcome expectancy combined
with a highly certain helplessness expectancy).12,13 Whereas attributing
important negative life events to stable and global causes gives rise to
the negative outcome expectancy component of hopelessness (and therefore
the symptoms of hopelessness depression), Alloy et al. (1990) suggested
that a perceived lack of control over negative events fosters a
helplessness expectancy which, in turn, leads to the development of
depressive symptoms.
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It might appear at first glance that, although troublesome to the
original hopelessness model, the pattern of event cognition findings
obtained in the present study and reported by Brown and Siegel (1988),
Benassi et al. (1991), and Pagel et al. (1985) is consistent with Alloy
et al.'s (1990) helplessness-hopelessness model.

A close inspection of

that model, however, shows that this is not the case.

The proximal

contributory cause component of Alloy et al.’s model regards control
perceptions and causal attributions as independent rather than
interactive etiological factors.

That is, either attributing a negative

life event to a stable and global cause or perceiving a lack of control
over that event is believed to increase the likelihood of hopelessness
expectancies and the subsequent development of depressive symptoms.
Alloy et al. (1990) clearly do not suggest that helplessness
expectancies stem from stable and global causal attributions that are
made exclusively about uncontrollable stressors.

As will be shown

below, however, the link between hopelessness expectancies and
depressive symptoms proposed by both Alloy et al. (1990) and Abramson et
al. (1988) is actually better accounted for by an interaction of
maladaptive event cognitions and perceptions of uncontrollability than
by independent effects of event cognitions and control perceptions.
When describing the proximal sufficient cause of hopelessness
depression, Alloy et al. (1990, p. 511) note that
Although helplessness [the expectation that one can not control the
future occurrence of negative outcomes] is a necessary component of
hopelessness, It is not sufficient to produce hopelessness. For
hopelessness to develop, helplessness must be accompanied by a high
degree of certainty about the expected occurrence of negative
outcomes (Garber, Miller, & Abramson, 1980) [see also Abramson et
al. (1988, p. 359)].
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The linkages that Alloy et al. (1990) proposed between causal
attributions and negative outcome expectancies, and between perceived
uncontrollability and helplessness expectancies, do not logically follow
from the above claim.

If hopelessness expectancies are defined by the

joint presence of a highly certain negative outcome expectancy and a
highly certain helplessness expectancy, it is unclear how stable and
global attributions can be associated with depressive symptoms via only
the negative outcome expectancy component or how control perceptions can
be associated with depression exclusively through the helplessness
expectancy component.
If the formation of hopelessness expectancies was hypothesized to
stem from both a perceived lack of control over negative outcomes and
stable and global causal attributions, such a logical inconsistency
would not exist.

The perception of uncontrollability would account for

the development of the helplessness expectancy whereas stable and global
attributions would account for the development of the negative outcome
expectancy.

Thus, only an interactive relation between control

perceptions and causal attributions is able to adequately explain the
occurrence of both components of the proposed proximal sufficient cause
of hopelessness depression.
Although Alloy et al.'s (1990) revision of hopelessness theory
reintroduces perceptions of event uncontrollability back into the
learned helplessness framework, it does so in a manner that is
inconsistent with other central theoretical postulates.

Careful

consideration of the Abramson et al. (1978), Abramson et al. (1989), and
Alloy et al. (1990) models suggests that the predictions made by the
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former regarding the interactive effects of perceived control and causal
attributions have not only been validated at the empirical level but are
more theoretically sound.
One final aspect of Alloy et al.'s (1990) revision of hopelessness
theory deserves comment here.

The diathesis-stress portion of Alloy et

al.'s model hypothesizes that a generalized tendency to perceive a lack
of control over negative outcomes may render individuals vulnerable to
becoming hopeless just as a negativistic attributional style does.

Like

similar predictions within the hopelessness framework, a "depressogenic
perception of control style" (p. 514) is believed to increase the
likelihood that particular negative life events will be perceived as
uncontrollable and should, therefore, foster the development of
helplessness expectancies only when negative life events are
encountered.

Alloy and Clements (1992) evaluated predictions

derived from Alloy et al.'s (1990) expansion of hopelessness theory's
diathesis-stress component and obtained generally supportive evidence.
Specifically, they evaluated the hypothesis that individuals who exhibit
an illusion of control (i.e., perceive a contingency between a
particular response and the occurrence of a particular outcome when no
such contingency exists) will be less likely than those with more
accurate perceptions of response-outcome noncontingency to become
hopeless and experience depressive symptoms in response to laboratoryinduced and real-life stressors.
Subjects completed a standard judgment of contingency problem and
then worked on an insoluble block-design task during the first phase of
Alloy and Clements' (1992) investigation.
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Analysis of pre- to post-task

changes in scores on the MAACL hostility, anxiety, and depression
subscales showed that exposure to the uncontrollable failure had no
adverse effect on the affective experiences of subjects who exhibited an
illusion of control on the contingency problem.

In fact, levels of

hostility, anxiety, and depressive affect among these subjects actually
declined slightly following exposure to the insoluble problems.

In

contrast, subjects who more accurately perceived a lack of control on
the contingency problem displayed residual increases in hostile,
anxious, and depressive affect after working on the insoluble blockdesign task.
The second phase of Alloy and Clement's (1992) study was conducted
when subjects returned one month later to complete measures of recent
negative life events, event-related stress and discouragement (i.e.,
hopelessness), and depressive symptomatology.

Phase one contingency

judgments significantly predicted residual changes In levels of stress
and discouragement stemming from the recent occurrence of negative life
events.

The more control subjects perceived over the response

noncontingent outcome, the larger their phase one to phase two decreases
were in event-based stress and discouragement.

This effect emerged even

after statistically controlling for phase one levels of perceived
stress, discouragement, and depressive symptomatology.
In line with Alloy et al.'s (1990) diathesis-stress hypotheses,
the interaction of subjects' phase one judgment of control scores and
the number of negative life events experienced over the previous month
was a significant predictor of residual changes in depressive
symptomatology.

Among subjects who recently experienced a large number
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of life stressors, only those who failed to exhibit an illusion of
control experienced an increase in depressive symptoms.

Phase one to

phase two increases in depressive symptom severity were not observed
among the subset of highly stressed subjects who fell prey to the
illusion of control.
Similar support for Alloy et al.'s (1990) contention that the
tendency to perceive a lack of control over negative events predisposes
individuals to depressive symptomatology was not obtained in the present
research.

Of the five cognitive vulnerability measures administered to

subjects, only scores on Levenson's (1981) locus of control scale failed
to interact with stress ratings to predict residual changes in
depressive symptomatology among subjects who perceived a lack of control
over negative interpersonal events (see Table 17).

Subjects with an

external locus of control orientation were no more likely than their
internally-oriented counterparts to exhibit increases in depressive
symptoms in the face of highly upsetting uncontrollable interpersonal
stressors.
An examination of the alpha coefficient reliabilities in Table 1
shows that the internal consistency of the locus of control composite
was equal or superior to that of the other cognitive vulnerability
measures used in this research.

Psychometric inadequacies do not,

therefore, appear to account for the failure of locus of control
orientation to predict residual depression scores.

Thus, despite

repeated demonstrations of a significant association between an external
locus of control orientation and elevated levels of depressive symptoms
(see Benassi, Sweeney, & Dufuor, 1988 for a comprehensive review of this
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research), the current findings did not support an etiological role for
locus of control orientation in the onset of depressive symptoms.
Specific Vulnerability and the Dsnressogenic Consequences of Life
Stressors
Hopelessness theory's predictions regarding the domain specificity
of attributional style and life stressor effects were also not supported
in this study.

Stronger tendencies to make stable and global

attributions for negative interpersonal outcomes and for negative
achievement outcomes were associated with T1 to T2 increases in
depressive symptomatology among subjects who experienced highly
upsetting uncontrollable interpersonal stressors.

Neither attributional

style in the achievement domain nor attributional style in the
interpersonal domain interacted with the severity of subjects'
uncontrollable achievement stressors to predict changes in levels of
depressed mood.
These findings are inconsistent with the results obtained by
Metalsky et al. (1987) in the only other study that explicitly evaluated
hopelessness theory's diathesis-stress congruency hypothesis.

Metalsky

et al. found that attributional style for achievement outcomes, but not
for Interpersonal outcomes, predicted the severity of undergraduates’
depressive reactions to a disappointing performance on a midterm
examination.

Tests of analogous specific vulnerability hypotheses put

forth by Beck (1983) and by various psychodynamic theorists (e.g.,
Blatt, Quinlan, Chevron, McDonald, & Zuroff, 1982) have, however,
yielded stronger congruency effects in the interpersonal domain than in
the achievement domain (e.g., Hammen et al., 1985; Hammen, Ellicott, &
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Gitlin, 1989; Robins, 1990, Study One; Robins & Block, 1988; Segal,
Shaw, & Vella, 1989; Segal, Shaw, Vella, &Katz, 1992).
For example, Hammen et al. (1985) assessed levels of depressive
symptomatology as well as experience with interpersonal and achievement
stressors among undergraduates categorized as either dependent (i.e., an
interpersonal domain vulnerability) or self-critical (i.e., an
achievement domain vulnerability).

Within-group comparisons revealed

that, among dependent subjects, depressive symptomatology was more
highly correlated with the severity of interpersonal stress experienced
over the four month study period than with the severity of achievement
event stress.
critical group.

The reverse pattern was not observed among the selfThat is, levels of depressed mood among self-critical

subjects were not differentially associated with the severity of
achievement and interpersonal stress.

In addition, the results of

between-group comparisons showed that the magnitude of the interpersonal
stress-depression association was larger among dependent subjects than
it was among self-critical subjects.

The magnitude of the achievement

stress-depression relation did not reliably differ, however, in the
dependent and self-critical groups.
In a more recent investigation, Segal et al. (1989) found that
levels of interpersonal stress experienced over a six month period were
significantly correlated with the severity of depressive symptoms and
the likelihood of relapse among remitted depressives characterized as
dependent.

Moreover, relapse among these subjects was more likely to

follow periods of increased interpersonal stress than periods of
elevated achievement stress.

Segal et al. failed to observe
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corresponding patterns among a subset of remitted depressives
characterized as self-critical.
The results of these and other studies have led researchers to
speculate about possible differences between achievement and
interpersonal stressors that might influence the strength and nature of
their association with depressive symptoms among vulnerable individuals.
Hammen et al. (1985) suggested that, because the base rate of negative
achievement events is high in student populations, undergraduates might
perceive the occurrence of those events as normative. If students do
not regard negative achievement events as particularly diagnostic of
their individual self-worth or competency level, experience with such
events should have little adverse impact on mood.

Taking a somewhat

different perspective, Segal et al. (1992) pointed out that
interpersonal stressors often take the form of discrete losses (e.g.,
the breakup of a romantic relationship) and result in highly salient
disruptions in one's life whereas achievement stressors frequently
reflect more gradual deteriorations in existing conditions (e.g., one
poor performance on a course exam). As such, the threshold for
depressive reactions might be lower for interpersonal stressors and/or
the depressogenic effects of negative interpersonal events might become
apparent more quickly after their occurrence.

Achievement stress, on

the other hand, might contribute to depressive symptomatology in an
additive or cumulative fashion.
In the present study, high scores on all vulnerability measures
(except locus of control) were associated with T1 to T2 increases in
depressive symptomatology among individuals who experienced high levels
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of uncontrollable interpersonal stress but not among those who
experienced high levels of uncontrollable achievement stress.

Like

those obtained by Hammen et al. (1985) and Segal et al. (1992), these
findings also suggest that important contextual and/or perceptual
differences exist between achievement and interpersonal stressors.

To

better understand the nature of those differences, I compared subjects'
perceptions of and inferences about their most upsetting T2 achievement
and interpersonal stressors.

Overall, there were no differences in the

degree to which subjects perceived personal deficiencies, expected
adverse consequences, or blamed their characters for the occurrence of
negative achievement and interpersonal events (e s ranged from .19 to
.43).

Subjects perceived their negative achievement experiences as more

upsetting (e — .003) and more internally caused (e < .0001) than their
negative interpersonal experiences, and were more likely to blame their
behavior for the former than for the latter (e < .0001).

Interpersonal

stressors, on the other hand, were perceived as less controllable (e <
.0001) and as caused by factors that were more stable and global (e <
.0001).
The results of these comparisons are inconsistent with the
proposals offered by both Hammen et al. (1985) and Segal et al. (1992).
With respect to the former, achievement stressors were not less likely
than interpersonal stressors to be regarded as relevant to one's selfworth.

With respect to the latter, subjects did not expect the

consequences of interpersonal stressors to be any more severe than those
of achievement stressors and actually regarded negative achievement
events as more upsetting than negative interpersonal events.
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Alternatively, these findings suggest that variations in control
perceptions and causal attributions for interpersonal and achievement
stressors were responsible for the differential associations between
these events and depressive symptoms among vulnerable subjects.

It is

possible that highly uncontrollable experiences that are attributed to
stable and global factors trigger increases in depressive symptoms among
vulnerable individuals, regardless of the domain in which those
experiences fall. This is, of course, consistent with the predictions
of the reformulated learned helplessness model (expect for the fact the
1978 theory also discussed internal attributions as important to the
etiology of depressive symptomatology). The finding that levels of
dysfunctional cognitive styles interacted exclusively with stressfulness
of negative interpersonal events might therefore have less to do with
the interpersonal nature of those events than with the placement of
those events on the control and attributional dimensions.
This line of reasoning implies that the stressfulness of negative
achievement events would have combined with levels of dysfunctional
cognitive style to predict changes in depressive symptoms if those
events were perceived as uncontrollable as negative interpersonal events
were.

In an effort to evaluate this prediction, cognitive style X

achievement stress interactions were examined among a subset of subjects
(n - 56) whose perceived control ratings for their most upsetting T2
achievement stressors fell above A.5 (the median perceived control
rating for subjects' most upsetting T2 interpersonal stressors).

As

shown in Table 64, the results of regression analyses provided
preliminary support for this prediction. Levels of achievement stress
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Table 64
Regression Hodels Predicting Time 1 (Tl") to Time 2 (T2) Change in
Residualized BDI Scores from Achievement Stress. Dysfunctional
Cognitive Style, and Achievement Stress X Dysfunctional Cognitive
Style Interactions Among Subjects Who Provided Event Control
Ratings Greater Than 4.5 (N — 56)

Step Predictors in Set

1
2
3

1
2
3

1
2
3

1
2
3

1
2
3

T1 BDI
EASQ-ACGEN
ACSTRESS
EASQ-ACGEN X ACSTRESS
Tl BDI
DYSATT
ACSTRESS
DYSATT X ACSTRESS

Tl BDI
IRRIDEAS
ACSTRESS
IRRIDEAS X ACSTRESS

Tl BDI
OVERGEN
ACSTRESS
OVERGEN X ACSTRESS

Tl BDI
LOCUS
ACSTRESS
LOCUS X ACSTRESS

R2j
me

F.inc

df

pr
.64
.08
.22
.07

6.35a
0.58
1.65
0.50

.64
.13
.21
.23

6.35®
0.97
1.56
1.67d

.64
.31
.22
.20

6.35®
2.36b
1.60
1.47e

.64
.17
.21
-.09

6.35®
1.22
1.56
-0.61

.64
.03
.22
.28

6.35®
-0.19
1.60
2.05c

.43

40.29a

1,54

.03
.003

1.44
0.25

3,52
4,51

.43

40.29®

1,54

.04
.03

1.76
2.79d

3,52
4,51

.43

40.29®

1,54

.08
.02

4.19b
2.16®

3,52
4,51

.43

40.29®

1,54

.04
.004

2.05
0.38

3,52
4,51

40.29®

1,54

.43

-

.03
.04

1.29
4.19c

3,52
4,51

t

Note. BDI-Beck Depression Inventory; AC STR ESS-Ach ievement Event Stress;
EASO-ACGEN-Extended Attributional Style Questionnaire-Achievement Events
Generality Composite; DYSATT-Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale ;
IRRIDEAS-Irrational Ideas Inventory; OVERGEN-Overgeneralization Subscale
of the Attitudes Toward Self Scale; LOCUS-Powerful Others and Chance
Locus of Control Composite
® £ < .0001. b £ - .01. c £ < .05. d E - .10. e E < .15.
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interacted with Locus of Control scores and, marginally, with scores on
the Irrational Ideas (p — .15) and Dysfunctional Attitudes (p. — .10)
scales.

Further examination of these effects showed that as the

stressfulness of highly uncontrollable achievement events increased,
higher scores on all three measures were more strongly predictive of
residual increases in levels of depressive symptoms.

Similar relations

were not observed for scores on the Overgeneralization and Attributional
Style (Achievement Domain) measures.
These findings help to clarify the inconsistent results obtained
for interpersonal and achievement stressors in the diathesis-stress and
specific vulnerability analyses.

They also reinforce conclusions drawn

earlier regarding the importance of perceived uncontrollability to the
onset of depressive symptomatology, and in doing so, again point to the
theoretical superiority of the reformulated learned helplessness model
over the hopelessness model.
The results of these supplemental analyses might also prove useful
in efforts to determine why tests of specific vulnerability hypotheses
have frequently yielded stronger support in the interpersonal domain.
The recent focus on life stressors in achievement and interpersonal
domains has advanced our understanding of the ways in which negative
life events precipitate depressive symptomatology.

However, the

confounding of event domain with other characteristics such as
controllability and causal attributions might ultimately serve to
obscure the role that the latter factors play in the etiology of
depression.

As in the present study, future research might benefit by

looking beyond event domain to the contextual and psychological

192

dimensions on which negative achievement and interpersonal events vary.
Event Cognitions as Mediators of Diathesis-Stress Effects
In their reformulation of learned helplessness theory, Abramson et
al. (1978) regarded casual attributions for specific negative outcomes
as the mechanisms through which a negativistic attributional style
exerted its effects on depressive symptoms.

Although hopelessness

theorists (Abramson et al., 1989) expanded the domain of proximal
contributory causes to include personal deficiency and negative
consequence inferences, they did not modify the reformulation's
hypotheses about the mediating role of specific event cognitions.
Tests of these mediational hypotheses failed to support the
predictions from either model.

Event cognition scores were not

predictable from interactions of cognitive styles and levels of
uncontrollable interpersonal stress.

The failure of event cognitions to

mediate the interactive relations observed among dysfunctional cognitive
styles, uncontrollable interpersonal stress, and depressive symptoms is
surprising in light of the fact that higher scores on most event
cognition measures predicted increases in depressive symptomatology
among subjects who perceived a lack of control over highly stressful
interpersonal life events.

Rather than playing a mediating role,

maladaptive event cognitions appeared to have affected depressive
symptoms independently of dysfunctional cognitive styles.
Most of the published research on hopelessness theory has focused
exclusively on the model's diathesis-stress hypotheses (e.g., Alloy &
Clements, 1992; Andersen, 1990; Metalsky & Joiner, 1992; Metalsky et
al., 1993).

Despite their prominent and more proximal association with
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hopelessness expectancies and depressive symptoms, measures of event
cognitions have only infrequently been included in studies that also
assess dysfunctional cognitive styles (cf. Hammen, 1988) . Mediational
predictions specific to Abramson et al.'s (1978) reformulated learned
helplessness theory have been evaluated, but only in several
investigations (Cutrona, 1983; Follette & Jacobson, 1987; Metalsky et
al., 1987).

Although more definitive conclusions admittedly await

additional research, the evidence collected to date provides, at best,
limited support for these predictions.
For example, Cutrona (1983) examined associations between
prepartum responses to the six negative outcomes on the Attributional
Style Questionnaire (Peterson et al., 1982) and causal attributions for
postpartum "maternal blues," highly upsetting child-care stressors, and
daily life stressors.

Although the ASQ scores of initially nondepressed

women predicted levels of depressive symptomatology at two and eight
weeks postpartum, attributional style was not significantly correlated
with any of the postpartum measures of stressful event attributions.
Moreover, two of Cutrona's three postpartum event attribution measures
failed to predict levels of concurrent depressed mood, and prepartum ASQ
scores remained significant predictors of postpartum depressive
symptomatology after the effects of event attributions were
statistically controlled.
Follette and Jacobson (1987) and Metalsky et al. (1987) did obtain
significant correlations between scores on the Extended Attributional
Style Questionnaire and causal attributions for exam performance among
students who were disappointed with their exam grade (failure group).
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However, in neither of these studies was the same correlation examined
among students who were satisfied with their exam performance (success
group). Such an approach does not provide a stringent test of
mediational hypotheses that predict exclusive associations between
dysfunctional cognitive styles and cognitions about highly stressful
outcomes (cf. Alloy et al., 1988).

Unequivocal support for these

predictions requires that maladaptive attributions are made only by
cognitively vulnerable individuals who experience a highly a stressful
event (i.e., as indicated by a significant cognitive style X stress
interaction).

At a minimum, Follete and Jacobson (1987) and Metalsky et

al. (1987) should have demonstrated that the magnitude of the
attributional style-exam attribution relation was stronger in the high
stress (failure) group than in the low stress (success) group.
In addition, the attributional style X exam stress interaction was
not a reliable predictor of depressive symptoms in Follette and
Jacobson's (1987) study.

As such, the significant association that they

observed between ASQ scores and exam attributions does not bear on the
validity of the mediational predictions proposed by learned helplessness
reformulators. Metalsky et al. (1987) did find that the interaction of
attributional style X exam stress was a significant predictor of
subsequent depressed mood.
students, exam attributions

They also demonstrated that, among failure
accounted for a significant portion of the

variance in depressive symptoms and that the ASQ scores of those
students were no longer predictive of depressed mood after exam
attributions were statistically controlled.

Although Metalsky et al.'s

(1987) findings are generally consistent with the predictions advanced
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by the reformulated learned helplessness and hopelessness models, the
small number of subjects used in their mediational analyses (n - 23) and
the failure to observe a significant relation between exam attributions
and depressive symptoms after controlling for ASQ scores weakens any
conclusions that can be drawn from that research.
The results obtained in the present mediational analyses were not
supportive of model hypotheses insofar as dysfunctional cognitive styles
did not exclusively predict cognitions about subjects' most stressful
uncontrollable interpersonal experiences.

However, the fact that scores

on several dysfunctional cognitive style measures were related to
subjects' cognitions about all of the uncontrollable negative
interpersonal events reported at T2 (i.e., irrespective of the
stressfulness of those events) should not be regarded as theoretically
unimportant.

Subjects with certain cognitive vulnerabilities were more

likely than their counterparts to make particular maladaptive inferences
about the highly upsetting interpersonal stressors over which they
perceived a lack of control.

That cognitively vulnerable individuals

imposed similar interpretations on less upsetting uncontrollable
interpersonal stressors does not negate this fact.

In other words, the

failure of dysfunctional cognitive styles to confer a specific risk for
depressogenic inferences about the most stressful of subjects'
experiences does not diminish the fact that depressogenic inferences
were made about these experiences.
Although cognitively vulnerable subjects made maladaptive
inferences about less upsetting stressors, those inferences were not
associated with Increases in depressive symptomatology.
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Perceived

personal deficiencies, negative consequence expectancies, behavioral
blame, and characterological blame predicted changes in levels of
depressed mood only when they were associated with the most stressful of
subjects' uncontrollable interpersonal outcomes.

In this sense, the

results of the mediational analyses are not at odds with hopelessness
theory even though they did not conform to the model's prediction that
the interaction of the hypothesized cognitive diatheses and
negative life events should increase the likelihood that
individuals will make negative interpretations (i.e., internal,
stable, and global attributions or biased personal inferences) for
the particular negative events they encounter (Alloy et al., 1988,
p. 36).
The results of the mediational analyses also bear on a number of
subsidiary issues related to cognitive style and event cognition
associations.

Several researchers have expressed doubt about the cross-

situational consistency of causal attributions, suggesting that
attributions for hypothetical outcomes bear little or no relation to
attributions for real-life stressors (Cutrona et al., 1984; Miller,
Klee, & Norman, 1982).

Cutrona et al. (1984), for example, reanalyzed

data from Cutrona's (1983) postpartum depression investigation and
reported relatively modest correlations between ASQ scores and causal
attributions for post-delivery stressors.

Moreover, the magnitude of

those associations did not substantially increase when data were
examined separately for women whose responses to the six hypothetical
ASQ outcomes were most consistent.

Similarly, Miller et al. (1982)

failed to observe significant associations between the attributions
depressed inpatients made about a real life stressor and those made
about either hypothetical or experimentally-created negative outcomes.
In contrast to those findings, the tendency to make stable and
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global causal attributions for hypothetical negative interpersonal
outcomes was predictive of stability and globality attributions for
specific (uncontrollable) interpersonal stressors in the present
research.

It is likely that tests of the cognitive style-event

inference relation have yielded inconsistent findings because cognitions
about any one event are influenced by a number of different factors.
Hopelessness theorists are quick to point out that the interpretation
given to any one stressor will be a function of dispositional factors
such as attributional style, the specific nature of the event, and the
context within which the event occurs.

In light

of

these

considerations, it becomes clear that the validity of hypothesized
associations between dysfunctional cognitive styles and maladaptive
event inferences should not rise and fall based on correlations (or lack
thereof) between cognitive style measures and inferences made about a
single real life event.

In fact, such an approach represents an

extremely stringent test of such hypotheses.
Following the lead of attitude-behavior researchers (cf. Ajzen &
Fishbein, 1977; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1974; Weigel, Vernon, & Tognacci,
1974), a more fruitful approach to this question might be to assess
relations between dysfunctional cognitive styles and inferences made
about a number of different real-life stressors.

For example, Cutrona

et al. (1984) found that ASQ scores were more highly related to
attributions averaged over 14 stressors (r - .263, p < .01) than to
attributions averaged over only three stressors (r - .136, ns) . Thus,
before more definitive conclusions are drawn regarding the crosssituational consistency of causal attributions, researchers should await

the results of tests similar to those suggested here.
Finally, it should be noted that a certain level of specificity
between dysfunctional cognitive styles and event inferences is implied
in the hopelessness model.

Hopelessness theory seems to suggest that

tendencies to attribute negative outcomes to stable and global causes
will be related to stable and global event attributions but not to
negative consequence expectancies or perceived personal deficiencies.
No such specificity was observed in the present research.

Attributional

style was related not only to event attributions but to negative
consequence expectancies, perceived personal deficiencies, behavioral
blame, and characterological blame.
overgeneralization measure.

The same was true for scores on the

This pattern of findings is inconsistent

with the specific cognitive style-event inference relations implied by
hopelessness theorists and suggests that at least some dysfunctional
cognitive styles leave individuals vulnerable to making a host of
negativistic inferences when life stressors occur.
Hopelessness as a Mediator of Dysfunctional Cognitive Style and
Maladaotive Event Inference Effects
The subtype of depression described by Abramson et al. (1989) is
defined by the causal precedence of hopelessness expectancies.

Yet the

cognitive style and event inference measures that predicted increases in
depressive symptoms among subjects who experienced highly upsetting
uncontrollable interpersonal stressors were unrelated to levels of
hopelessness among the same subjects.

The only exceptions to this

pattern occurred for interactions of uncontrollable interpersonal stress
and behavioral as well as characterological blame.
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Careful scrutiny of

the latter, however, suggested a closer association with hopelessness
expectancies than with depressive symptoms.

The general failure of

hopelessness expectancies to mediate relations between depressive
symptomatology and either dysfunctional cognitive styles or maladaptive
event inferences has potentially crucial implications for the validity
of Abramson et al.'s (1989) model (and for the 1978 reformulation of
learned helplessness theory which makes similar predictions).
Evidence that hopelessness mediates relations between depressive
symptoms and either dysfunctional cognitive styles or maladaptive event
inferences has also proven somewhat elusive in other investigations that
included measures of future outcome and control expectancies.
mediation has rarely been established.

Complete

Metalsky et al.'s (1993) study

of depressive symptoms among undergraduate students who recently
received feedback regarding their grades on a midterm exam was the only
study I located that demonstrated such an effect.

In that study, a

three-way interaction of attributional style, self-esteem, and exam
performance predicted changes in both depressive symptom and
hopelessness levels following the receipt of exam grades.

Pre- to post

grade increases in depressive symptoms as well as hopelessness
expectancies were observed only among low-scoring subjects who reported
relatively low levels of achievement self-esteem and who exhibited a
tendency to attribute negative achievement outcomes to stable and global
causes.

Metalsky et al. (1993) established the mediational role of

future outcome expectancies by showing that levels of hopelessness
reported at one day post-grade predicted levels of depressed mood
reported at two, three, and four days post-grade.
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Moreover, the

attributional style X self-esteem X exam performance interaction that
previously predicted post-grade levels of depressive symptomatology no
longer did so after the effects of that interaction on hopelessness
expectancies were statistically controlled.
Unlike the research just described, most studies have either
demonstrated only partial mediation (Alloy & Clements, 1992; Metalsky &
Joiner, 1992) or have failed to demonstrate mediation altogether
(Andersen, 1990; McEvoy DeVellis & Blalock, 1992; Riskind et al., 1987).
Alloy and Clements (1992), for example, found that perception of control
styles (i.e., judgments of control over a noncontingent outcome)
assessed at Tl interacted with the number of negative life events
reported at T2 to predict both the degree of discouragement (i.e.,
hopelessness) subjects experienced following the occurrence of those
stressors and Tl to T2 changes in levels of depressed mood.

When

discouragement ratings were entered as a control variable in the
regression equation predicting residual changes in depressive symptoms,
the effect of the control X stress interaction was reduced in strength
(i.e., the Beta for the interaction decreased from -.20 to -.16) but
remained a significant predictor of residualized depression scores (p <
.05).

Although Alloy and Clements (1992) interpreted the reduction in

the control X stress interaction Beta as support for partial mediation,
it is important to note that they did not test the two Betas to
determine whether they were significantly different
1984; see also present study).

(cf. Williams,

The absence of evidence indicating that

the interaction Betas reliably differed, combined with the fact that the
control X stress interaction remained a reliable predictor of depression
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scores after discouragement levels were controlled, weakens any
conclusions that can be made about hopelessness mediation.

At best, the

support that Alloy and Clements obtained for hopelessness theory's
mediation component appears preliminary.
Only slightly stronger evidence for the mediational predictions of
hopelessness theory was obtained when Metalsky and Joiner (1992)
examined the degree to which hopelessness expectancies accounted for the
interactive effects of life stress and maladaptive cognitive styles on
depressive symptomatology observed in their research.

Of the three

cognitive style X stress interactions that reliably predicted temporal
changes in levels of depressed mood, only the effect of negativistic
inferences about the self appeared to be mediated by hopelessness.
Subjects who demonstrated a tendency to derogate themselves following
the occurrence of negative outcomes and who reported a large number of
stressful life events exhibited Tl to T2 increases in levels of both
depressed mood and hopelessness.

Time 2 hopelessness levels were

strongly related to depressive symptoms at T2 and the interaction of
life stress and self-derogation tendencies failed to account for a
significant portion of the residual variance in depression scores when
the variance attributable to hopelessness expectancies was statistically
controlled.
Metalksy and Joiner's (1992) examination of attributional style
scores showed that they also interacted with levels of life stress to
predict changes in hopelessness and depressed mood.

These effects were

not interdependent, though, as the attributional style X life stress
interaction remained reliably related to depression scores after
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accounting for hopelessness expectancies.

The variance in residualized

depression scores explained by this interaction was reduced only by
about 2% (from 5.8% to 3.6%) when hopelessness was used as a control
variable in the regression equation.

It is not clear whether this

reduction was a reliable one because Metalsky and Joiner failed to test
the difference between the two interaction Betas.

Less equivocal

results were obtained for the third cognitive style X stress interaction
assessed by Metalsky and Joiner.

The interaction of generalized

negative consequence expectancies and life stress was exclusively
predictive of changes in depressed mood.

Furthermore, the magnitude of

this effect was unaltered when hopelessness expectancies were
statistically controlled.
Andersen (1990) also observed a significant interactive effect of
attributional style and life stress scores on a measure of hopelessness
as well as depressive symptoms, but found neither complete nor partial
hopelessness mediation.

In addition, both Riskind et al. (1987) and

McEvoy DeVellis and Blalock (1992) failed to demonstrate the predicted
mediational role of hopelessness expectancies but found evidence for a
moderating role instead.
Riskind et al. (1987) found no association between attributional
style scores and scores on a concurrently administered measure of
hopelessness nor did they find a significant relation between Tl
hopelessness expectancies and changes in levels of depressed mood over
the six week study period.

They did demonstrate, however, that

attributional style, by Itself, and in conjunction with hopelessness
expectancies, predicted residualized changes In depressive
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symptomatology levels.

Analysis of the attributional style X

hopelessness interaction showed that higher levels of hopelessness were
associated with increases in depressive symptoms only among subjects who
tended to attribute negative outcomes to internal, stable, and global
causes.

Among subjects who tended to explain negative outcomes in terms

of external, unstable, and specific causes, higher levels of
hopelessness predicted decreases in depressive symptomatology.
The pattern of results obtained by Riskind et al. (1987) is
inconsistent with hopelessness theory's mediational predictions but
supports an alternative, moderating model.

In the "confluence model"

suggested by Riskind and colleagues, a variety of factors in addition to
attributional style contribute to the development of hopelessness
expectancies; not all individuals with a negativistic attributional
style will become hopeless and not all individuals with negative outcome
expectancies possess a negativistic attributional style.

The model also

states, however, that hopelessness will bring about increases in
depressive symptoms only among individuals who possess maladaptive
attributional tendencies.

In other words, a maladaptive attributional

style and negative outcome expectancies are independent (i.e., non
causally related) risk factors, which, by themselves, are either
unrelated to or weakly related to depressive symptomatology.

It is only

when these vulnerability factors combine, do they contribute to the
onset of depressive symptoms.

As Riskind et al. (1987, p. 350) note

According to the confluence hypothesis, the predictive capacity of
attributional style is contingent on the degree of correspondence
between attributions and expectations; specifically, it states
that the working combination of a highly negative attributional
style and negative outcome expectations represents the worst case
of risk for future depression. Furthermore, negative
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attributional style or expectations alone are not as indicative of
higher levels of depression in the future.
Proponents of hopelessness theory might point out that the failure
to assess the occurrence of negative life events limits the conclusions
that can be drawn from Riskind et al.'s (1987) research regarding the
role of hopelessness expectancies.

That is, it could be argued that the

failure to observe a significant relation between attributional style
and future outcome expectancies was due to the fact that the stress
levels of subjects were not taken into account.

Neither hopelessness

theory nor the reformulated learned helplessness model predict a main
effect relation between attributional style and hopelessness; both
models propose that individuals who possess a negativistic attributional
style are at risk of becoming hopeless only when they experience high
levels of life stress.

Thus, a reliable association between

attributional style scores and hopelessness expectancies (consistent
with hopelessness theory's mediational component) might have emerged in
Riskind et al.'s study if that relation had been assessed among a subset
of subjects who had recently experienced important life stressors.
Although the failure to assess life stress might explain why
Riskind et al. (1987) failed to establish hopelessness mediation, it can
not adequately account for a similar observation made by McEvoy DeVellis
and Blalock (1992) in their study of attributions, hopelessness
expectancies, and depressive symptomatology among rheumatoid arthritis
patients.

McEvoy DeVellis and Blalock used the internality, stability,

and globality dimensions to code spontaneous attributions that a sample
of arthritis sufferers made for various aspects of their illness (e.g.,
onset, course, symptom flare-ups, treatment difficulties).
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Patients

also completed measures of future control and outcome expectations
regarding their disease and reported on their levels of depressed mood
at baseline (Tl) and again four months later (T2).
McEvoy DeVellis and Blalock (1992) used these data to evaluate
mediating and moderating models of the relations among attributions for
illness-related events, hopelessness expectancies, and depressive
symptomatology.

Tests of the mediating model were unsupportive.

Controlling for Tl levels of depressed mood and physical functioning,
illness attributions (a stability-globality composite and stability
scores alone) predicted T2 levels of depressive symptomatology but were
unrelated to Tl hopelessness expectancies.

Moreover, the use of

hopelessness as a third control variable in the model predicting changes
in depression levels had no effect on the strength of the attribution
effect.
Assessment of the alternative moderating model yielded significant
main effect relations between Tl to T2 changes in depressive
symptomatology and both illness attributions and hopelessness
expectancies.

In addition, the interaction of attributions and

hopelessness was a significant predictor of residualized depression
scores.

In an effort to clarify the nature of that interaction, McEvoy

DeVellis and Blalock (1992) examined the relation between attributions
and depressive symptoms separately for patients who felt relatively
hopeless and relatively hopeful about their disease prognosis.

Time 1

to Time 2 increases in depressive symptomatology were reliably
associated with more stable and global illness attributions only among
patients who felt unable to control the future course of their illnesses
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and who were pessimistic about the long term prognosis of their
condition.

Among the more optimistic patients, illness attributions

were unrelated to changes in depressive symptom levels over the four
month study period.
Taken together, the results obtained by Riskind et al. (1987) and
McEvoy DeVellis and Blalock (1992) provide little support for the
mediational links among cognitions, hopelessness expectancies, and
depressive symptoms proposed by hopelessness theory.

The effects of

negativistic attributions on depressive symptoms found in these studies
were not explained by attribution-hopelessness and hopelessness depression relations.

Neither attributional style nor event

attributions predicted subjects' levels of hopelessness.

Although

hopelessness theorists in no way claim that attributions and
hopelessness expectancies will be perfectly correlated, they do suggest
a nonzero relation between the two.

Alloy et al. (1988, p. 36)

specifically state
The negative interpretations for particular negative life events
(attributions or biased inferences) that a person makes should, in
turn, increase the likelihood of forming the expectation of
hopelessness... Again, because the particular interpretations an
individual makes for negative events are hypothesized to
contribute to, but not be sufficient for, the formation of
hopelessness..., this probability linkage should be greater than 0
but less than 1.0" (emphasis added).
Rather than operating through a mediating process, attributions worked
in conjunction with hopelessness expectancies to predict changes in
depressive symptomatology.

Only the combination of negativistic

attributions and pessimistic future expectancies was related to
increases in depression.
In an effort to determine whether similar moderated relations
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were present in this research, three-way interactions between
hopelessness expectancies (as assessed by the BHS), levels of
interpersonal stress, and scores on the cognitive style and event
inference measures were used to predict residual changes in depression
among subjects who perceived a lack of control over negative
interpersonal events. Moderator effects would be demonstrated if
increases in depressive symptomatology were exhibited only by highly
stressed subjects who reported both maladaptive cognitions and high
levels of hopelessness.

None of the hopelessness X stress X cognition

interactions were significantly related to changes in levels of
depressed mood.

Thus, although the moderating effects of hopelessness

expectancies have now been documented in several recent investigations,
these findings were not replicated in the present research.
The failure to observe either moderating or mediating effects of
hopelessness might be due to the fact that generalized future control
and outcome expectancies were assessed whereas all of the cognition X
stress findings were domain specific (i.e., pertained only to
interpersonal stressors).

In their discussion of hopelessness theory,

Abramson et al. (1989) distinguished between circumscribed pessimism and
generalized hopelessness.

The former is said to occur when individuals

anticipate a lack of control over a specific set of negative outcomes
(e.g., interpersonal events) whereas the latter describes situations in
which negative expectancies cut across multiple domains.

It is perhaps

more reasonable to expect that the maladaptive cognitions subjects held
about uncontrollable interpersonal stressors gave rise to circumscribed
pessimism regarding future social interactions than to generalized
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feelings of hopelessness about many different areas of their lives.
The BHS, which was used in the present study to assess
hopelessness, is a measure of generalized future expectancies.

If the

cognition X interpersonal stress interactions that predicted increases
in depressive symptomatology had specific effects on expectancies
regarding future interpersonal outcomes, it is unlikely that those
effects would have been detected by the items on the BHS.

Considered in

this light, the failure of the cognition X interpersonal stress effects
to either predict changes in BHS scores (consistent with a mediated
relation) or interact with BHS scores to predict changes in depressive
symptoms (consistent with a moderating relation), becomes more
unde rstandab1e .
A close examination of the hopelessness measures used in other
investigations however, suggests that the lack of sensitivity inherent
in the BHS can not completely account for the absence of mediational or
moderator effects in this study.

Moderator effects have been obtained

by researchers who used both generalized and domain-specific measures of
hopelessness expectancies.

In Riskind et al.'s (1987) study, for

example, the interaction of attributional style scores and scores on a
measure of global outcome expectancies predicted increases in depressive
symptoms among college undergraduates.

In contrast, McEvoy DeVellis and

Blalock (1992) found that illness attributions interacted with
expectancies regarding disease prognosis to predict changes in
depressive symptomatology among arthritis patients.
In the Metalsky et al. (1993) investigation, which provides the
strongest evidence in support of hopelessness mediation, attributional
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style for negative achievement outcomes and self-esteem in the
achievement-domain interacted with performance on a midterm exam
(achievement stress) to predict scores on a measure that assessed
generalized hopelessness expectancies as well as expectancies regarding
future achievement and interpersonal outcomes.

In discussing their use

of a broad-based hopelessness inventory, Metalsky et al. (1993, p. 103)
commented that "In contrast to the original Hopelessness Scale..., the
EHS [Extended Hopelessness Scale] includes 20 achievement-related items,
20 interpersonal-related items, and the 20 original items.

Because we

were interested in predicting generalized hopelessness. across content
domains, we used all 60 items of the EHS" (emphasis added). These
results are at odds with the suggestion advanced earlier that global
measures of hopelessness are not sufficiently sensitive to detect the
effects of domain-specific cognitions on future outcome and control
expectancies.

Nevertheless, the level at which hopelessness

expectancies are assessed remains an important methodological and
theoretical issue which might account for variability in findings across
studies.
Self-Blame and Depressive Symptoms
Although not included among the set of proximal contributory
causes of hopelessness depression, self-blame has been cited as a
prominent feature of depressive thinking (Beck, 1967) that co-occurs
with a perceived lack of control over negative outcomes (Abramson &
Sackheim, 1979; Peterson, 1979).

In discussing the relation between

self-blame and depressive affect, Janoff-Bulman (1979) distinguished
between behavioral blame (i.e., blaming oneself for past actions or
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inactions) and characterological blame (i.e., blaming oneself for being
a particular type of person) and regarded only the latter as a
maladaptive response to negative outcomes capable of bringing about
depressive symptomatology.
According to Janoff-Bulman, blaming negative events on one's
actions or inactions implies that similar events can be avoided in the
future by simply altering one's behavior.

Because behavioral blame

serves to enhance expectations of future control, it should be
associated with positive coping outcomes.

Conversely, blaming a faulty

character, which is not as readily amenable to modification, implies a
lack of control over future negative outcomes and should therefore be
associated with helplessness expectancies and depressive affect.
Janoff-Bulman (1979, Study 1) attempted to validate this distinction by
examining the manner in which relatively depressed and nondepressed
female undergraduates allocated blame for hypothetical negative outcomes
between their behavior, their character, other people, and the external
environment.

As predicted, relatively depressed subjects scored higher

than their less symptomatic counterparts on the characterological blame
measure.

The expectation that behavioral blame would be higher among

nondepressed subjects was not, however, supported.

No significant

differences emerged between the two groups in their behavioral blame
scores.
The concurrent association that Janoff-Bulman (1979) observed
between characterological blame and depressive symptomatology levels was
replicated by Major, Mueller, & Hildebrandt (1985) in their study of
abortion patients.

Women who engaged in more characterological blame
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prior to an abortion procedure exhibited higher levels of depressive
symptomatology immediately after the procedure.

Levels of behavioral

blame were not, however, significantly related to the severity of postprocedure depressive symptoms.

As a supplement to their cross-sectional

data, Major et al. obtained longitudinal data on depressive symptoms
from a subset of the women in their sample who attended a follow-up
visit three weeks after their abortion.

When pre-procedure levels of

depressive symptomatology were controlled, neither behavioral nor
characterological blame predicted the severity of depressed mood at the
three week follow-up.

Taken together, Janoff-Bulman's (1979, Study 1)

findings, and those reported by Majors et al. (1985), provide little
evidence for an etiological role of characterological blame in
depressive disorders.

Rather, they suggest that characterological blame

is a concomitant of depressive symptomatology.
The results of the present study suggest a different conclusion
about the etiological importance of characterological and behavioral
self-blame. Higher levels of both behavioral and characterological blame
for subjects' most upsetting uncontrollable interpersonal stressors were
associated with temporal increases in hopelessness expectancies as well
as depressive symptomatology (although the latter effects were only
marginally significant).

The findings pertaining to characterological

blame are consistent with Janoff-Bulman's (1979) expectation that
blaming negative events on uncontrollable aspects of the self will be
associated with maladaptive affective outcomes.

The effects of

behavioral blame, however, are at odds with Janoff-Bulman's claim that
blaming controllable factors for negative events protects individuals
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against the development of future helplessness expectancies and
elevations in depressed mood.
Because characterological blame was not statistically controlled
in the analyses involving behavioral blame, it is possible that the
relations found between behavioral blame and both hopelessness
expectancies and depressive symptoms were spurious.

That is, the

effects of behavioral blame might simply reflect the strong positive
association (r - .89) between behavioral and characterological blame for
uncontrollable interpersonal stressors.

To assess this possibility,

supplementary analyses of residual hopelessness and depression scores
were undertaken with controls for the main effect of characterological
blame and its interaction with levels of uncontrollable interpersonal
stress.

The interaction of behavioral blame and levels of

uncontrollable interpersonal stress was not predictive of residual
changes in either BHS (pr2 - .07, p « .46) or BDI for2 - .04, p *» .67)
scores in these analyses.
Several additional points are important to the interpretation of
these findings.

First, in both the hopelessness and depressive symptom

analyses, the Betas associated with the behavioral blame main effect (Bs
- .36 and .06 for BHS and BDI scores, respectively) and interaction
terms (Bs - .12 and .06 for BHS and BDI scores, respectively) remained
positive when characterological blame scores were controlled.

Thus, it

does not appear that characterological blame served to obscure an
otherwise negative association between behavioral blame and either
helplessness expectancies or depressive symptomatology (cf. JanoffBulman, 1979).

Second, when the behavioral blame main effect and
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interaction terms were used as a covariates in the analyses involving
characterological blame, the characterological blame X interpersonal
stress interaction no longer predicted changes in either hopelessness
expectancies for2 — .08, p - .40) or levels of depressive symptomatology
fpr2 - .06, p - .52) among subjects low in perceived control.
Thus, it was the variance shared by behavioral and
characterological blame that was responsible for the emergence of the
interaction effects involving both variables.

It may be that a more

general self-punitive component, which is tapped by both blame measures,
fosters hopelessness expectancies and depressive symptomatology in
response to uncontrollable interpersonal stressors.

Given the potential

etiological significance of self-blame suggested by the results of the
present study, it would seem a worthy pursuit to attempt to replicate
these findings as well as explicate the operative dimension underlying
measures of behavioral and characterological blame.
Study Limitations and Future Research Directions
The results of this research add to a growing body of evidence
suggesting that dysfunctional cognitive styles represent a risk factor
for the development of depressive symptomatology.

They also suggest

that the specific inferences individuals make about the uncontrollable
experiences they encounter moderate the severity of depressive reactions
elicited by those events.

The present findings, as well as those

obtained in related inquiries (e.g., Alloy & Clements, 1992; Metalsky &
Joiner, 1992; Metalsky et al., 1987, 1993), suggest an optimistic
outlook for the future verification of learned helplessness models of
depression.

However, such verification ultimately depends on how well
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the predictions advanced in these models fare when subjected to rigorous
examination in investigations that do not suffer from the methodological
shortcomings of this and similar studies.
In the present research, for example, depressive symptomatology
and life stressors were assessed within a three week period.

With such

a brief assessment period, its unlikely that many individuals will
experience the types of severe events that are most strongly associated
with the onset of depressive symptoms (Brown, 1981; Monroe & Simons,
1991),

Only 107 of the 226 participants in this study reported the

occurrence of highly stressful uncontrollable interpersonal events and
only 56 subjects reported the occurrence of equally uncontrollable
achievement stressors.

The loss of this many subjects greatly reduced

the power of the statistical analyses and, in turn, the strength of the
effects that emerged from those analyses.

The brevity of the study

period might have also caused the depressogenic effects of some
stressors to go undetected.

Those subjects who experienced a

significant stressor shortly before the final assessment session might
not have developed a recognizable cluster of depressive symptoms until
after the assessment (cf. Depue & Monroe, 1986).

"Classroom

methodologies," like those used by Metalsky et al. (1987, 1993), are
better able to provide the type of access to subjects that multiple
assessments and extended observation periods require, as are "daily
report methodologies" which require subjects to keep ongoing daily
records of life events and emotional experiences (cf. Vestre, 1984).
Methodologies such as these might also prove useful in reducing
the interpretive difficulties that arise when individuals
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retrospectively report life events that occurred over a certain time
period.

The subjects in the present study reported on the stressful

events they experienced over the three weeks since their initial
participation (see Alloy & Clements, 1992; Barnett & Gotlib, 1990, 1991
for examples of similar methodologies).

Such a procedure is vulnerable

to a number of reporting biases that can obscure true temporal relations
between depressive symptoms and life stress.

Higher levels of

depressive symptomatology at T2 (i.e., when subjects completed the life
event measures), for instance, might have contributed to the selective
recall of negative life experiences, inflated perceptions of the
stressfulness (or uncontrollability) of those events, and/or more
negativistic inferences about those events (Depue & Monroe, 1986; Monroe
& Simons, 1991).

Moreover, these distortions might have been

particularly likely to occur among relatively depressed subjects who
also possessed higher levels of dysfunctional cognition (Monroe &
Simons, 1990).
It is also possible that higher levels of depressive
symptomatology, which arose after the first assessment session from
factors other than life stress, contributed to the actual occurrence of
highly upsetting experiences during the three week interim period.
Hammen (1991, p.555) has recently argued that "at least some subsets of
depressed people are exposed to considerable stress by virtue of their
condition and their characteristics and behaviors and that to some
degree, depressed persons generate the stressors that befall them."

She

went on to demonstrate that clinically depressed women experienced more
"behavior-dependent" stressors and more interpersonal stressors
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(especially those involving conflicts with others) over a six month
period than did psychiatric, medically ill, and normal female controls.
Although the depressed women in Hammen's (1991) research reported higher
levels of overall stress, they did not experience more "behaviorindependent" events than their nondepressed counterparts.
Monroe and Simons (1991) have likewise suggested that individuals
who are vulnerable to depression (e.g., those who possess maladaptive
cognitive styles) may create stress as a result of either a
dysfunctional interactional style and/or chronic, low-level affective
symptomatology. They make the frequently overlooked point that
... stress is not a random process, but part of a developmental
sequence systematically influenced by the diathesis. Whereas the
construct of stress may still play an important role in the
evolving scheme, it is generated to a considerable degree by the
person's behavior, which in turn is likely to be influenced by the
diathesis (p. 411).
Individuals who believe, for example, that they are worthy only to the
extent that they are loved or regarded highly by others may behave in
excessively needy and dependent ways toward others.

Such behavior may,

in turn, ultimately lead to the very types of conflicted relationships
and rejection experiences that they feared originally.

For those whose

esteem is mastery-based, self-imposed achievement pressures may
debilitate performance to the point of failure, again leading to the
very outcomes those individuals sought to avoid.
With respect to the present research, the reporting of selfgenerated stressors by relatively depressed subjects and/or cognitively
vulnerable subjects might have artifactually inflated the strength of
stress-depression associations among those scoring the highest on
various measures of maladaptive cognitive styles.
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This set of

circumstances would lead to the false conclusion that stress played an
etiological role in the onset of depressive symptoms among those who
possess cognitive diatheses.

It is difficult to unequivocally establish

the cause and effect sequencing of life stress and depressive symptoms
in two-wave panel designs that rely on retrospective reports of negative
life experiences.

The use of Tl depression level as a covariate in the

analysis of panel data only removes the effects of initial symptom
severity from T2 reports of life stress and depressive symptomatology.
It makes no adjustment for the effects of either maladaptive cognitive
styles or interim changes in symptom severity on T2 reports of life
stress.

Panel designs, such as the present one, would be better able to

disentangle the complex relations among vulnerability factors, life
stress, and depressive symptoms if precise datings of event occurrences
and symptom changes were obtained (cf. Brown, 1981; Depue & Monroe,
1986).
The use of a "respondent-based" approach to the measurement of
life stress might have also contributed to a number of interpretive
problems.

In contrast to an "investigator-based" assessment method in

which details about the occurrence and context of negative life events
are systematically collected by trained interviewers, respondent-based
questionnaire methods rely solely on the subject for information about
life stress (Brown, 1981).

The responsibility for resolving issues such

as what constitutes a stressful event, what distinguishes interpersonal
stressors from achievement stressors, or whether or not a particular
occurrence qualifies for a given event category (e.g., "received a low
grade on a course examination") falls primarily on the subject.
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In

addition, judgments regarding the stressfulness or severity of life
events are made exclusively by subjects.
Respondent-driven/questionnaire-based methods of measuring stress
have been harshly criticized, and their use discouraged by a number of
life stress researchers.

Brown (1981), Dohrenwend, Dohrenwend, Dodson,

and Shrout (1984), and Monroe and Simons (1991), for example, each
describe numerous reporting biases that threaten the reliability and
validity of such assessment instruments.

Relatively depressed

individuals, or those who possess highly dysfunctional attitudes, might
have a lower threshold for life stress, and thus perceive relatively
minor events as extremely stressful or upsetting.

In addition, although

efforts were made to ensure that the stressors included on the event
checklists did not reflect symptoms of disorder (e.g., change in eating
habits), It is possible that this goal was not fully realized.

Subjects

were free to write In other negative events that they experienced during
the relevant time period and then to choose one of those events as their
most upsetting stressor.

The events that subjects supplied were not

evaluated to determine whether they represented aspects of disorder.
These potential distortions and inaccuracies increase the difficulty of
disentangling stress from diathesis and disorder so that the appropriate
causal ordering of these factors can be established.
Furthermore, despite explicit instructions about the reference
period from which they were to report life stressors

(i.e., the 3 weeks

since their initial participation), subjects might have reported on
events that occurred before that time period if those events were
particularly salient.

Alternatively, they might have reported chronic
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stressors that began in the more distant past but were still present at
the time of assessment (e.g., interpersonal difficulties with
roommates). No effort was made to distinguish chronic stressors from
more acute or discrete occurrences, despite the fact that these two
classes of events are likely to bear different relations to the
development and maintenance of depressive symptomatology (Depue &
Monroe, 1986; Monroe & Simons, 1991).

In addition, the lists of events

provided to subjects were primarily comprised of minor stressors.

More

severe or traumatic events (e.g., severe physical illness) were not
included because they have low base rates of occurrence in student
populations and would have been unlikely to occur within the time frame
of this research.

Although acute, major stressors are likely to play a

larger role In the etiology of depressive symptomatology than are minor
events (Brown, 1981), their assessment in a prospective study would have
required following subjects over a much longer time period.

The

inadequate assessment of major life events probably contributed to the
relative weakness of the effects obtained in this research.
For these and other reasons, investigator-based methods of stress
assessment, such as the contextual threat interview developed by Brown
and Harris (1978), have become more common in investigations of stressdisorder relationships (e.g., Hammen, Mayol, deMayo, & Marks, 1986;
Hammen, 1991).

Using an event checklist as a guide, contextual threat

interviewers query respondents about the occurrence of life stressors
over a prespecified time period.

For each event reported, respondents

are asked to pinpoint as precisely as possible the date on which the
event occurred.

When needed, probes are used by the trained
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interviewers to ensure the accurate dating of events. Detailed
information is also collected about such things as the circumstances
surrounding the event's occurrence, the respondent's previous
experiences with event, and the adequacy of his/her resources (e.g.,
social support) for dealing with the event and its consequences.
Interviewers subsequently prepare narrative reports of the details of
each event and the context in which it occurred, omitting all
information about the respondent's emotional reactions to the event.
Independent judges then use explicit criteria to rate the level of
threat associated with each event.

This procedure yields data,

uninfluenced by reporting inaccuracies and distortions, regarding the
degree of stress to which an individual has been exposed.

Combined with

information about changes in depressive symptom levels and the timing of
those changes, the contextual threat method enables investigators to
better determine whether elevations in symptomatology antedate or follow
life stress.

Other approaches, such as the study of Individuals

presently experiencing high levels of stress (e.g., postpartum women,
Cutrona, 1983; abortion patients, Majors et al., 1985; individuals with
chronic or recurrent medical illnesses, McEvoy DeVellis & Blalock,
1992) , also avoid the problems of respondent-based methods of stress
assessment, and are becoming more common in investigations concerned
with the psychopathological sequelae of life stress.

The fact that

theoretical predictions of the learned helplessness models of depression
received partial support in this study despite the shortcomings
associated with the assessment of life stress, suggests that the expense
entailed in these more sophisticated approaches is warranted.
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Problems associated with the operationalization and assessment of
maladaptive cognitive styles might have also served to weaken the
findings of this research.

Measures of dysfunctional attitudes,

irrational ideas, and overgeneralization were used to assess the
cognitive styles included in hopelessness theory's expanded diathesis
component.

Although Abramson et al. (1989, p. 362) likened those

cognitive styles (tendencies to exaggerate the adverse consequences of
negative life events and to infer personal deficiencies when negative
life events occur) to the notions of dysfunctional attitudes and
irrational ideas, the overlap between these concepts is not complete.
It is possible that stronger diathesis-stress effects and/or cognitive
style-event cognition relations would have emerged if more direct
measures of these cognitive styles had been used.
Metalsky and Joiner (1992), for example, used the Cognitive Style
Questionnaire (CSQ; Abramson & Metalsky, 1986) to measure generalized
tendencies to infer negative consequences and personal deficiencies in
response to life stress.

The CSQ asks subjects to imagine that they

experienced each of 12 hypothetical negative events (the same events
used on the EASQ), and then rate a.) the likelihood that the event will
result in other bad occurrences, and b.) the degree to which the event
implies some personal flaw(s).

Metalsky and Joiner (1992) found that

scores on both measures interacted with the number of negative life
events subjects experienced over a five week period to predict residual
increases in depressive symptomatology.

The stress X negative

consequences interaction accounted for seven percent of the variance in
residualized depression scores and the stress X personal deficiency
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interaction explained four percent of the variance in symptom changes.
Only the latter interaction term predicted changes in hopelessness
expectancies, however, and this effect was independent of (i.e., did not
mediate) the interactive effects of stress and generalized personal
deficiency inferences on changes in depressive symptomatology.

Thus,

Metalsky and Joiner's (1992) direct assessments of the proposed
dysfunctional cognitive styles yielded somewhat stronger, but by no
means complete, support for hopelessness theory's diathesis-stress and
hopelessness mediation predictions.
With respect to the present study, it is also noteworthy that
none of the cognitive style X stress interactions effects were uniquely
predictive of increases in depressive symptomatology when assessed
simultaneously in the same regression analysis (see Metalsky & Joiner,
1992 for a similar result). This finding might simply reflect "shared
method variance," in that each measure was administered in the same
format during the same assessment session.

Alternatively, it might be

that the cognitive style measures used in this research assess different
aspects of the same construct rather than independent constructs.

The

results of a factor analysis of the Attributional Style (Interpersonal
Domain), Overgeneralization, Dysfunctional Attitudes, and Irrational
Ideas scores obtained by subjects who perceived interpersonal stressors
as uncontrollable provided preliminary evidence for the latter
speculation.

Only one factor, accounting for 59% of the score variance,

emerged from that analysis (an identical result was obtained when
cognitive style data from the full sample was factor analyzed).
If these results are upheld in subsequent investigations, an
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important objective for future research would be to specify more
explicitly the nature of this general diathesis.

For example, the

common vulnerability factor being tapped by the different cognitive
style measures used in this study might partially overlap with the
constellation of traits believed to characterize the depressive
personality.

The depressive personality encompasses such traits as

quiet, introverted, passive, and nonassertive; gloomy, pessimistic,
serious, and incapable of fun; self-critical, self-reproaching, and
self-derogatory; skeptical, hypercritical, and hard to please;
conscientious, responsible, and self-disciplined; brooding and given to
worry; preoccupied with negative events, feelings of inadequacy, and
personal shortcomings (Akiskal, 1983).
Research by Klein (1990) has shown that psychiatric outpatients
who met the criteria for depressive personality scored higher on
measures of attributional style, dysfunctional attitudes, selfcriticism, introversion, and self-constraint.

Klein (1990) did not

report the correlations between scores on these measures and the
depressive personality index, nor did he perform a factor analysis to
determine whether the set of personality and cognitive style scales
converge onto a unitary dimension.

The results of his research

nevertheless suggest that the depressive personality may serve as a
useful framework for integrating research on maladaptive cognitive
styles and other personality variables that appear to predispose
individuals to the development of depressive symptomatology.
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END NOTES
1 Abramson et al. (1978) were inconsistent in their discussion of the
role that causal attributions play in the onset and nature of learned
helplessness. They sometimes suggested that internal, stable, and
global attributions for uncontrollable negative outcomes were necessary
for both the onset and the nature (i.e., chronicity and generality) of
future uncontrollability expectations. For example, Abramson et al.
(1978) state that,
The old model [Seligman, 1975], however, was vague in specifying
the conditions under which a perception that events are
noncontingent (past or present oriented) was transformed into an
expectation that events will be noncontingent (future oriented).
Our reformulation regards the attribution the individual makes for
noncontingency between his acts and outcomes in the here and now as
a determinant of his subsequent expectations of future
noncontingency. These expectations, in turn, determine the
generality, chronicity, and type of his helplessness symptoms (p.
52).
At other times, however, Abramson et al. (1978) implied that the
perception of negative events as uncontrollable was sufficient for the
onset of future uncontrollability expectations and causal attributions
determined only the nature of that expectation and thus the nature of
helplessness deficits. These suggestions are illustrated in the
following quote, "In general, the properties of the attribution predict
in what new situations and across what span of time the expectation of
helplessness will be likely to recur" (p. 59).
Abramson et al. (1988b) acknowledged this source of confusion in
the reformulated model. In an attempt to provide clarification, they
offered the following comments,
The 1978 statement of the hopelessness theory of depression was
unclear about whether or not certain events (i.e., causal
attributions) in the hypothesized causal chain contributed to the
onset of depressive symptoms as well as to their chronicity and
generality or only to their chronicity and generality. We believe
that the underlying logic of the 1978 statement suggests that the
causal events in question contribute to the onset, chronicity, and
generality of depressive symptoms, and present the theory
accordingly. Consistent with our interpretation of the underlying
logic of the 1978 statement, Seligman, Abramson, Semmel, and von
Baeyer (1979) wrote, 'According to the reformulated hypothesis, a
certain attributional style, when combined with bad outcomes,
causes depression' (p. 247).
Unfortunately, these comments leave a logical problem unresolved. If a
particular pattern of causal attributions is necessary for symptom
onset, there can be no symptom variability. That is, if future
uncontrollability expectations develop only when noncontingent outcomes
are attributed to internal, stable, and global causes, it would follow
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that all cases of learned helplessness or depression would be chronic,
highly generalized, and would involve self-esteem loss. It is thus
logically inconsistent to postulate that causal attributions serve the
dual roles of bringing about future uncontrollability expectations and
shaping the nature of those expectations.
2 The decision to include Levenson's (1981) Multidimensional Locus of
Control Scale in this research was made subsequent to the start of the
study. As a result, data on this measurewere obtained for only 228 of
the 247 Time 1 participants.
3 Metalsky et al. (1987) created an "exam stress" variable by taking
the difference between subjects' midterm grade aspirations and their
actual exam grade. They then used the multiplicative product of exam
stress and scores on the Importance subscale of the EASQ (Achievement
Domain) in conjunction with EASQ-Generality scores (Achievement Domain)
to predict change in depressive symptoms among the students in their
sample. To the extent that Metalsky et al.'s stress variable includes
an element of dysfunctional cognition, the precise meaning of the
diathesis-stress interaction term that they created is unclear. Given
this problem, combined with the fact that the weighted approach used by
Metalsky et al. was abandoned in a subsequent "classroom study"
conducted by this group (Metalsky et al., 1993), event stress in the
present study was weighted by the perceived importance
of those events
rather than by EASQ importance,
4 The assumption of homogeneity of variance-covariance matrices was
evaluated prior to performing all multivariate analyses of variance
reported in this research. No violations of this assumption were
revealed.
5 All multivariate significance tests were based on Wilks' criterion.
6 When a MANOVA is performed on a set of correlated measures, it is
inappropriate to interpret the results of univariate ANOVAs performed on
the individual measures following a significant multivariate effect. A
significant univariate effect might emerge for a given measure, not
because that measure is necessarily related to the independent variable,
but because it shares variance with another measure that is affected by
the independent variable. Moreover, the univariate F's associated with
correlated measures are not independent and the alpha levels for those
tests can not easily be adjusted to control overall error rates
(Tabachnick and Fidell, 1989).
Stepdown analysis is the appropriate strategy for evaluating the
significance of correlated measures following a significant MANOVA. As
described by Tabachnick and Fidell (1989, pp. 400-401), stepdown
analysis is similar to hierarchical regression. Each measure is first
prioritized in order of its importance to the independent variable.
The significance of the highest-priority measure is then assessed in a
univariate ANOVA. Each remaining measure is tested in an ANCOVA with
higher priority measures serving as covarlates. The alpha levels for
the individual tests are adjusted using a Bonferonni procedure to
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control the overall (familywise or experimentwlse) error rate.
Stepdown analysis is a conservative strategy and its use here was
somewhat problematical because at times there was no clear ordering of
the individual measures (see Tabachnick & Fidell, 1984, p. 402 for a
discussion of this problem). An effort was made, however, to impose the
most meaningful order on the measures within each set. To the extent
that this goal was not realized, caution must be used when interpreting
the results of each stepdown analysis.
^ The homogeneity of regression assumption was evaluated prior to
conducting all MANCOVAs. Unless otherwise indicated, the assumption was
met in all cases.
8 A significant subject gender X T1RSES interaction indicated a
violation of the homogeneity of regression assumption. The results of
this analysis should be interpreted with caution.
9 Data from only those subjects whose negative achievement or
interpersonal events occurred within the three weeks prior to the second
assessment session were used in these and all other analyses.
10 It might be argued that the subset of interpersonal stressors that
were perceived as uncontrollable differed from those that were perceived
as controllable on some other important dimension besides
controllability, and that those other differences contributed to the
cognitive style X stress regression results. For example, if
uncontrollable stressors were also perceived as more stressful or more
likely to result in negative consequences, that might account for the
fact that significant diathesis-stress interaction effects were obtained
only among subjects who experienced uncontrollable interpersonal
stressors. To examine whether this was the case, I compared the stress
and cognition ratings provided by the 107 subjects who perceived their
most upsetting interpersonal stressor as relatively uncontrollable with
those of the 111 subjects who perceived their most upsetting
interpersonal stressor as relatively controllable. Controllable and
uncontrollable interpersonal stressors did not differ In perceived
stressfulness (j> - .81), attributional generality (2 - .27) or
anticipated negative consequences (2 " .53). As might be expected,
attributional intemality, perceived personal deficiencies, behavioral
blame, and characterological blame ratings were higher for controllable
versus uncontrollable interpersonal stressors (all 2 s < .0001).
Additional comparisons revealed that subjects who perceived their most
upsetting interpersonal stressor as relatively uncontrollable were no
more depressed at Tl than were their counterparts (2 ~ .99), nor did the
former report the occurrence of more stressful life events in the Tl to
T2 interim (2 " .81). Thus, it does not appear that perceptions of
control were confounded with another dimension that could also account
for the diathesis-stress results obtained in this research.
11 It might be argued that this effect occurred simply because the
attributional composite was comprised in part of scores on the
internality dimension. To test this hypothesis, an additional analysis
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was performed on T2 RSES scores after removing the internality dimension
from the attributional composite. Although the interaction from this
analysis was nonsignificant (e - .69), the corresponding regression
coefficient was positive (b - .004), suggesting a pattern of results
similar in form to that found for the interaction of interpersonal
stress and scores on the internal, stable, and global composite.
A similar finding was obtained when the same analysis was
performed separately for subjects who perceived interpersonal stressors
as controllable. That is, a positive regression coefficient (b - .02)
was obtained for the marginally significant (e - .16) interaction of
interpersonal stress and composite stability/globality scores. These
findings run counter to the argument that the internality dimension was
solely responsible for the form of the interpersonal stress X internal,
stable, and global attributional composite interaction.
12 No mention is made of personal deficiency inferences or negative
consequence expectancies in Alloy et al.'s (1990) discussion of the
proximal contributory causes of hopelessness expectancies. Although
their etiological status in the "helplessness-hopelessness theory of
anxiety and depression" is unclear, researchers testing hopelessness
theory (Metalsky & Joiner, 1992) have continued to measure both types of
event-based cognitions even after the 1990 publication Alloy et al.'s
model. Thus, it seems appropriate to infer that the hypotheses
regarding personal deficiency inferences and negative consequence
expectancies outlined in Abramson et al.'s (1989) original model are
still valid.
13 Alloy et al. (1990) likewise make no mention of the predisposing
effects of tendencies to infer personal deficiencies or expect negative
consequences when negative life events occur. As hopelessness theorists
(Metalsky fit Joiner, 1992) have also continued to assess these constructs
in empirical investigations, it would appear that the original
hypotheses remain valid.
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